US embassy cable - 05MADRID3540

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 003540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, MO, SP 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: MIGRANT ASSAULT CRISIS CHALLENGES ZAPATERO 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: CASABLANCA 1052 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.4 (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  After weeks of increasingly brazen and 
dangerous incursions by illegal immigrants into the Spanish 
North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the Zapatero 
administration launched a high-profile effort to stem the 
flood of sub-Saharan immigrants into the two cities. 
Zapatero faced growing criticism by the opposition Popular 
Party that he was failing to enforce border security and was 
not exerting enough pressure on the Moroccan government to 
help cut the flow of migrants.  The government has gradually 
escalated its response, ordering additional troops to the 
enclaves to improve border security and authorizing the 
construction of an additional barrier to supplant the two 
fences that have failed to block hundreds of migrants from 
entering over the last several weeks.  On October 5, FM 
Moratinos announced that Spain would activate a long-standing 
agreement with Morocco to accept the return of migrants, 
including non-Moroccan citizens that cross into the enclaves; 
the first group of migrants were scheduled to be transfered 
to Moroccan custody on October 6 but the move did not take 
place. Zapatero dispatched Vice President Maria Teresa 
Fernandez de la Vega to Ceuta and Melilla to observe 
developments.  Zapatero resisted early calls for him to go to 
the enclaves as well, but now indicates that he may go.  The 
Spanish government is trapped between its desire to improve 
relations with Morocco and concern that the migration crisis 
will open Zapatero to criticism by Spanish nationalists that 
he has been too "soft" on Morocco.  End Summary. 
 
//A CRISIS BUILDS...// 
 
2. (U) Migrants have attempted twelve mass incursions into 
Ceuta and Melilla since August 28, with five incidents since 
September 27 involving 500 or more migrants.  Melilla has 
borne the brunt of the incursions, though the most deadly 
incident took place on September 29 in Ceuta, where as many 
as five migrants are believed to have died and over 100 
suffered injuries when 700 individuals attempted to breach 
the border.  The border incursions have become increasingly 
dangerous as migrants have begun to attack Spanish police 
officials with stones and other weapons in order to avoid 
capture.  An additional 500 migrants attempted to cross into 
Melilla on October 6 and there were initial indications that 
six migrants may have died in that incident.  In all, 6,000 
persons have attempted to enter Ceuta and Melilla since 
August 28, at least 721 have managed to enter the enclaves, 
eight migrants have died, and 307 migrants and 19 Spanish 
security officials have been injured. 
 
//INITIAL RESPONSE FAILS// 
 
3. (U) The Spanish media devoted considerable coverage to the 
incursions, leading the Zapatero government to respond with 
high-profile, but limited steps to stem the flow of migrants. 
 These included the dispatch of three military units to shore 
up security along the fenceline between Melilla and Morocco 
and the construction of a third barrier along that border. 
However, some soldiers complained that their strict rules of 
engagement essentially prevented them from presenting much 
more than a psychological deterrent to desperate refugees 
determined to reach their objective.  An October 3 crossing 
by 740 migrants was among the most violent yet, with seven 
Spanish security officials injured in the melee. 
 
//STONGER STEPS ENACTED// 
 
4. (U) The use of violence by the migrants and the failure of 
the increased military presence to halt the incursions 
prompted the Zapatero government to adopt additional measures 
on October 5.  FM Moratinos announced that Spain would 
activate provisions of a 1992 agreement with Morocco that 
allow for the expedited return of migrants from Spanish 
territory to Morocco.  The first group of migrants was 
scheduled to be transported from Melilla to Morocco on 
October 6, but the transfer was delayed.  Vice President 
Fernandez de la Vega, dispatched to the enclaves by President 
Zapatero, asserted that the agreement with Morocco did not 
contravene Spanish immigration laws requiring a full case 
study for each deportee.  Spanish affiliates of NGOs "Doctors 
Without Borders" and "SOS Racism" argued against 
implementation of the agreement with Morocco, claiming that 
over 40 percent of migrants suffered abuse at the hands of 
Moroccan authorities.  The Spain representative of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Carlos Boggio, joined the 
NGOs, criticizing the Spanish government for returning the 
migrants to Morocco "because human rights are violated (in 
that country)." 
 
//TAMING NATIONALIST RUMBLINGS// 
 
5. (U) Against the backdrop of the migration crisis, Zapatero 
has faced opposition criticism that he has not pressed the 
Moroccan government hard enough or demanded greater 
cooperation to restrain the flood of migrants into Ceuta and 
Melilla.  The incursions were particularly inopportune for 
the Spanish government, spiking even as the leaders and 
cabinets of both countries were meeting in Sevilla for their 
bilateral High Level Summit.  Zapatero avoided public 
statements on the issue during the Summit, earning further 
criticism from political opponents and the municipal leaders 
of Ceuta and Melilla (which are governed by the opposition 
Popular Party) that he was ceding to Moroccan designs to gain 
control of the two enclaves.  He felt sufficient pressure to 
declare publicly on October 6 that Spanish sovereignty over 
the enclaves was "not at issue" and said he would visit both 
Ceuta and Melilla, though he did not set a date.  Zapatero 
emphasized Spain's openess to controlled migration, but noted 
that the yawning "prosperity gap" between Spain and Morocco 
meant that illegal migration would remain a problem.  He also 
called on the EU to send a commission to study the problem, 
since Ceuta and Melilla effectively represent the EU's border 
with North Africa, and urged a reinvigoration of the 
Barcelona Process. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
6. (C) Improved relations with Morocco remain one of 
Zapatero's top foreign policy priorities.  However, 
skepticism of Moroccan intentions runs deep across Spain's 
political spectrum, in large part because of the Western 
Sahara issue but also because of nationalist sentiment in 
favor of continued control over Ceuta and Melilla.  In this 
context, Zapatero finds himself working against popular 
sentiment in order to solidify a strategic partnership with 
Rabat.  The migration crisis has complicated this effort, but 
thus far the Zapatero government seems committed to managing 
both domestic requirements and its relations with Morocco. 
AGUIRRE