US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT4338

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 004338 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EFIN, EAID, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: IRAQ SPECIAL ADVISER JEFFREY MEETS WITH GOK 
OFFICIALS ON IRAQ SUPPORT, OCTOBER 5, 2005 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary. On October 5, Senior Adviser on Iraq Jeffrey 
and his delegation met separately with the Speaker of the 
Kuwaiti National Assembly and the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Finance and Interior (also Deputy PM) to reaffirm 
the USG's long-term commitment to Iraq and to urge greater 
Arab support for the Iraqi government.  Ambassador Jeffrey 
was critical of Arab disassociation with the Iraqi political 
process and urged increased GOK effort in Iraq and with Arab 
neighbors to ensure greater political inclusion of all Iraqi 
groups, particularly Sunnis.  He cautioned against the 
long-term risks to Arab states of inaction in Iraq.  He urged 
tangible public support for the Iraqi government, including 
diplomatic representation, commitment to debt relief, and 
pressure on Syria and Iran to abandon their destabilizing 
policies.  The GOK officials reaffirmed their country's 
long-standing commitment to political and economic progress 
in Iraq, acknowledged the urgency of greater Arab involvement 
in the political process, encouraged increased USG dialogue 
with Syria and Iran to curb their actions, cautioned against 
an premature U.S. withdrawal, remained eager to offer project 
aid but cautious on debt relief and welcomed increased 
cooperation and dialogue with Iraqi counterparts. 
 
2. (C)  The longest and most substantive meeting was with the 
Foreign Minister, who had just met with the Iraqi Assembly 
Speaker and who had returned the day before from meetings in 
Jeddah with other Arab Foreign Ministers.  Dr. Mohammed was 
clear that the Arabs had not done enough to support Iraq and 
at the meeting in Jeddah had decided on the need to do more, 
particularly in the run-up to the vote on the constitution. 
(End Summary) 
 
 
Meeting with Foreign Minister 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  In his meeting with Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. 
Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, Ambassador Jeffrey 
expressed USG appreciation for Kuwait's continued support for 
Iraq, noting that while GOK's efforts were a model for other 
Arab states, the region as a whole had to do more to help 
reinforce the legitimacy and success of Iraq's political 
process.   Ambassador Jeffrey underscored the USG's steadfast 
commitment to Iraq's success despite the risks and costs 
associated with such a long-term endeavor.  He cautioned that 
Arab states could no longer afford to disassociate themselves 
from the broader international effort to stabilize Iraq, 
explaining that continued inaction by some, and interference 
by others, most notably Syria, could easily aggravate 
divisions in Iraq and lead to regional instability. 
 
4. (C) Praising Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal's call 
for greater Arab involvement in Iraq, Dr. Mohammed expressed 
hope that there would be renewed progress along these lines 
in the near future. He said the October 3 meeting in Jeddah 
of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's neighbors recognized that 
the Arabs had not done enough to support political evolution 
in Iraq.  One result was appointment of Arab League (AL) 
Secretary General, Amre Moussa, as an interlocutor with Iraq, 
 
SIPDIS 
particularly within the context of the constitutional 
process. Shaykh Mohammed called for urgent Arab engagement in 
the constitutional process prior to the October 15 
referendum, but shared U.S. disappointment that Amre Moussa 
was reluctant to travel to Iraq until after the referendum, 
and had decided to send a preparatory team.  The Foreign 
Minister commented that Moussa considered the referendum to 
be an American-driven process and therefore did not want to 
"risk his political life" by being directly involved. 
Ambassador Jeffrey expressed USG support for coordination 
with the Arab League on its initiative, but voiced 
disappointment at Moussa's hesitancy, stating that further 
delays would undermine the effectiveness of the mission. 
 
5. (C) Expressing concern about increased sectarian violence 
in Iraq, Shaykh Mohammed reaffirmed Ambassador Jeffrey's call 
for increasing contacts with Sunni groups, commenting that 
ties with Sunnis were urgently needed to reinforce Kuwait's 
already well-established ties with Shia and Kurds, groups 
historically opposed to Saddam's Baathist regime.  The 
Foreign Minister said that he underscored the importance of 
political inclusivity during his meetings with the visiting 
Iraqi Speaker of Parliament and urged the Iraqi 
representative to bridge differences in the run-up to the 
constitutional referendum. (Note: The Foreign Minister met 
with the Speaker immediately before meeting with Ambassador 
Jeffrey.) 
6.  (C) Ambassador Jeffrey voiced USG concerns with Syria's 
destabilizing policies in Iraq and urged the GOK to engage 
with Syria to modify its behavior.  The Foreign Minister 
acknowledged the importance of curbing foreign interference 
in Iraq, but expressed uncertainty about Syria's direct 
involvement in the country's internal affairs, stating that 
"Iran is the key problem" and that cities like Basra had now 
become "more conservative than Qom."  He added that these 
transformations were prompting Kuwait to become more engaged, 
particularly in southern Iraq. 
 
7.  (C) Ambassador Jeffrey asserted that the U.S. goal, as 
enshrined in the UN Security Council Resolution, was to help 
ensure a united, pluralistic, democratic and federal Iraq at 
peace with its neighbors, capable of securing its borders and 
a respected member of the community of Arab states. 
Ambassador Jeffrey explained that the U.S. sought greater 
political involvement by all Iraqi groups, particularly the 
under-represented Sunnis, to ensure the viability of the 
country's political process.  He urged Kuwait to extend its 
contacts to under-represented elements and to encourage its 
Arab counterparts to do the same.  He noted that outreach by 
Kuwait and other Arab states could encourage Sunnis and other 
groups to moderate their behavior and seek political 
compromise. 
 
8.  (C) The Foreign Minister commented that the notions of 
democracy, unity, pluralism, and federalism were "wonderful 
phrases and not just words," but cautioned about "pursuing 
them too literally," referring to the lengthy U.S. historical 
experience in achieving such political milestones.  He 
advised that Iraq's political evolution should not be 
dictated by a political timetable, suggesting that the 
country's political process should drive timelines, and not 
vice versa.  He noted that the issue of separating "church 
and state" takes time, and added that while "Kuwait stands to 
benefit the most" from such political milestones, the 
Kuwaitis, while hopeful, were practical realists when it came 
to Iraq's political evolution.  He advised that the U.S. not 
deem its mission a failure if such political milestones are 
not accomplished, stating that success will require a 
long-term presence, which Kuwait welcomes, and not a hasty 
exit strategy as some fear the U.S. is likely to pursue. 
Ambassador Jeffrey reaffirmed the USG commitment to these 
milestones and to the long-term mission in Iraq. 
 
9. (C) CENTCOM Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt explained that 
the U.S. recognized and was committed to a long-term mission 
in Iraq, stating that U.S. forces would remain for as long as 
necessary to accomplish the task at hand.  He clarified that 
the U.S. strategy in Iraq is not driven by timelines and is a 
consultative process with the Government of Iraq to ensure 
the highest probabilities of success.  He added that the 
strategy is gradual and conditions-based, determined by four 
key criteria:  (1) the strength of the insurgency in a given 
region; (2) the Iraqi security forces' capability to counter 
the insurgency; (3) the scope and scale of governance in a 
region; and (4) the Coalition's ability to provide in 
extremis support to government forces. 
 
10. (C) BG Kimmitt pointed out that the gradual hand-over of 
security responsibility based on these criteria had already 
taken place in parts of Baghdad and in parts of northern and 
southern areas, but that complete withdrawal of U.S. forces 
would not occur in the near future.  Shaykh Mohammed welcomed 
the U.S. long-term commitment, but urged the U.S. to consider 
"the most important handover of all," and transfer Saddam 
Hussein to the Iraqi government and people.  BG Kimmitt 
explained that Saddam's legal status already placed him in 
the custody of the Iraqi government, including its legal 
jurisdiction, and that the U.S. role was limited to detention 
assistance at the request of the Iraqi government.  Dr. 
Mohammed sought confirmation on the trial date, noting that 
it would send a profound message to Saddam's supporters and 
opponents. 
 
11. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey urged the Foreign Minister to 
nominate an ambassador to Iraq, even if non-resident, as part 
of an Arab gesture of diplomatic support for and confidence 
in the Iraqi government.  He encouraged greater bilateral 
exchanges between Kuwait and Iraq and offered USG assistance 
in identifying a secure location in the Green Zone for a 
Kuwaiti Embassy.  He urged greater risk-taking on the part of 
the Arab states, explaining that inaction was detrimental to 
the entire political process. Shaykh Mohammed reaffirmed his 
country's commitment to Iraq's success, agreeing that more 
had to be done and asserting that Kuwait has been "very eager 
from the outset to get Iraq back into the Arab fold" despite 
continued reluctance and antagonism by some Arab states, 
"some of whom want to see you fail." 
 
12. (C) The Foreign Minister disagreed with the urgency of 
establishing a diplomatic presence, stating that the "issue 
is not Embassies at this stage," commenting that embassies 
would be useless as long as the Arab media continues to 
portray the insurgents as martyrs and the Coalition as an 
occupying power.  He urged greater pressure by the USG on 
Arab states, notably Qatar and Jordan, to rein in their 
respective state media outlets to abandon the pro-insurgency 
rhetoric, explaining that while "you cannot force Arab 
countries to send their boys to Iraq" the U.S. can pressure 
Arab states to take action against their respective medias. 
 
 
Meeting with National Assembly Speaker 
-------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C)  In his meeting with National Assembly Speaker Jassem 
Al-Khorafy, Ambassador Jeffrey praised Kuwait's support for 
Iraq, and the important role of Kuwait's Parliament in this 
effort (Note: The National Assembly Speaker ranks third in 
the protocol order after the Amir and Crown Prince of 
Kuwait.)  He urged greater regional involvement in Iraq's 
political process, suggesting that a number of outstanding 
political problems, most notably the inclusion of Sunnis in 
the political process, continued to undermine the chances of 
political success.  He called for greater expressions of 
solidarity by Iraq's Arab neighbors and underscored the USG 
commitment to Iraq's long-term success despite the risks 
associated with the mission. 
 
14. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey pointed out that while the USG was 
fully committed to pluralism, democracy, unity and federalism 
in Iraq, Arab states and groups within Iraq remained 
partially committed to these important political milestones. 
Ambassador Jeffrey called on Kuwait officials to emphasize 
these themes in discussions with Arab counterparts and work 
to pressure Syria to abandon its destabilizing policies. 
Brigadier General Michael D. Jones from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff assured the Speaker of the long-term U.S. commitment to 
the military mission in Iraq and clarified that the U.S. 
strategy for drawing down troops was conditions-based and not 
driven by timelines, outlining the key criteria involved on 
handing over security to Iraqi forces. 
 
15. (C) Al-Khorafy voiced concern with Iraq's instability and 
the heightened probabilities of civil war.  He reaffirmed 
Kuwait's support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, pointing out that 
"Kuwait is the only (Arab) country" that supported the U.S. 
entry into Iraq.  He added that U.S. efforts in Iraq were "a 
step in the right direction," but that past mistakes made by 
the U.S. would take time to remedy.  He noted that the U.S. 
appeared more cognizant of its mistakes and the need to 
remedy them urgently.  He cautioned against sending signals, 
particularly to domestic U.S. audiences, of an early 
withdrawal, noting that messages intended for domestic 
consumption resonate as widely, if not more, with an 
international audience.  He urged the U.S. to enhance its 
"targeted public relations" efforts to reassert its long-term 
commitment to Iraq.  He praised recent public statements by 
President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair reaffirming the 
long-term U.S. and UK commitments to Iraq. 
 
16. (C) The Speaker commented that "there are some 
(countries) trying to irritate you through Iraq," and advised 
that the U.S. avoid getting bogged down in such efforts but 
focus more broadly on regional engagement to resolve 
problems.  He encouraged greater diplomatic engagement with 
Syria and Iran, either directly, or through Arab allies such 
as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.  He added that Iran "needs to be 
appreciated and given the prestige it thinks it deserves." 
Al-Khorafy noted that recent discussions with the Iranian 
Parliamentary Speaker revealed a greater Iranian commitment 
to regional stability. 
 
Meeting with the Interior Minister 
---------------------------------- 
 
17.  (C) In his meeting with Interior Minister and Deputy 
Prime Minister Shaykh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, 
Ambassador Jeffrey thanked the GOK for its continued support 
and urged greater engagement by Kuwait with key Arab 
neighbors, particularly Syria, to cease support for 
insurgents and to enhance Arab cooperation and buy-in for 
Iraq's political process.  Ambassador Jeffrey warned that 
continued Arab indecisiveness and disassociation with the 
Iraq's political future would undermine the country's future 
and result in an unacceptable ideological and political shift 
toward Iran.  While acknowledging that the risks associated 
with success in Iraq were costly and long-term, Ambassador 
Jeffrey underscored the importance of accomplishing the goals 
outlined for a stable Iraq. 
 
18.  (C) Shaykh Nawaf expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts 
to stabilize "an Iraq that is still in crisis."  He 
reaffirmed the GOK's commitment to the success of Iraq's 
democratic process.  He added that while Kuwait was committed 
to supporting Iraq, other Arab states had yet to take 
concrete actions to demonstrate similar support.  He 
acknowledged the lack of border control in Syria and the need 
to prevent the infiltration and exfiltration of insurgents, 
stating that while Kuwait was taking steps to better control 
its relatively smaller border with Iraq, the burden fell more 
directly on Syria and Iran to control their large borders to 
prevent further instability. 
 
19.  (C) The Minister noted that in recent meetings with 
Syrian officials, including the Syrian Interior Minister, he 
and Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah had stressed the 
importance of border control, urging Syrians to even monitor 
and report on Kuwaiti nationals seeking to enter Iraq.  The 
Minister stated that neither the Syrians nor the Iranians had 
taken tangible steps to improve border control despite 
assurances by their governments of increased vigilance. 
Ambassador Jeffrey suggested that Syria should focus on 
controlling its ports of entry (airport, ports), given the 
challenges associated with effective border control, in order 
to prevent cross-border infiltration of insurgents. 
 
Meeting with the Finance Minister 
--------------------------------- 
 
20. (C) In his meeting with Finance Minister Bader 
Al-Humaidhi, Ambassador Jeffrey conveyed USG appreciation for 
GOK financial assistance to Iraq's reconstruction efforts and 
called for a GOK public commitment on debt relief for Iraq. 
Larry MacDonald from the Treasury Department encouraged full 
participation by non-Paris Club member states, specifically 
GCC members, in support of the debt relief terms agreed to by 
Paris Club member states as a prerequisite to enhanced 
economic growth and development in Iraq.  He noted the 
importance of Iraq reaching a stand-by agreement with the 
IMF, and the role of debt relief in allowing Iraq to 
reintegrate itself into international capital markets. 
Ambassador Jeffrey, referring to the United States' own 
historically challenging experience with debt relief in the 
aftermath of World War I, acknowledged the political 
sensitivities of such policies but noted the urgent need to 
reassure the Iraqis of their political and financial 
viability in the international arena.  He urged Al-Humaidhi 
to consider increased GOK cooperation on this issue, 
specifically through a public statement during Iraqi Finance 
Minister Allawi's upcoming visit (no date set) declaring the 
GOK's commitment to debt relief for Iraq.  Ambassador Jeffrey 
added that a public statement by Kuwait would facilitate USG 
engagement with other Arab states on the matter. 
 
21. (C) The Finance Minister started his remarks by 
emphasizing the need to make urgent and visible progress in 
disbursing some of the 120 million dollars in project grant 
aid that Kuwait has committed for projects in Iraq.  He noted 
that the two sides had so far identified school construction 
and mobile hospitals as the priorities for the first sixty 
million tranche but had yet been able to discuss the second 
tranche.  Even for the first portion, the GOI had been unable 
so far to identify where it wanted the projects to be carried 
out.  Al-Humaidhi said that he had met with GOI Finance 
Minister Allawi during the IMF meetings in Washington and the 
latter had agreed to engage soon to get the aid moving. 
Al-Humaidhi pointed to Kuwait's long-standing commitment to 
Iraq's success but rejected debt relief in the near future, 
stating that "Kuwait will not be able to touch this now," and 
adding that "it is a very sensitive issue" for the Kuwait 
Parliament and public.  He noted that Iraq is not being 
impacted directly by the outstanding loan burden since there 
is no interest accruing on the old loans.  Ambassador Jeffrey 
pointed out that American casualty figures were an equally 
sensitive domestic issue for the USG and urged Al-Humaidhi to 
exert as much effort as possible toward an agreement with his 
Iraqi counterpart on the debt. 
22. (C) Ambassador sought clarification regarding the GOK's 
earlier political commitment to the 80% Paris Club terms. 
Al-Humaidhi noted that while the GOK is committed to debt 
relief in principle, the specifics have yet to be worked out 
with the Iraqi government.  He added that the final terms 
will be reviewed on the basis of Paris Club guidelines.  He 
also hinted that eventual debt relief might be part of a GCC 
package deal, although the specific debt would need to be 
forgiven bilaterally.  Al-Humaidhi cautioned against 
expecting substantial progress on debt relief until after an 
agreement has been reached between the GOK and Iraq on how 
best to proceed on specifics.  He welcomed the upcoming visit 
by Minister Allawi as an opportunity to continue bilateral 
discussions on the issue. 
23. (C) Al-Humaidhi asserted that "we've suffered more than 
any other Arab country" as a result of Saddam's aggression, 
adding that the Kuwait faced many of the same burdens as the 
U.S. when it came to the situation in Iraq.   He referred to 
Kuwait's unparalleled financial generosity with Iraq but 
stated that the government of Iraq seemed to lack the 
absorption capacity for all the international assistance 
being offered, including Kuwait's generous assistance.  He 
commented that the "Iraqis are so involved with political 
issues that they can't focus on economic development." 
Al-Humaidhi added that the GOK was having technical 
difficulties communicating with relevant counterparts to 
coordinate assistance.  Ambassador Jeffrey acknowledged the 
coordination challenges, clarifying that Iraqi officials were 
working under very difficult and life-threatening conditions. 
 Such conditions called for extraordinary efforts by Iraq's 
friends, who had a huge stake in Iraq's stability and 
progress. 
 
24. (U) Amb. Jeffrey cleared this report. 
LEBARON