US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2217

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002217 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR GREEN 
LONDON FOR BELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PTER, PINS, NP, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: ICJ GENERAL SECRETARY UNDERSCORES CONTINUED 
DIFFICULTIES IN NEPAL 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2185 
     B. KATHMANDU 2145 
     C. KATHMANDU 2123 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (C) In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, Nicholas 
Howen, International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), stressed 
the importance of protecting human rights in what could 
potentially become an increasingly repressive environment in 
Nepal.  The Ambassador and Howen discussed possibilities of 
prolonging the Maoists' three-month unilateral ceasefire, 
agreeing that the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) would be the best monitoring body if the 
international community could convince the Maoists to sign a 
Human Rights Code of Conduct.  Howen commended the Ambassador 
for his recent strong stance against provisions within His 
Majesty's Government of Nepal's (HMGN) draft NGO Code of 
Conduct.  Howen noted that the only good news coming out of 
Nepal was an increasingly independent judiciary, which the 
ICJ hoped to support in its efforts to improve rule of law 
and the ability to prosecute cases to the fullest extent. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
THE KING AND THE PARTIES:  WILL THE WEDDING EVER TAKE PLACE? 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
2. (C) In their September 30 meeting, the Ambassador informed 
Nicholas Howen, ICJ General Secretary, that, since February 
1, the USG had encouraged the King to release detainees, 
reach out to the parties, and restore civil liberties.  While 
the Palace had addressed the first and third recommendations, 
the second was the "toughest," the Ambassador stated, as it 
required a decision to step back from power.  Between the 
King's expansion of the Cabinet in late July and his 
conviction of former Prime Minister Deuba on what many 
believed to be politically-motivated corruption charges, it 
appeared that the King had no intention of reaching out to 
the Parties.  Vice Chairman Giri's latest comments regarding 
the Constitution as an obstacle to the Palace's post-February 
1 goals further indicated the King's lack of interest in 
collaborating with the political parties (ref C).  While 
there was a great deal of bravado among the top leadership of 
the parties, the Ambassador commented, it was clear they were 
scared of the Maoists.  Despite the fact that Parties 
remained skeptical of Maoist intentions, they might "hop into 
bed with the Maoists," Howen and the Ambassador agreed.  The 
Maoists' unilateral ceasefire remained "mixed," as the 
Maoists had not allowed the parties into the villages as 
promised, and abductions and extortion had actually 
increased.  The Ambassador noted that the biggest victors 
from February 1 were the Maoists, as they had gained the most 
and the RNA was weaker today than before the royal takeover. 
 
ICJ'S CONCERNS:  PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROLONGING THE 
CEASEFIRE 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
3. (C) Howen stated that the ICJ had two primary concerns in 
Nepal.  The first was human rights-related, namely how to 
ensure people would be protected within an increasingly 
repressive political milieu.  Howen commented that we had to 
learn our lessons from February 1 and be prepared for a 
situation in which increasing numbers of people might seek 
asylum.  Howen revealed that he had discussed with Ian 
Martin, the OHCHR Resident Representative, the role Embassies 
might play in such a scenario.  Communities at risk, such as 
representatives of human rights organizations and political 
parties, were already self-identified, Howen noted, and were 
looking to the United Nations and the diplomatic community 
for what help they might offer if Nepal had another 
repressive state of emergency similar to the situation after 
the February 1 royal takeover.  Howen cautioned that the 
Embassy, along with the rest of Nepal's diplomatic community, 
should prepare for a "February-style crackdown" and the 
various scenarios (such as demonstrations, mass arrests, 
etc.) that could potentially follow. 
 
4. (C) Another issue of great importance to the ICJ, Howen 
stressed, was how to make the Palace reciprocate the Maoists' 
unilateral ceasefire and make it long-term.  He noted that 
perhaps the Maoists could be convinced to sign a Human Rights 
Code of Conduct to show their sincerity; OHCHR could then 
monitor it.  The Ambassador noted that MK Nepal, leader of 
the United Marxist-Leninist (UML) Party, had advocated that 
the Maoists agree to such a code of conduct, which would 
allow political parties and civil society back into the 
villages.  Signing a code of conduct would allow the Maoists 
to show that they were taking political initiative, which in 
turn might push the King to respond.  The Ambassador stated 
that Nepalese were still "scared to death" to report Maoist 
atrocities, citing the September 28 briefing by the Nepal 
Human Rights Commission in which reports of disappearances by 
government security forces outnumbered abductions by the 
Maoists (ref A).  This argued that an OHCHR presence on the 
ground would be a better monitoring mechanism. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador revealed that there was a proposal to 
ask the King to respond to the Maoists' unilateral ceasefire 
and request the United Nations to monitor such a ceasefire 
(ref B).  It would be great if this could happen, he 
continued, but it was unlikely that the King would respond. 
Moreover, the Maoists were unlikely to respond.  They were 
unpopular in much of the country; giving up violence would 
therefore erode their influence in the countryside. 
 
DRAFT NGO CODE OF CONDUCT 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Howen commended the Ambassador for his strong stance 
regarding HMGN's draft Code of Conduct for nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs).  The head of the SWC, the Ambassador 
replied, had assured the Embassy already that agreements 
between governments and donors would take precedence and the 
SWC would not attempt to override them.  The Embassy had also 
strongly disagreed with the secrecy clauses in the Code of 
Conduct. 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Perhaps the only good news coming out of Nepal these 
days, Howen asserted, was the increasing independence of the 
Supreme Court and its willingness to stand up to the 
government.  The Supreme Court, in the last six months, had 
shown it was becoming stronger, and this was filtering down 
to the appellate courts.  Howen told the Ambassador that the 
ICJ had encouraged the Chief Justice to take two of the 
strongest re-arrest cases and "follow them through to the 
end."  This would be the "next step" in the independence of 
the judiciary, Howen stressed.  Another challenge, the 
Ambassador underscored, was how to enable the courts to try 
the Maoists. 
 
8. (C) Howen explained that the ICJ planned to bring a senior 
human rights lawyer to Nepal to work with lawyers in the 
districts in order to help improve the broader rule of law 
context of the re-arrest issue.  The ICJ was also interested 
in conducting more research on the Maoists' parallel justice 
system in order to better understand the Maoist courts and 
their excesses. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) Given the government's lack of action to bridge its 
differences with the Parties, Post agrees with Howen's 
assessment that we should consider the worst case scenarios. 
Ground reality calls for the international community to 
consider how to handle asylum and refugee seekers should the 
situation worsen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORIARTY