US embassy cable - 05AMMAN7986

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007986 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE, NEA/ELA 
STATE ALSO FOR EB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EFIN, PREL, JO 
SUBJECT: ADVOCATES AND SKEPTICS SHARE THEIR VIEWS ON THE 
NATIONAL AGENDA 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 7498 
     B. AMMAN 6898 
     C. AMMAN 5849 
     D. AMMAN 5065 
 
Classified By: CDA DAVID HALE FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  As the Jordanian political class awaits the 
release of the reform recommendations of the Royal Commission 
for the National Agenda (NA), Jordanian officials and 
political observers shared their views on the prospects for 
reform with visiting NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Elizabeth 
Dibble during her late September visit to Amman.  DPM Marwan 
Muasher highlighted a reformed electoral law, a new political 
parties law, and tax reform as the three issues to tackle 
early on in the comprehensive national plan for the next 
decade.  Planning for the rollout of the thousand-page NA 
report later in October is underway, including a shorter, 
more digestible summary of the text.  Some leading political 
analysts expressed skepticism that real political reform 
could overcome the power of entrenched political elites. 
COMMENT: For all the intense work put into the National 
Agenda over the past seven months, the GOJ's heavy lifting 
has yet to begin.  END COMMENT AND SUMMARY. 
 
DPM Muasher: Upbeat NA Facilitator 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher, the chairman of 
the Royal Commission for the National Agenda, described for 
Dibble on September 25 the work of the Commission's eight 
committees comprised of over 200 leaders and experts - 
overwhelmingly from outside government - who met over the 
past seven months to hammer out a blueprint for reform-driven 
political, economic and social development in Jordan (Refs A, 
B).  Pulling from his desk a 5-inch thick document, Muasher 
flipped through the full text of the National Agenda to show 
how each of the sections included performance indicators for 
which ministries would be held responsible.  He noted that 
the NA language was flexible enough to accommodate changing 
conditions while being applied to each task.  The Agenda 
would call for actions from government, the private sector, 
and partnerships of the two. 
 
3.  (C) Boosting the rule of law in Jordan is a central 
element of the NA, Muasher noted.  For example, the NA 
criticizes the manner by which Jordan adapted to global 
economic competition (and acceded to the WTO) by adopting 
over 220 provisional laws and amendments to laws while 
parliament was out of session.  COMMENT: We have heard this 
criticism aired privately by retired ministers concerned 
about constitutionality, but never in public and not in a 
document to be proposed for adoption by the government.  END 
COMMENT.  This and other similar sections of the NA may not 
be very welcome to some in the GOJ, Muasher opined, but they 
reflected the transparent process by which the National 
Agenda had been crafted. 
 
4.  (C) Muasher said the three most prominent pieces of the 
NA were the elections law, a political parties law, and tax 
reform.  Of these three, he focused on legislation regarding 
elections and parties as critical next steps in the very near 
future without which the rest of the NA could not move 
forward.  NOTE: In a separate conversation, U.K. Ambassador 
Christopher Prentice repeated for Dibble this same scenario, 
based on his briefing with Muasher, an indication this is a 
consistent GOJ message. END NOTE.  For Muasher, tax reform - 
devising an equitable system that consistently collects 
revenues - is an issue to be picked up in 2006, after the 
first two hurdles have been overcome. 
 
5.  (C) Muasher lamented the difficulties he has faced in 
getting the word out to the public on the National Agenda. 
Once he has a final version, Muasher predicted he would be in 
a better position to market it.  Muasher took pride in the 
shorter and more readable version of the document his staff 
was producing, which would help make the case for the NA with 
graphics, charts and slides. 
 
6.  (C) Muasher thought it likely the chief opposition to the 
Commission's recommendations would come from two camps: 
first, from within "the political establishment of this 
country" - a reference to elements who would see themselves 
losing power under political and media reforms and, second, 
"from the skeptics", chiefly in the media, who do not believe 
a government commission is capable of producing 
recommendations for serious reform.  Muasher believed at 
least the second camp would be won over after the release of 
the report. 
 
Hatough-Boran: Buy-In and Consensus Key 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Acting Foreign Minister and Minister of Tourism 
Hatough-Boran told DAS Dibble the National Agenda represented 
nothing less than the future of Jordan.  Reflecting the 
Cabinet's general knowledge of the NA process (vice Muasher's 
intimate, day-by-day handling of the NA), she said that 
consideration was now being given on how to present the 
National Agenda to the public.  Boran  surmised that it was 
critical to have something akin to a "public debate," and 
that more players had to be involved in laying the groundwork 
for it.  Each of the 200 experts who participated in drafting 
the National Agenda now have to go back to their 
constituencies and sell the reform message.  Because this 
represented the ideas, the concepts, and the future of 
Jordan, GOJ officials have to do it right and play it right, 
she said.  Boran noted that the Jordanian habit of heavily 
criticizing any initiative would be an obstacle to consensus. 
 Journalists' attitudes so far were mixed. 
 
8.  (C) Boran said the GOJ planned to involve embassies of 
donor nations in the rollout - the National Agenda in each of 
its sections is keyed to foreign assistance requests for 
specific amounts - and that Prime Minister Badran would give 
the NA a needed push.  Responding to DAS Dibble's comment, 
she concluded that Jordan was definitely committed to 
remaining a leader of reform in the region. 
 
9.  (C) Central Bank of Jordan Deputy Governor Mohammad 
Shahin noted to Dibble that the National Agenda had an 
important economic component, including the portion he was 
interested in - finance and banking.  He said that Jordan 
wanted to be a "financial hub," but that the many 
prerequisites were "tremendous" in terms of legal and other 
regulatory commitments.  The National Agenda spelled these 
out, he added. 
 
Dinner With the Skeptics 
------------------------ 
 
10.  (C) At a dinner hosted by Charge September 26 with four 
leading academic and media political analysts, Dibble heard 
views typical of the second, "skeptical camp" identified by 
Muasher above.  Political columnist Oreib Rintawi, supported 
by two of the other Jordanian guests, noted that 
government-driven initiatives for reform -- the "Jordan 
Charter" campaign of the early 1990's, and the "Jordan First" 
campaign in the late nineties -- had been tried before. 
Rintawi was included in these efforts, and worked just as 
hard as the NA royal commission recently had.  But according 
to Rintawi, the earlier reform commissions' recommendations 
"had gone nowhere" and he expected the same of the NA. 
American-educated Yarmouk University political scientist 
Muhammad Mo'many pushed back, pointing out that the palace 
had taken on, and been bruised by, Jordan's entrenched 
political interests this spring in the stand-off over PM 
Badran's cabinet (Refs C, D).  Mo'mani called on commentators 
to wait until the plan's rollout before condemning it. 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT: While DPM Muasher appeared tired as he 
explained how much had gone into building the NA, he seemed 
relieved that he could now move into the next phase of 
introducing a finished product to the public.  This phase, 
too, may exact a price - this time political - from those who 
are tasked with selling the National Agenda to a wary public, 
especially entrenched East Bank elites still uncertain of the 
King's vision that to some degree has only peeled away the 
comfortable cocoon of paternalistic government to which they 
have become accustomed. 
 
12.  (U)  DAS Dibble did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message. 
HALE