US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4133

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PINS, PTER, IZ, Security 
SUBJECT: MCNS MEETS TO DISCUSS SECURITY IN BAGHDAD, TAL 
AFAR, SECTARIAN STRIFE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a), (b), (d 
) 
 
 1. (C//REL GBR AUS)  SUMMARY:  Prime Minister Jaafari 
convened on short notice a meeting of the Ministerial 
Committee for National Security (MCNS) at his office on the 
evening of September 25.  Topics discussed included a 
disagreement between Coalition Force (CF) officers and 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) officers 
concerning the security plan for Baghdad, the situation in 
Tal Afar, and an incident the previous night in which CF and 
Iraqi Army (IA) forces had become engaged in a one hour 
firefight in Sadr City with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. 
Jaafari was upset that he had learned the details of these 
events late or second hand, and it was clear that in calling 
the meeting he was sending a message that he is not to be 
left in the dark.  Underlying the entire discussion was a 
sense of rising sectarian tensions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  On the evening of Sept. 25, National 
Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak Rubaie announced that Prime 
Minister Jaafari had decided to call an immediate meeting of 
the MCNS at his office.  All the members of the committee 
were present: the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense Saadoun 
al-Dulime, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr, Minister of State 
for National Security Affairs Karem al-Anzi, Ambassador 
Khalilzad, U.K. Ambassador Patey, and MNF-I Commanding 
General Casey.  MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Brims was 
also present, as were a translator and notetakers. 
 
3.  (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari entered the room last and 
immediately launched the meeting with a minimum of 
pleasantries.  He said that he had called it to discuss three 
urgent matters: recent reports that had reached him that CF 
and Iraqi officials were meeting to discuss the security of 
Baghdad; a report he had received from a trusted friend in 
Tal Afar that atrocities and other bad acts were taking 
place; and reports he had heard second hand of a major 
firefight in the Sadr City district of Baghdad the previous 
night that left a number of people dead. 
 
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MEETINGS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY - SIGNS OF SECTARIAN TENSIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
4. (C//REL GBR AUS) With regard to the security plan for 
Baghdad, Interior Minister Jabr said that GEN Casey had 
suggested a new plan be considered in light of the coming 
referendum and elections, so officers from the MOI, MOD, and 
the Multinational Force (MNF-I) met to discuss a new plan. 
Some of the MOI officers felt their input was not even sought 
and that the plan was being imposed on them, and threatened 
to resign if it was implemented.  During the discussions the 
topic of how to assign police and defense units to different 
districts of the city was raised.  Iraqi officers preferred 
that the units be assigned with consideration given to the 
sectarian make-up of the units and the areas to be patrolled. 
 Jaafari told the group that security was his primary concern 
and that he had never failed to attend a meeting to discuss 
the subject.  He believed that arguing over plans is a sign 
of weakness and is very disturbing. 
 
5. (C//REL GBR AUS)  GEN Casey explained that there was a 
misperception about what had taken place. He confirmed that 
plans for the security of Iraq and Baghdad can only be 
decided by the MCNS.  What was being discussed were possible 
changes at the tactical level, designed to carry out the 
plans agreed upon by the MCNS.  It was only prudent to do so 
given the upcoming referendum.  Once a change had been agreed 
upon by the commanders, the MCNS would be briefed.  Jaafari 
agreed that what was being discussed were options, not plans. 
 
 
6. (C//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey continued that he perceived 
that the disagreement between commanders had to do about 
whether to employ Shia forces in Sunni neighborhoods and 
vice-versa.  This was very troubling as it was the first time 
he had seen such sectarian fissures begin to manifest at that 
level within the security forces. Minister of Defense Dulime 
echoed these comments and warned that a deadly media campaign 
directed by the terrorists was emerging.  The enemy is trying 
to convince the people that the MOI is a Shia force and the 
MOD is a Sunni force.  This is not true.  He is a Sunni 
minister, but 90 percent of his forces in Baghdad are Shia. 
Jabr concurred, pointing out that while he is a Shia, the 
commanders of his Commando and Public Order Battalions, the 
chief of police in Baghdad, and the commander of his major 
crimes unit are all Sunni. Dulime urged that these false 
perceptions should not be allowed to affect the relationships 
between the MOD, MOI, and CF. "If sectarian feelings start 
infiltrating the MOI or MOD it would be the beginning of a 
civil war." 
 
7. (C//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari agreed with Dulime that if not 
checked, insurgent propaganda playing on the sectarian theme 
would definitely lead to civil war.  But, he emphasized, he 
believes that actions, not merely words, are necessary to 
prove one is nonsectarian.  There must be strict guidance for 
all security forces to avoid in engaging in sectarian acts of 
violence, and all police and soldiers must abide by this 
guidance. 
 
8. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi said he has heard complaints that 
the ISF is not being allowed to realize its full potential 
because CF controls prevent them from operating in an 
effective manner. He was critical of Operation Thunder and 
opined that the disposition of forces in and around the city 
did not conform to the agreed upon plan.  He agreed with 
Dulime that the terrorists are conducting a psychological 
campaign to make it seem that Baghdad is being divided along 
sectarian lines.  He said that specific units must be 
assigned to specific parts of the city where their mission 
will be to destroy the enemy.  He also proposed creating a 
single team whose job would be to handle and interrogate 
terrorists.  This team would have trained officers, special 
detention facilities, and counter-intelligence officers to 
infiltrate terrorist cells.  He was also of the opinion that 
all cities should be the responsibility of the MOI, while the 
areas outside of the cities should fall to the MOD. 
 
9. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi continued that what matters is 
good intelligence so that enemy leaders can be targeted 
instead of being permitted to roam freely through Iraq and 
other countries.  Leaders of the Baath Party feed the 
terrorists with money, plans, and relationships.  Some have 
been accepted into government positions, and some speak out 
against the success in Tal Afar, telling lies that civilians 
were killed.  Some of these leaders talk as if they were 
defending the terrorists.  Al-Anzi's solution to the 
insurgency is to arrest Baath Party leaders. 
 
--------------------- 
SITUATION IN TAL AFAR 
--------------------- 
 
10. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari next addressed the issue of Tal 
Afar.  He stated that while we speak of the success of the 
operation, he is receiving reports from people he trusts that 
there are still problems in the town that include possible 
sectarian violence.  It is important that anyone caught 
engaging in such acts be punished and shown on television to 
get the message out that this will not be tolerated.  He said 
he had heard there were problems when the Police Commandos 
were pulled out without being replaced by a Public Order 
Brigade, leaving a vacuum that was filled momentarily by 
terrorists who killed and burned homes.  The report he 
received also spoke of water shortages in Shia neighborhoods, 
and plans for "terrorists" to infiltrate the newly forming 
police force.  Jaafari then complained that he was hearing 
these reports from contacts in Tal Afar but nothing of the 
other side of the story from his staff.  Dulime said he was 
receiving similar reports from Sunnis and suggested a 
committee to report on the conditions. 
 
11. (C//REL GBR AUS) In response to Jaafari's complaint that 
he isntreeiving information onwhat i happnng i Tal 
Afar MNF-I Deuty Commanding General Brims responded that he 
had briefed the Prime Minister's aide on Tal Afar every day 
since September 8.  He advised that the predominately Shia 
MOI Commando Brigade had been withdrawn from the city to 
mitigate complaints that they were behaving in a sectarian 
manner against Sunnis.  MNF-I was unable to confirm or deny 
the allegations.  The deployment of the MOI Public Order 
Battalion was being delayed for the same reason the commandos 
had been removed, and this was on the advice of both military 
commanders on scene and local officials.  Brims stressed the 
need for the ITG to immediately begin to pay compensation and 
to move forward with their reconstruction program, which so 
far has not budged.  In addition, the formation of a balanced 
police force is critical to the success of Tal Afar.  At the 
present, security is being provided by CF and IA until a 
police force can be reconstituted. 
 
--------------------- 
INCIDENT IN SADR CITY 
--------------------- 
 
12.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  The Prime Minister next turned to the 
subject of Sadr City.  He was upset because the night before 
a firefight had erupted between CF and IA soldiers and Jaysh 
al-Mahdi (JAM) members in that district of Baghdad.  The 
battle lasted ninety minutes and a number of people were 
killed, yet he had not heard about it until hours later and 
even then he had only limited details.  GEN Casey explained 
to Jaafari what had taken place.  It was a joint CF/IA 
operation with a specific target, but the IA forces were 
ambushed by JAM and called for help.  A CF quick reaction 
force responded to assist.  With regard to the assertion that 
Jaafari was not being kept informed, GEN Casey noted that his 
staff is briefed every morning by MNF-I about the events of 
the previous 24 hours.  In addition, it is the role of the 
Prime Minister's Situation Room to monitor events as they are 
taking place and inform him as needed. 
 
13.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  Minister of Defense Dulime added that 
these types of operations take place all the time and do not 
need to be approved in advance at the highest levels.  In 
this case, the IA was fiercely attacked by JAM and suffered 
three killed in action.  In his opinion, one of the most 
serious problems the ITG faces is the rise in influence of 
JAM.  Jaafari strongly disagreed.  He said that JAM is part 
of the government, with three ministers and 23 assembly 
members.  He challenged Dulime to produce documented evidence 
that these people supported the insurgents and if so, he 
would deal with them himself.  Jaafari was quickly corrected 
by Rubaie, who pointed out that Jaafari hadn't meant to say 
JAM was in the government.  Rather, the Prime Minister meant 
that other supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr were. 
 
14.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  Al-Anzi supported the Prime Minister's 
view on this.  He asserted "there are no terrorists" in Sadr 
City but there are members of JAM there.  "And as far as I 
know," he said, "the ITG has not declared war on Jaysh 
al-Mahdi."  The goal of the ITG is to turn JAM into a 
political organization.  Until that happens, it is 
predictable that whenever CF operate in Sadr City there will 
be trouble.  He recommended that the families of those killed 
be paid compensation by the government. 
 
15.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari opined that in politics there 
is no such thing as black or white.  Sometimes it is 
necessary to accept the bad to avoid the worst.  "We all 
knew," he said, "that when we were negotiating the 
constitution we were dealing with people who support the 
insurgency.  There are people in the government who stand up 
and speak out against the government when it is trying to rid 
Tal Afar and other places of terrorists.  This must be 
accepted."  Jaafari said that following the tragedy on the 
A'imma Bridge where a thousand Shias died, he had not once 
mentioned any of these "martyrs" by name.  Rather, he had 
told the story over and over of the young Sunni man, Othman, 
who had died saving the lives of Shias.  Jaafari is convinced 
that if he had not done this, Iraq would be in a civil war 
today.  It is critical that the enemies of Iraq not be 
allowed to inflame sectarian divisions. 
 
--------------------------- 
ADDRESSING SECTARIAN STRIFE 
--------------------------- 
 
16.  (C//REL GBR AUS) U.K Ambassador Patey observed that the 
common theme of the subjects discussed had been the growing 
specter of sectarian strife.  The dispute of commanders about 
how and where to place security forces, the situation in Tal 
Afar, and the firefight with JAM in Sadr City all pointed to 
signs of growing sectarian rivalries.  He said that the 
terrorists are winning the campaign of perceptions and that 
it is important to counter this.  He suggested the formation 
of a commission composed of respected individuals from all 
the major sectarian groups to refute the charges of those who 
stand up and try to incite sectarian conflict.  If 
allegations that certain military or police units are putting 
sectarianism ahead of loyalty to the state, this commission 
should be able to say whether the allegations are true or 
not.  And if true, action must be taken to stop it. 
 
17. (C//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari agreed, and said that Iraqi 
army and police units are not to be assigned to areas based 
on the religious make-up of their members.  "We cannot have a 
Sunni army and a Shia police force."  GEN Casey concurred, 
but pointed out that Ambassador Patey's remarks went farther 
than that.  Casey reiterated the need for a publicity 
campaign to publicize the good work the Iraqi military does, 
and a commission to investigate and deal with complaints of 
sectarianism. 
 
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COMMENT 
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18.  (C//REL GBR AUS) The Prime Minister was clearly showing 
signs of stress.  The fact that the meeting was called with 
no advance notice and the tone he took throughout were 
unusual. While civility prevailed, disagreements between the 
Sunni Dulime and the Shias Jaafari and Anzi were evident. 
While they all agree that they are fighting a tough battle to 
prevent an outright break between Sunni and Shia, they 
nevertheless are quick to defend the position of their own. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khalilzad