US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4132

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, IZ, Security 
SUBJECT: MCNS DISCUSSES SECURITY IN BAGHDAD, TAL AFAR, 
SECTARIAN STRIFE 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 
 1.4 (a), (b), AND (d). 
 
1. (C//REL GBR AUS)  SUMMARY:  Prime Minister Jaafari 
convened on short notice a meeting of the Ministerial 
Committee for National Security (MCNS) at his office on the 
evening of September 25.  Topics discussed included a 
disagreement between Coalition Force (CF) officers and 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) officers 
concerning the security plan for Baghdad, the situation in 
Tal Afar, and an incident the previous night in which CF 
and Iraqi Army (IA) forces had become engaged in a one-hour 
firefight in Sadr City with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. 
Jaafari was upset that he had learned the details of these 
events late or second hand, and it was clear that in 
calling the meeting he was sending a message that he is not 
to be left in the dark.  Underlying the entire discussion 
was a sense of rising sectarian tensions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  On the evening of Sept. 25, National 
Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak Rubaie announced that Prime 
Minister Jaafari had decided to call an immediate meeting 
of the MCNS at his office.  All the members of the 
committee were present: the Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defense Saadoun al-Dulime, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr, 
Minister of State for National Security Affairs Karem 
al-Anzi, Ambassador Khalilzad, U.K. Ambassador Patey, and 
MNF-I Commanding General Casey.  MNF-I Deputy Commanding 
General Brims was also present, as were a translator and 
notetakers. 
 
3.  (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari entered the room last and 
immediately launched the meeting with a minimum of 
pleasantries.  He said that he had called it to discuss 
three urgent matters: recent reports 
that CF and Iraqi officials were meeting to discuss the 
security of Baghdad; a report he had received from a 
trusted friend in Tal Afar that atrocities and other bad 
acts were taking place; and reports he had heard second 
hand of a major firefight in the Sadr City district of 
Baghdad the previous night that left a number of people 
dead. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
MEETINGS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY - SIGNS OF SECTARIAN TENSIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
4. (C//REL GBR AUS) With regard to the security plan for 
Baghdad, Interior Minister Jabr explained that GEN Casey 
had suggested a new plan be considered in light of the 
coming referendum and elections; so officers from the MOI, 
MOD, and the Multinational Force (MNF-I) met to discuss a 
new plan.  Some of the MOI officers felt that their input was 
not even sought and that the plan was being imposed on 
them; they threatened to resign if it were implemented. 
During the discussions the topic of how to assign police 
and defense units to different districts of the city was 
raised.  Iraqi officers preferred that the units be 
assigned with consideration given to the sectarian make-up 
of the units and the areas to be patrolled.  Jaafari told 
the MCNS that security was his primary concern and that he 
had never failed to attend a meeting to discuss the 
subject.  He believes that arguing over plans is a sign of 
weakness and is very disturbing. 
 
5. (C//REL GBR AUS)  GEN Casey explained that there was a 
misperception about what had taken place. He confirmed that 
plans for the security of Iraq and Baghdad can only be 
decided by the MCNS.  What was being discussed were 
possible changes at the tactical level, designed to carry 
out the agreed plans of the MCNS.  Once a change had 
been agreed upon by the commanders, the MCNS would be 
briefed.  Jaafari agreed that what was being discussed was 
options, not plans. 
 
6. (C//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey continued that he perceived 
that the disagreement between commanders had to do with 
whether to employ Shia forces in Sunni neighborhoods and 
vice-versa.  This was very troubling to him as it was the 
first time he had seen such sectarian fissures begin to 
manifest at that level within the security forces. Minister 
of Defense Dulime echoed these comments and warned that a 
deadly media campaign directed by the terrorists was 
emerging.  The enemy is trying to convince the people that 
the MOI is a Shia force and the MOD is a Sunni force.  This 
is not true.  He is a Sunni minister, but 90 percent of his 
forces in Baghdad are Shia.  Jabr concurred, pointing out 
that while he is a Shia, the commanders of his Commando and 
Public Order Battalions, the chief of police in Baghdad, 
and the commander of his major crimes unit are all Sunni. 
Dulime urged that these false perceptions should not be 
allowed to affect the relationships between the MOD, MOI, 
and CF. "If sectarian feelings start infiltrating the MOI 
or MOD, it would be the beginning of a civil war." 
 
7. (C//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari agreed with Dulime that, if not 
checked, insurgent propaganda playing on the sectarian 
theme definitely would lead to civil war.  But, he 
emphasized, actions, not merely words, are 
necessary to prove one is nonsectarian.  There must be 
strict guidance for all security forces to avoid 
engaging in sectarian acts of violence, and all police and 
soldiers must abide by this guidance. 
 
8. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi said he has heard complaints 
that the ISF is not being allowed to realize its full 
potential because CF controls prevent them from operating 
in an effective manner. He was critical of Operation 
Thunder and opined that the disposition of forces in and 
around the city did not conform to the agreed-upon plan. 
He agreed with Dulime that the terrorists are conducting a 
psychological campaign to make it seem that Baghdad is 
being divided along sectarian lines.  He said that specific 
units must be assigned to specific parts of the city where 
their mission will be to destroy the enemy.  He also 
proposed creating a single team whose job would be to 
handle and interrogate terrorists.  This team would have 
trained officers, special detention facilities, and 
counter-intelligence officers to infiltrate terrorist 
cells.  He was also of the opinion that all cities should 
be the responsibility of the MOI, while the areas outside 
of the cities should fall to the MOD. 
 
9. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi continued that what matters is 
good intelligence so that enemy leaders can be targeted 
instead of being permitted to roam freely through Iraq and 
other countries.  Leaders of the Baath Party feed the 
terrorists with money, plans, and relationships.  Some have 
been accepted into government positions, and some speak out 
against the success in Tal Afar, telling lies that 
civilians were killed.  Some of these leaders talk as if 
they were defending the terrorists.  Al-Anzi's solution to 
the insurgency is to arrest Baath Party leaders. 
 
--------------------- 
SITUATION IN TAL AFAR 
--------------------- 
 
10. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari next addressed the issue of 
Tal Afar.  He stated that, while we speak of the success of 
the operation, he is receiving reports from people he 
trusts that there are still problems in the town that 
include possible sectarian violence.  It is important that 
anyone caught engaging in such acts be punished and shown 
on television to get the message out that this will not be 
tolerated.  He said he had heard there were problems when 
the Police Commandos were pulled out without being replaced 
by a Public Order Brigade, leaving a vacuum that was filled 
momentarily by terrorists who killed and burned homes.  The 
report he received also spoke of water shortages in Shia 
neighborhoods and plans for "terrorists" to infiltrate the 
newly forming police force.  Jaafari then complained that 
he was hearing these reports from contacts in Tal Afar but 
nothing of the other side of the story from his staff. 
Dulime said he was receiving similar reports from Sunnis 
and suggested a committee to report on the conditions. 
 
11. (C//REL GBR AUS) In response to Jaafari's complaint 
that he is not receiving information on what is happening 
in Tal Afar, MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Brims 
responded that he had briefed the Prime Minister's aide on 
Tal Afar every day since September 8.  He advised that the 
predominately Shia MOI Commando Brigade had been withdrawn 
from the city to mitigate complaints that they were 
behaving in a sectarian manner against Sunnis.  MNF-I was 
unable to confirm or deny the allegations.  The deployment 
of the MOI Public Order Battalion was being delayed for 
a similar reason (largely-Shia composition), and this was on 
the advice of both military commanders on scene and local 
officials.  Brims stressed the need for the ITG to 
immediately begin to pay compensation and to move forward 
with their reconstruction program, which so far has not 
budged.  In addition, the formation of a balanced police 
force is critical to the success of Tal Afar.  At the 
present, security is being provided by CF and IA until a 
police force can be reconstituted. 
 
--------------------- 
INCIDENT IN SADR CITY 
--------------------- 
 
12.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  The Prime Minister next turned to 
the subject of Sadr City.  He was upset because, the night 
before, a firefight had erupted between CF and IA soldiers 
and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) members in that district of 
Baghdad.  The battle lasted ninety minutes, and a number of 
people were killed; yet he had not heard about it until 
hours later, and even then he had only limited details.  GEN 
Casey explained to Jaafari what had taken place.  It was a 
joint CF/IA operation with a specific target, but the IA 
forces were ambushed by JAM and called for help.  A CF 
quick reaction force responded to assist.  With regard to 
the assertion that Jaafari was not being kept informed, GEN 
Casey noted that his staff is briefed every morning by 
MNF-I about the events of the previous 24 hours.  In 
addition, it is the role of the Prime Minister's Situation 
Room to monitor events as they are taking place and inform 
him as needed. 
 
13.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  Minister of Defense Dulime added 
that these types of operations take place all the time and 
do not need to be approved in advance at the highest 
levels.  In this case, the IA was fiercely attacked by JAM 
and suffered three killed in action.  In his opinion, one 
of the most serious problems the ITG faces is the rise in 
influence of JAM.  Jaafari strongly disagreed.  He said 
that JAM is part of the government, with three ministers 
and 23 assembly members.  He challenged Dulime to produce 
documented evidence that these people supported the 
insurgents; if true, he would deal with them himself. 
Jaafari was quickly corrected by Rubaie, who pointed out 
that Jaafari hadn't meant to say JAM was in the 
government.  Rather, the Prime Minister meant that other 
supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr were. 
 
14.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  Al-Anzi supported the Prime 
Minister's view on this.  He asserted "there are no 
terrorists" in Sadr City, but there are members of JAM 
there.  "And as far as I know," he said, "the ITG has not 
declared war on Jaysh al-Mahdi."  The goal of the ITG is to 
turn JAM into a political organization.  Until that 
happens, it is predictable that, whenever CF operate in Sadr 
City, there will be trouble.  He recommended that the 
families of those killed be paid compensation by the 
government. 
 
15.  (C//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari opined that in politics 
there is no such thing as black or white.  Sometimes it is 
necessary to accept the bad to avoid the worst.  "We all 
knew," he said, " when we were negotiating the 
constitution, we were dealing with people who support the 
insurgency.  There are people in the government who stand 
up and speak out against the government when it is trying 
to rid Tal Afar and other places of terrorists. This must 
be accepted."  Jaafari said that, following the tragedy on 
the A'imma Bridge where a thousand Shias died, he had not 
once mentioned any of these "martyrs" by name.  Rather, he 
had told the story over and over of the young Sunni man, 
Othman, who had died saving the lives of Shias.  Jaafari is 
convinced that if he had not done this, Iraq would be in a 
civil war today.  It is critical that the enemies of Iraq 
not be allowed to inflame sectarian divisions. 
 
--------------------------- 
ADDRESSING SECTARIAN STRIFE 
--------------------------- 
 
16.  (C//REL GBR AUS) U.K Ambassador Patey observed that 
the common theme of the subjects discussed had been the 
growing specter of sectarian strife.  The dispute of 
commanders about how and where to place security forces, 
the situation in Tal Afar, and the firefight with JAM in 
Sadr City all pointed to signs of growing sectarian 
rivalries.  He said that the terrorists are winning the 
campaign of perceptions and that it is important to counter 
this.  He suggested the formation of a commission composed 
of respected individuals from all the major sectarian 
groups to refute the charges of those who stand up and try 
to incite sectarian conflict.  If there are allegations that 
certain military or police units are putting sectarianism 
ahead of loyalty to the state, this commission should be 
able to say whether the allegations are true or not.  And if 
true, action must be taken to stop it. 
 
17. (C//REL GBR AUS)  Jaafari agreed and said that Iraqi 
army and police units are not to be assigned to areas based 
on the religious make-up of their members.  "We cannot have 
a Sunni army and a Shia police force."  GEN Casey 
concurred but pointed out that Ambassador Patey's remarks 
went farther than that.  Casey reiterated the need for a 
publicity campaign to publicize the good work the Iraqi 
military does and a commission to investigate and deal 
with complaints of sectarianism. 
 
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COMMENT 
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18.  (C//REL GBR AUS) The Prime Minister was clearly 
showing signs of stress.  The fact that the meeting was 
called with no advance notice and the tone he took 
throughout were unusual. While civility prevailed, 
disagreements between the Sunni Dulime and the Shias 
Jaafari and Anzi were evident.  While they all agree that 
they are fighting a tough battle to prevent an outright 
break between Sunni and Shia, they nevertheless are quick 
to defend the position of their own. 
Khalilzad