US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI7795

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PBTS, ECON, MOPS, PK, IN, INDO-PAK 
SUBJECT: DNSA NAMBIAR TO AMB CROCKER: PAKISTANI GLASS HALF 
FULL? 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Playing bad cop, Deputy National Security 
Advisor Vijay Nambiar gave visiting US Ambassador to Pakistan 
a twenty minute assessment of Pakistani terrorists' ties to 
regional and global jehadi groups as a way of "balancing 
Musharraf's rhetoric."  Bangladesh, he feared, was the new 
hub for global terror groups.  Highlighting the 
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)'s prominence, Nambiar said they now 
rival Al Qaeda as a threat to stability.  Ambassador Crocker 
explained the difficulties Musharraf faces inside Pakistan, 
especially in Waziristan, and that we had to treat the 
Pakistani glass as half full, not half empty.  Crocker also 
briefed on Pakistani views of Afghanistan as well as the July 
18 India-US agreement.  End Summary. 
 
THE BAD COP STATES HIS CASE 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (S) In contrast to Ambassador Crocker's upbeat meeting 
with GOI J&K Interlocutor NN Vohra (septel), Nambiar launched 
the October 4 meeting with a twenty-minute presentation aided 
by a fancy colored graphic that underlined his basic point: 
Pakistan is at the epicenter of regional and global jehad. 
Starting off with a smile, Nambiar said the MEA and the 
Indian High Commission in Islamabad (including during his 
tenure) were programmed to view the Pakistani glass as half 
full.  Now that he is at the National Security Council staff, 
his institutional perspective is to view it as half empty. 
Certain "grim elements" of Pakistani jehadi activity against 
India, he said, and the web of connections from Pakistan to 
the July 7 London Tube attacks, gave India pause.  Nambiar 
sketched an inner circle of Jehad emanating from Pakistan to 
encompass Kashmir, north India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and 
Nepal.  The outer circle encompassed the entire rest of the 
world.  India, he asserted, had noted the evidence of direct 
links between terrorist groups in Bangladesh, Virginia, 
Australia, France, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the 
UK to LeT, Harkat al Ansar, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and other 
groups operating in Pakistan.  Over the years, he complained, 
the training Pakistan had given to people in the inner and 
outer circles of jehad had expanded capabilities and 
threatened stability.  Nowadays, an odd role-reversal had 
occurred, with the LeT giving training to remaining Taleban 
elements in Afghanistan. 
 
THE ACCUSED: BANGLADESH 
----------------------- 
 
3. (S) Focusing on Bangladesh, Nambiar said India was 
particularly worried.  India had started to detect the actual 
presence of Pakistani based terror groups there, in addition 
to groups in Bangladesh having linkages to Pakistan.  India 
had evidence, he alleged, of ISI teams visiting to meet 
Bangladeshi DGFI counterparts and coordinate jehadis' 
activities.  Bangladesh, worried Nambiar, had become a hub in 
the international network of terror.  Publications emanating 
from Bangladesh revealed the jehadis' desire to attack India, 
the US, UK, and Israel as "infidels."  Nambiar fretted about 
the porous border with India, close cultural linkages, 
arrests of Bangladeshi jehadi "commanders" in India, and 
evidence that Bangladeshi groups had sought to network with 
Kashmiri jehadis.  Joint training and procurement had 
commenced as these local franchises found new ways to 
cooperate in their terrorist plans. 
 
THE LeT IS THE WORST OF THE BUNCH 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (S) Nambiar asserted that the LeT now rivals Al Qaeda, and 
India had evidence that the Director General of the ISI had 
met with LeT commanders.  LeT was exerting its influence 
beyond Kashmir to encompass Bangladesh and Afghanistan, where 
elements friendly to LeT were attempting to enter politics 
and become parliamentarians.  Commented Nambiar, "they're not 
fleeing, they're entering politics" in an effort to open yet 
another front in their effort to drive the US out of 
Afghanistan. 
 
AND YOUR POINT IS? 
------------------ 
5. (S) Nambiar told Crocker he did not mean to frighten, but 
rather to seek to balance Musharraf's rhetoric.  Even as 
people-to-people efforts expanded, CBMs continued, and the 
Composite Dialogue progressed, efforts continued by Pakistan 
to recruit and train insurgents and individuals in India. 
Nambiar insisted India had good intelligence information, but 
that it was very hard to take firm and decisive action in a 
democracy where rule of law and civil liberties had to be 
respected.  As a result, he added, loosening the visa regime, 
while helpful in many ways, would give security agencies a 
headache and a monitoring challenge. 
 
CROCKER: THE PAKISTANI GLASS IS HALF FULL 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Terrorism was certainly fungible, said Ambassador 
Crocker, and did not remain in neat boxes.  He added that the 
USG had noted the same LeT linkages Nambiar cited. 
Musharraf, he explained, was increasingly persuaded of what 
needed to be done to combat terror; the process had proceeded 
to a point that returning to a modus vivendi with jehadis was 
now impossible.  The USG had conducted many tough 
conversations with him in that regard.  The Kashmiri groups 
now had tentacles in Pakistan and Afghanistan, too. 
Musharraf's motivations compel him to act to ward off 
instability within Pakistan.  The ISI has nothing like full 
control, and that complicated matters.  Jehadis had tried to 
kill Musharraf and his Corps Commanders.  There has, he 
stressed, been some progress; the Pakistani street did not 
react negatively to overtures to Israel, and the broad swathe 
of Pakistani society was not pro-extremist.  Pakistan was 
trying very hard in tough combat in Waziristan to flush out 
terrorists.  Pitched battles reveal their firm intent. 
Musharraf knew Pakistan needs decisive action in order to 
evolve; he sees the dangers and the transformation was now 
underway.  The USG was pressing for democracy even as 
Pakistani internal politics tried to get away from zero-sum 
games. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
7. (S) The two discussed Afghanistan, with Crocker 
emphasizing that Karzai would get more out of Musharraf if he 
voiced his criticisms privately.  Public attacks had greatly 
irritated the Pakistanis, and had become counter-productive. 
Pakistanis, Crocker affirmed, view Karzai -- a Pashtun who 
had kept the Northern Alliance from leadership and acted 
against anti-Pak warlords -- as the best leader they could 
have expected.  Pakistanis genuinely wanted Karzai to 
succeed, he added.  Nambiar was skeptical, saying Pakistan 
could claim victory whether Karzai or the Taleban succeeded. 
Crocker countered that Pakistan also had grave doubts about 
India's large presence in Consulates in Afghanistan, and its 
suspected role in destabilizing Baluchistan. 
 
THE US-INDIA AGREEMENT 
---------------------- 
 
8. (S) In response to Nambiar's question, Crocker said 
Pakistanis see the July 18 accord as the flip side of F-16 
sales to Pakistan.  Pakistanis realize that the US has huge 
equities with India and that relations must proceed in their 
natural direction.  De-hyphenation meant that each country 
would seek its own excellent bilateral ties with the US 
independent of the other.   Pakistan's elite, he reported, 
had dealt with July 18 quite well, no matter how they felt at 
the time.  Thus far, they have not pressed for similar 
treatment, recognizing that it would be a non-starter. 
 
9. (U) Ambassador Crocker cleared this message. 
 
10. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
Mulford