US embassy cable - 05AMMAN7997

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, JO, IZ 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S MEETING WITH JORDANIAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 
 
 
Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1.  (C) In his meeting with Jordan's National Security 
Advisor Sa'ad Kheir, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad 
emphasized recent efforts made to deal with Sunni Arab 
concerns over the draft Constitution, and asked for Jordanian 
help in encouraging prominent Sunni Arabs to support the 
Constitution and to focus on the constitutional referendum as 
a way station to the December election.  Kheir agreed that 
the general election is crucial and promised increased 
Jordanian efforts to encourage Sunni Arab turnout.  Khalilzad 
noted that Sunnis and other Iraqis need help in developing an 
effective cross-sectarian leadership that can put Iraq firmly 
on the road to stability, unity, and prosperity.  Kheir made 
several allegations regarding Iranian infiltration and 
expansion into Iraq; Khalilzad acknowledged the problem, but 
stressed the importance of not playing Iran's game of 
promoting sectarian confrontation that would push Iraqi Sh'ia 
into Iran's arms.  Khalilzad reiterated that the best 
response to Iran is to encourage the growth of responsible 
Iraqi nationalist and cross-sectarian political movements and 
leaders.  Kheir agreed, and promised stepped-up Jordanian 
efforts to construct with us a more activist policy.  End 
Summary. 
 
Moving Sunni Arabs Forward 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad and Charge 
met with Sa'ad Kheir, Jordanian National Security Advisor, in 
Amman on October 3.  Kheir endorsed the need for broad-based 
Sunni Arab participation in the December elections and 
engagement in the overall political process.  He added that 
this view is now widely accepted among Iraqi Sunnis, marking 
"a real step forward."  However, he noted that many Sunni 
Arabs remain unhappy with the new draft Constitution. 
Ambassador Khalilzad observed that most Iraqi Sunni Arabs are 
not familiar with what is really in the Constitution - 
especially after the most recent revisions, which explicitly 
addressed Sunni Arab concerns over federalism, Iraq's Arab 
identity, and qualifications for citizenship. 
 
3.  (C) Khalilzad also stressed that Sunni Arabs can't keep 
"moving the goal posts" on what they need to make the current 
text acceptable, citing Sunni Arab backpedaling after 
obtaining requested concessions on federalism as an example. 
Major Sunni figures need to recognize that the Constitution 
is a largely positive, compromise document that can be 
amended, and is an acceptable basis for moving forward. 
Khalilzad noted that public articulation of these points by 
prominent Sunnis will help us and them gain further 
concessions on revising the text of the draft Constitution 
from the Sh,ia and Kurdish leadership. 
 
4.  (C) Kheir agreed that Sunni Arabs need to look past the 
upcoming constitutional plebiscite and focus on the December 
elections.  He said that King Abdullah has decided to host a 
conference in Amman in late October designed to bring 
together Iraqi Sunni Arab, Kurdish, Turkomen, and Shi'a 
leaders to assist them in forming a unified, democratic, and 
nationalist approach to Iraq,s future. 
 
Containing Iranian Influence 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Kheir expressed great concern about extensive Iranian 
infiltration of and rising influence in Iraq.  He claimed 
that southern Iraq is becoming an Iranian colony, and alleged 
that key Iraqi government figures, including Prime Minister 
Jafari and Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr, are "Iranian 
agents."  He was particularly emphatic in denouncing Jabr as 
an Iranian loyalist.  More worrisome, Kheir asserted that 
Iranian infiltration runs from top to bottom in the Iraqi 
bureaucracy and security forces.  He also alleged that the 
Iranians have positioned sleeper cells throughout the country 
and are using large-scale "charitable donations" as a tool 
for building massive front organizations.  All these efforts 
are designed to ensure that Iran gains a powerful grip over 
Iraq regardless of the outcome of the December 2005 
elections. 
 
6.  (C) Kheir asserted that, while Western observers 
frequently stress the doctrinal/political differences between 
Iraqi and Iranian Sh,ia, the reality is that "in any 
confrontation with Sunnis, all the Sh,ia (Iranian and Arab) 
will stick together."  Khalilzad argued that the vast 
majority of Iraqi Sh,ia remain nationalistic and will side 
with Iraqi Sunnis in any conflict they perceive as "Iraq 
against Iran."  To avoid playing into Iranian hands, we and 
Sunni Arabs (both in Iraq and in neighboring countries) need 
to be very careful not to fall into the trap of acting as if 
"all Sh,ia are pro-Iran."  Khalilzad highlighted the need to 
make a sharp distinction in political strategy and in public 
and private statements between Iraqi Sh,ia in general and 
those few who are truly loyal to Iran.  To do otherwise will 
simply push the Iraqi Sh,ia into Iranian arms. 
 
7.  (S) Khalilzad noted that one of the best ways to begin 
containing Iran's aggressive strategy, and ultimately roll it 
back, is through encouraging the formation and success of 
moderate, cross-sectarian movements.  Unfortunately, he 
observed, many recent Sunni Arab practices in Iraq, including 
the January 2005 election boycott and toleration or support 
for the insurgency, have actively facilitated the Iranian 
agenda.  Kheir agreed, offering as "proof" Jordanian 
intelligence information that Iran is providing funds and 
arms to Zarqawi and the Iraqi "insurgents."  Khalilzad urged 
the GOJ to help wake the Sunnis up to the reality of how they 
are being manipulated, and to their true interest in 
participating in the political process. 
 
HALE