US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1129

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BM, RS 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SEES A DIFFERENT BURMA 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: the Charge,s initial courtesy call on 
Russian Ambassador Oleg Kabanov on September 27 revealed that 
U.S. policy and Russian policy toward Burma remain poles 
apart.  Amb. Kabanov echoed the Burmese regime,s assertions 
that only the military can maintain order in the country and 
that democracy can only lead to chaos and collapse &in such 
a backward country.8 
 
2.  (C) The Charge d,Affaires called on Amb. Kabanov on 
September 27 at his residence within the Russian Embassy 
compound, a Stalinist-style bunker next to the Foreign 
Ministry in downtown Rangoon.  The Russian mission,s views 
of Burmese politics seem stuck in the same Stalinist frame. 
Kabanov began by asking about the pending referral of the 
situation in Burma to the UNSC, calling that a &serious move 
that could lead to new sanctions.8  The Charge explained 
that Nobel laureates Havel and Tutu had helped raise the 
issue to recent prominence.  Many people agreed that a 
discussion of how the UN could play a more constructive role 
to promote dialogue in Burma would be useful in light of the 
fact that the current situation in the country is unstable 
and adversely affects its neighbors. 
 
3.  (C) Kabanov agreed that past international efforts to get 
the Burmese regime to engage in dialogue had been 
unsuccessful, but urged that we reconsider our position on 
the GOB,s own seven-step Road Map and constitutional 
convention.  The Charge noted that any lasting solution has 
to include all the people and ethnic groups of Burma, and to 
date the GOB,s process was exclusionary and scripted, not 
representative and open. 
 
4.  (C) The Russian Ambassador said that, in his view, the 
choice in Burma was not between perfect and imperfect but 
between &any8 and &none.8  He said the constitutional 
convention was the only remaining chance for political reform 
in Burma.  The process had taken longer than expected, he 
surmised, because the GOB sought to extract additional 
concessions from the ceasefire groups (CFGs), with limited 
success since the ouster of Khin Nyunt.  The portions of the 
constitution he had seen leaked, Kabanov said, called for a 
more independent judiciary, the disbanding of all ethnic 
armies and a single Armed Forces of Burma.  The hardest thing 
would be persuading the CFGs to give up their arms and 
financial privileges, he added.  The Charge responded that 
secret negotiations hardly create a transparent 
 
SIPDIS 
constitutional process that reflects all views, so the ethnic 
groups resist giving up their weapons under such 
circumstances. 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador Kabanov expressed the view that the regime 
generals were not trying to fool the world with their Road 
Map, but only need more time to negotiate internally.  He 
conceded that they will not willingly give up any of their 
own economic interests.  He said the GOB would not release 
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and negotiate with the NLD because 
they &cannot fight on two fronts, and the ethnic groups are 
more formidable and a greater threat since they have arms.8 
The Charg responded that the continued imprisonment of ASSK 
and over one thousand others indicates that the military 
fears ideas more than guns. 
 
6.  (C) Kabanov expressed confidence that when the 
constitutional draft is released, it would provide an 
opportunity for public engagement on reform.  The Charge 
asked whether he thought the GOB would ever be willing to 
permit a real public debate on the constitution and allow a 
free flow of information to facilitate informed choice.  He 
said that a public discussion of the constitution would open 
up new opportunities for opposition groups to return to the 
political process.  He conceded Aung San Suu Kyi would easily 
win if an election were held in Burma at this time and 
surmised the regime would seek to prevent such a result in a 
future vote.  The Charge said that, in such a case, the 
election would have no credibility and achieve nothing. 
 
7.  (C) Growing more exercised, the Russian Ambassador 
complained that Western countries are &too impatient now.8 
He noted that it took centuries for democracy to develop in 
Europe and that it could take a very long time here, too.  He 
added that in 1988, the military had &been forced8 to 
restore order in Burma when &chaos erupted from public 
demonstrations8 after the ouster of Ne Win.  The Charge 
disputed Kabanov,s allegations and termed the military,s 
murder of hundreds of unarmed people engaged in peaceful 
protest as completely unjustified.  Kabanov claimed that he 
had learned from a former Russian diplomat here that there 
were &hooligans8 among the demonstrators and that street 
crime was widespread in August 1988.  The Charge reiterated 
that the victims were unarmed and protesting peacefully; it 
was the military that was out of line. 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT: the Russians, primary objective in Burma is 
intelligence gathering and arms sales.  Russia might agree at 
higher levels to not block UN discussion of Burma, but the 
Russian Ambassador in Rangoon clearly follows the regime 
line.  Kabanov seemed nostalgic for the era when his country 
was also an autocracy; he told the Charge that he keeps the 
55-volume set of Lenin,s collected works in his office, 
noting that it took years in exile for the Bolsheviks to plan 
and organize &reform8 of the Russian political system.  He 
dismissed NLD as having no plan, instead seemingly content to 
wait for change on the military,s terms.  End comment. 
Villarosa