US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2708

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002708 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PGOV, NL 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: ASD FLORY'S VISIT TO THE HAGUE 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, 
reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: During his September 30 visit to The Hague, 
ASD Peter Flory met with Lo Casteleijn, MOD Director for 
General Policy Affairs, and Pieter de Gooijer, MFA Deputy 
Director General for Political Affairs, to discuss 
Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, Kosovo, and 
NATO reform.  Dutch officials made clear that finding a 
partner to team with in Uruzghan province was a pre-condition 
necessary to obtain Dutch government and parliament approval 
of Dutch participation in ISAF Stage III.  They still hope to 
team with Australia, and will send a high-level delegation to 
Canberra in the coming weeks to make the case to the 
Australian government.  Dutch officials also were supportive 
of the U.S. proposed "two summit" strategy, but pushed back 
on the concept that the 2008 summit focus on enlargement. 
While it was important to encourage aspirants such as Ukraine 
to take the reforms necessary for NATO membership, the Dutch 
expressed doubts that Ukraine and others would be ready by 
2008.  ASD Flory also visited the HMS Van Amstel, which 
returned to the Netherlands following its deployment to 
assist hurricane relief efforts in the Biloxi region.  ASD 
Flory thanked the Van Amstel's crew for their hard work, and 
fielded questions from the press.  End summary. 
 
Australian Partnership a Must for Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  De Gooijer and Casteleijn both stressed the strong 
Dutch interest in partnering with Australia in a PRT for 
Uruzghan province in ISAF Stage III.  According to de 
Gooijer, this was a "political requirement" that would allow 
the Dutch government to present a convincing package to 
parliament.  While the Australian forces would provide useful 
operational capabilities, he added, the forces driving the 
Dutch to find a reliable partner were primarily political. 
Asked by Flory whether the Dutch were considering any 
alternatives to Australia, de Gooijer emphasized that they 
were not.  Noting that the Dutch cabinet hoped to be able to 
make a decision on the deployment in early November, de 
Gooijer asked the U.S. to weigh in with the Australians. 
Horbach added that the Dutch were looking at providing 
1,000-1,200 troops themselves and supplementing this force 
with roughly 200 Australians.  Horbach and de Gooijer 
confirmed that the Dutch expected Uruzghan to be a tough 
security environment and therefore supported robust ISAF 
rules of engagement. 
 
3. (C) In the meeting at MOD, Casteleijn reiterated that 
partnering with Australia was a vital pre-condition to Stage 
III participation.  Even with 200 Australian troops, 
Casteleijn said, the Dutch would still be working with far 
fewer troops than the UK or Canada, who are working on 
2,000-3,000 man PRTs.  The Dutch parliament, however, had 
explicitly limited the Dutch contribution to no more than 
1,000-1,2000 troops.  Casteleijn said the Dutch planned to 
send a high level Dutch delegation to Canberra in the coming 
weeks to make the case to the Australian government.  He 
added that the Australians have questions regarding their 
specific role in the PRT and the rules of engagement; the 
delegation to Canberra will seek to explain Dutch plans for 
an Australian contribution.  It was important to explain to 
the Australians that the rules of engagement question was a 
NATO issue currently under discussion, and not a bilateral 
issue, Casteleijn said. 
 
4. (C) Casteleijn noted that the Afghan elections appeared to 
have gone well; now it was important to revitalize the Bonn 
Process. The security situation in the south, he added, was 
particularly worrisome.  ASD Flory took issue with 
Casteleijn's negative security assessment, describing recent 
incidents as negative spikes in an increasingly positive 
security situation.  The elections were a great success; the 
Taliban chose not to disrupt the popular elections because 
the Afghan people overwhelmingly supported the electoral 
process.  Of course, bad guys will continue to try and turn 
up the heat, but they are losing the strategic battle, Flory 
said.  ASD Flory noted that the USG was aware that cost 
sharing for the renovation at Kandahar airport remained an 
issue for the Dutch.  He asked if the Dutch required any 
logistics assistance.  Casteleijn said they had approached 
Belgium regarding C-130 lift assistance, and have discussed 
extending the Belgian F-16 presence in Kabul into 2006.  He 
added that intelligence sharing would be helpful. 
 
5. (C) Casteleijn also reviewed plans to handover the Dutch 
PRT in Baghlan to Hungary.  He described the Hungarians as 
"very eager" to take over, even before the planned transition 
in October 2006 and have hinted at perhaps "going somewhere 
else".  Moreover, the Hungarians would like to make public 
announcements regarding the transition, which strikes the 
Dutch as "too early," Casteleijn said.  He explained that 
Dutch development agencies have finally received funding for 
work in Baghlan; Hungarian announcements of a takeover would 
raise questions in parliament why funds had been allocated if 
the Dutch plan to leave. 
 
Keeping ISAF and OEF Forces Separate 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Casteleijn said that the Dutch support a strict 
separation of ISAF and OEF forces, but added that the Dutch 
can support the recent U.S. proposal regarding interaction 
between the two.  He explained that the Dutch require the 
separation for domestic political reasons.  Any new 
deployment in Afghanistan will carry over past the 2007 
national elections.  The opposition Labor Party (PvdA) had 
opposed the deployment of Dutch special forces in support of 
OEF, Casteleijn said.  Recent polls suggest that the 2007 
elections will lead to a new government, perhaps under Labor 
leadership.  A deployment under ISAF auspices, Caseteleijn 
said, will not be contentious and therefore not subject to 
review.  De Gooijer confirmed that parliament was unlikely to 
accept another Dutch OEF deployment "on the ground" (as 
opposed to at sea); this would be, he said, "a bridge too 
far" for the PvdA.  On the other hand, he agreed that the 
latest U.S. proposal for improving coordination between the 
two missions was acceptable to the Dutch, as long as the two 
operations remained distinguishable to some degree. 
 
NTM-I 
----- 
 
7. (C) Casteleijn reviewed Dutch participation in the NATO 
Training Mission in Iraq.  The Dutch are willing in principle 
to increase their contribution toward the mission up to 100 
personnel assuming other nations make proportional increases. 
 He said that the Dutch are committed to working in Iraq, but 
questioned whether a training mission outside Iraq -- such as 
in Jordan -- might be more effective.  ASD Flory briefed on 
recent developments with the Iraqi constitution, and efforts 
to combat foreign fighters, especially those crossing the 
border from Syria.  He described Iran and Syria as 
particularly troublesome.  On a potential training mission 
outside Iraq, Flory said we should not discourage nations 
from participating in Iraq and described NTM-I as critical. 
He welcomed Dutch willingness to participate in any 
additional training mission as long as it does not detract 
from efforts in Iraq. 
 
8. (C) De Gooijer similarly stressed the continuing Dutch 
commitment to NTM-I.  The fact that the Dutch no longer had 
troops on the ground in Southern Iraq, he said, did not 
lessen the Dutch political commitment to the Iraq mission. 
He noted that, in addition to participating in NTM-I, the 
Dutch were playing an active role in EU programs for Iraq, 
including providing training to Iraqi jurists. 
 
Kosovo/Bosnia 
------------- 
 
9. (C) In the meeting with Casteleijn, OSD Principal Director 
for European and NATO Policy Jim Townsend related discussions 
in London, noting a real sense of concern regarding where the 
international community is heading on final status talks and 
the impacts Kosovo independence might have on other efforts 
in the region by break-away provinces to win independence. 
Casteleijn agreed, adding that it was difficult to predict 
where a "stuck" final status discussion will go.  He said 
there were difficult discussions going on in the MFA at 
present, and suggested that the Dutch government was looking 
to decrease troop levels in Bosnia.  He explained that the 
Dutch believe that their troops are being asked to perform 
tasks that are better suited for police. 
 
NATO Reform/Enlargement/Response Force 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C)  Flory and Townsend briefly reviewed the USG two 
summit strategy for NATO-- a 2006 mini-summit focusing on 
transformation and capabilities, and a 2008 enlargement 
summit -- for de Gooijer and Casteleijn.  Both expressed 
significant reservations about labeling the proposed 2008 
NATO summit an "enlargement" summit.  De Gooijer said the 
Dutch were comfortable with two summits and agreed on the 
need to make NATO more effective and efficient.  But, he 
said, Europe was already suffering from "enlargement" 
fatigue, which was a significant factor in the Dutch "no" 
vote on the EU's Constitutional Treaty.  The Dutch public and 
parliament, he stressed, were not psychologically prepared to 
consider enlarging NATO at this time, especially with regard 
to a large, problematic state like Ukraine. 
 
11. (C) Flory asked de Gooijer to clarify what, exactly, 
worried the Dutch about Ukraine.  De Gooijer responded that, 
while Ukrainian capabilities would be a welcome addition to 
NATO in practical terms, there were many other factors 
arguing against admission.  These included the possible 
impact on European relations with Russia, Ukraine's 
underdeveloped political system and rampant corruption, and 
the wide-spread perception -- right or wrong -- that 
admission to NATO was somehow linked to accession to the EU. 
The transatlantic alliance, he continued, should first 
develop a clearer view of its identity and future before 
enlarging further. 
 
12. (C) Casteleijn said that the Dutch recognize Ukraine's 
strategic importance.  However, labeling the 2008 summit as 
an enlargement summit will only raise expectations of 
aspirant countries, and there are too many questions 
regarding Ukraine's ability to take necessary reforms 
required for NATO membership.  On Georgia, Casteleijn said 
that the Dutch were concerned about corruption and 
military-to-military cooperation development.  Casteleijn 
suggested that the 2008 summit focus on defining or enhancing 
relationships between Partners and NATO, instead of an 
explicit commitment to enlargement. 
 
13. (C) De Gooijer warned that it would be difficult to 
achieve real transformation at a 2006 summit if people 
believe the summit's real purpose is to pave the way for 
enlargement in 2008; managing perceptions to avoid this 
outcome should be a high priority, he said.  Pressed to 
identify a country which might be ready for admission to NATO 
by 2008, de Gooijer offered that Croatia was probably the 
most likely candidate, but stressed that any discussion of 
enlargement, particularly with reference to a "package" of 
aspirants, would be sensitive in the current political 
climate. 
 
14. (C) ASD Flory said that the 2008 summit could be better 
defined to "take stock" of NATO's relations with aspirants. 
While it was important not to create unwarranted 
expectations, however, it was also important to use the 
enlargement concept as a catalyst to create pressure to 
undertake necessary reform, Flory said.  He emphasized that 
Ukraine has still a long way to go; much will depend on 
reform progress.  He also mentioned reform efforts in Georgia 
and Turkish EU membership as contributing factors. 
 
15. (C) Asked by de Gooijer to outline possible 
"deliverables" for the 2006 transformation summit, Flory and 
Townsend noted making the NRF operational and increasing its 
capabilities (perhaps through enhanced participation of 
Special Operations Forces) would be a high priority. 
Townsend also made a pitch to think creatively about methods 
to reform the NATO budget beyond "passing the tin cup".  De 
Gooijer agreed that the 2006 summit should focus on "doing 
what we do now, but better" and exploring new financing and 
operational concepts.  Casteleijn briefly outlined Dutch 
thinking on the NATO Response Force.  Previously, the Dutch 
were more inclined to agree with France on limited NRF use. 
Now, the Dutch agree that the NRF should be used more 
frequently.  Casteleijn said Defense Minister Kamp hopefully 
made this clear at the informal defense ministerial in 
Berlin. 
 
16. (U) ASD Flory did not have an opportunity to review this 
message. 
 
 
BLAKEMAN