US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA2987

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60TH UNFC: CANADA HEARS USG CONCERNS ABOUT AD HOC COMMITTEES, WANTS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE

Identifier: 05OTTAWA2987
Wikileaks: View 05OTTAWA2987 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ottawa
Created: 2005-10-06 19:41:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Tags: AORC PARM PREL MNUC CA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

061941Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 002987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: AORC, PARM, PREL, MNUC, CA 
SUBJECT: 60TH UNFC: CANADA HEARS USG CONCERNS ABOUT AD HOC 
COMMITTEES, WANTS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 185313 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN DICKSON. REASON 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
1. (C) DCM and polmiloff met with Canadian Assistant Deputy 
Minister for International Security Jim Wright late on 
October 5 to present general points on the UNFC draft 
resolution and deliver oral points, as instructed.  Arms 
Control Director Rob MacDougall and incoming Deputy Director 
Ron Stansfield sat in. 
 
2. (C) Responding to the points in the non-paper, Wright 
sought to reassure us that Canada's intention in supporting 
AHCs was merely to "jumpstart" the CD, not undermine it.  The 
alternative, he said, was to continue to "do nothing." 
Canada's concept of the AHC mechanism was that it would be 
pursued only in the continued absence of progress in the CD; 
were the CD to reach an understanding on a work plan there 
would be no need to activate AHCs.  At the same time, Wright 
recognized that the AHC concept would need more fulsome 
discussion in New York. 
 
3. (C) The GOC had no intention, Wright continued, of 
creating a separate vehicle to drive the CD agenda.  The 
institution was "very important" to Canada, he said, and the 
prospect of yet another year of gridlock difficult to 
countenance.  Wright affirmed that Canada greatly valued 
consensus, as did the U.S.  McDougall noted that "using 
consensus to block discussion," however, was going too far. 
 
4. (C) In conclusion, Wright asserted that the United States 
is a partner that Canada wants and needs in the CD. He noted 
that Canada would not/not be pursuing the two prior UNFC 
resolutions that had created such anxiety for the U.S. and 
conveyed assurance that Canada would examine USG concerns 
"carefully and constructively." Wright urgently appealed to 
the U.S. to help end the gridlock in the CD. 
 
5. (C/NF) COMMENT: In a separate conversation on October 6, 
Stansfield (protect please) said that GOC was taken aback by 
the "vehemence" of USG demarche, particularly given that the 
AHC concept had not been widely discussed among other 
delegations, let alone tabled as a resolution.  He confirmed 
that the DCM's message "was heard" and confided that Canadian 
Ambassador Meyer, who had been in the vanguard of Canadian 
activism on AHCs, was instructed to "stand down and not take 
a prominent role" in the briefing convened for October 6. END 
COMMENT. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS 

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