US embassy cable - 90JEDDAH2807

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JEDDAH 02807 
 
 
FROM GNEHM 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL, KU, SA 
SUBJECT: KUWAITI SAUDI RELATIONS - A KUWAITI PERSPECTIVE 
 
1.  SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
 
2.  SUMMARY 
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GIVEN THE VAST DIMENSIONS OF THE GULF CRISIS AND THE 
INTENSE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT AT 
THE PRESENT TIME, FRICTION OR DISAGREEMENTS ARE AMAZINGLY 
FEW AND GENERALLY OF A MARGINAL NATURE - AT LEAST FROM 
THE KUWAITI PERSPECTIVE.  THERE ARE, HOWEVER, AS MIGHT BE 
EXPECTED GIVEN THE PASSAGE OF TIME, A NUMBER OF RUBS IN 
THE RELATIONSHIP.  WHILE KUWAITI OFFICIALS REMAIN 
GENERALLY CONFIDENT ABOUT SAUDI POLICY, THERE ARE 
CONCERNS LACED WITH FEAR OVER THE SAUDIS BOTH WITHIN AND 
OUTSIDE THE AL SAUD FAMILY WHO ESPOUSE COMPROMISE WITH 
IRAQ AT KUWAITI EXPENSE.  KUWAITIS ALSO QUESTION THE 
SAUDI DECISION TO LOCATE THE GOK IN ISOLATED TAIF AND 
THEY ARE UPSET OVER SAUDI CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR REBUILDING 
OF THE KUWAITI MILITARY.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
3.  KUWAIT LITERALLY DRIVEN INTO SAUDI ARABIA 
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THE AUGUST 2 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND SUBSEQUENT 
IRAQI BRUTALITIES IN KUWAIT LITERALLY DROVE KUWAIT INTO 
SAUDI ARABIA.  THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND THE BULK OF 
KUWAIT'S GOVER`MENT ARRIVED ON THE SCENE IN NEED OF 
SUPPORT AND SUSTENANCE.  THE SAUDIS WERE AND REMAIN 
GENEROUS WITH BOTH.  THE SAUD FAMILY OPENLY RECALLED THE 
SABAH FAMILY (AND KUWAITI) SUPPORT FOR THE SAUDS DURING 
THEIR EXILE FROM SAUDI ARABIA EARLIER IN THE CENTURY AND 
THEY MADE CLEAR THEY WERE STANDING BY THEIR FRIENDS IN 
NEED DURING THIS CRISIS.  SAUDI SUPPORT HAS BEEN 
EXTENSIVE WITH MATERIAL AID (FOOD AND HOUSING) TO 
THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED KUWAITI NATIONALS.  THE SAG HAS 
ALSO HELPED THE GOK TO RECONSTITUTE ITSELF IN THE KINGDOM 
AND HAS FACILITATED THE COMINGS AND GOINGS OF KUWAITI 
OFFICIALS AND THEIR GUESTS.  GENERALLY THE SAUDIS HAVE 
GIVEN THE GOK FREE REIGN MOST DRAMATICALLY SEEN IN THE 
CONVOCATION OF AN ALL-KUWAITI CONFERENCE THAT HIGH- 
LIGHTED KUWAITI COMMITMENTS TO PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT. 
ON THE MILITARY FRONT, THE SAUDIS PERMITTED THE KUWAITIS 
TO REFURBISH THEIR AIR FORCE ON SAUDI BASES AND THERE IS 
A SIMILAR PROGRAM WITH KUWAITI LAND FORCES. 
 
4.  KUWAITIS CONTINUE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR SAUDI 
HOSPITALITY AND GENEROSITY AND THAT GRATITUDE REMAINS 
BASIC IN THE RELATIONSHIP.  AT THE SAME TIME THE KUWAITIS 
DO EXPRESS SOME FRUSTRATION - LARGELY STEMMING FROM AN 
UNNATURAL DEPENDENCY.  MANY KUWAITI OFFICIALS ARE 
INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WITH THE LOCATION OF THE GOK IN 
TAIF.  WHILE INITIALLY ACCEPTING THE SAUDI ARGUMENT IN 
FAVOR OF SECURITY, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND A CHANGED 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE 
KUWAITIS NOW FEEL INCREASINGLY ISOLATED AND CUT OFF FROM 
EVENTS.  KUWAITI OFFICIALS NOTE THAT VISITORS (INCLUDING 
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. CONGRESSIONAL GROUPS) PASS 
THROUGH NEARBY JEDDAH BUT DO NOT MAKE IT TO TAIF.  THEY 
LISTEN TO NEWSCASTERS WHO REPEATEDLY DISPARAGE THE GOK AS 
RESIDENT IN  A POSH HOTEL IN THE SAUDI MOUNTAIN RESORT. 
KUWAITIS IN EXILE CERTAINLY DO NOT CONSIDER TAIF A RESORT 
AND DESPAIR AT THE MEDIA'S CONTINUED HARPING ON THIS 
THEME.  THE KUWAITIS TEND TO BLAME THE SAUDIS FOR THEIR 
PREDICAMENT.  WE HEAR MORE AND MORE TALK FROM THE 
KUWAITIS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO RELOCATE BUT THEY 
BELIEVE THE SAUDIS WILL NOT AGREE. 
 
 
5.  KING SOLID, UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OTHERS 
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THE KUWAITIS REMAIN GENERALLY CONVINCED THAT SAUDI POLICY 
IS FIRMLY BEHIND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS 
- SPECIFICALLY FULL AND COMPLETE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND 
RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT.  THIS 
CONVICTION RESTS LARGELY ON THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE AMIR AND KING FAHD.  KUWAITIS REPEATEDLY 
REFER TO THE KING'S STAUNCH SUPPORT.  IN DOING SO, 
HOWEVER, IT OFTEN IMPLIES AN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE 
STRENGTH OF SUPPORT ELSEWHERE WITHIN THE SAUDI 
GOVERNMENT.  AT VARIOUS TIMES ONE HAS HEARD CONCERNS 
ABOUT THE POSITION OF CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OR DEFENSE 
MINISTER PRINCE SULTAN, BUT THESE DOUBTS APPEAR MORE A 
CONSEQUENCE OF THE EVER ONGOING KUWAITI PROPENSITY  TO 
DISSECT AND TO ANALYZE EACH AND EVERY INDICATOR OF 
POSSIBLE SHIFTS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THEIR CAUSE.  THERE 
ARE ALWAYS, FOR EXAMPLE, NERVOUS DISCUSSIONS OF EACH NEWS 
REPORT THAT SOME ARAB OR OTHER POLITICAL FIGURE IS 
UNDERTAKING AN EFFORT TO MEDIATE THE CRISIS.  INEVITABLY, 
THEY FRET OVER ANY INDICATION THE SAUDIS MAY BE INVOLVED. 
THUS FAR, SENIOR KUWAITI OFFICIALS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT 
SAUDI POLICY IS FIRM, BUT ONE NOW HEARS MORE RUMBLINGS 
THAN BEFORE FROM LESSER OFFICIALS CONCERNED THAT SAUDI 
DETERMINATION MAY ERODE.  THEY CITE MOUNTING DEBATE 
WITHIN THE KINGDOM BY SOME LESSER MEMBERS OF THE SAUD 
FAMILY AS WELL AS NON-ROYALS OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE 
KINGDOM SHOULD RISK WAR AND DISTRUCTION FOR KUWAIT, AND 
WHETHER KUWAIT SHOULD COMPROMISE AND OFFER SADDAM 
FACE-SAVING CONCESSIONS. 
 
6.  KUWAITI-SAUDI COOPERATION FINANCIALLY IN SUPPORT OF 
COALITION PARTNERS HAS BEEN CLOSE AND GENERALLY 
HARMONIOUS.  WORKING SOMEWHAT WITHIN A GCC CONTEXT THE 
TWO HAVE BASICALLY AGREEED ON RECIPIENTS AND LEVELS.  THE 
KUWAITIS ARE PROBABLY MORE WILLING THAN SAUDI ARABIA TO 
PROVIDE SOME ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN BUT THEY BOW TO STRONG 
SAUDI FEELINGS.  THE KUWAITIS SEEM AS FIRM AS THE SAUDIS 
IN OPPOSING AID TO JORDAN.  THE ONLY FRICTIONS WE DETECT 
IN THIS AREA WAS IN THE ALLOCATION OF DOLS 100 MILLION IN 
KUWAITI ASSISTANCE TO SOME SMALLER STATES (DJIBOUTI, 
SOMALIA, AND LEBANON).  THE KUWAITIS APPARENTLY GAVE 
THEIR DOLS 100 MILLION TO THE SAUDIS TO DISBURSE.  THE 
SAUDIS WITHOUT ASKING RECONFIGURED THE APPORTIONMENT 
AFTER THE KUWAITIS HAD TOLD THOSE GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR 
AID LEVELS LEADING TO SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO KUWAIT. 
 
 
7.  SOME SNAGS IN MILITARY COOPERATION 
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MILITARY COOPERATION APPEARS TO BE LARGELY SUCCESSFUL 
THOUGH WE ARE NOW HEARING REPORTS OF SOME DIFFICULTIES IN 
THIS AREA.  WHEN IRAQ INVADED KUWAIT, KUWAITI PILOTS FLEW 
THEIR FIGHTERS TO SAUDI ARABIA.  KUWAITI SOURCES SAY THE 
SAUDIS REFUSED TO REFUEL THE PLANES SO THEY COULD 
CONTINUE TO FIGHT.  ULTIMATELY THE  SAUDIS BASED THE 
KUWAITI A-4S IN KHAMIS MUSHAYT AND THE MIRAGE FIGHTERS IN 
TAIF.  IN THE DAYS AFTER THE INVASION, THE REMNANTS OF 
KUWAITI LAND FORCES STRAGGLED ACROSS THE SAUDI BORDER AND 
WERE EVENTUALLY COLLECTED IN HAFR AL-BATIN.  THROUGH THE 
PAST THREE MONTHS THE GOK MADE A HIGH PRIORITY OF GETTING 
THEIR FORCES REORGANIZED AND READY TO HELP LIBERATE THEIR 
COUNTRY.  WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE SAUDIS THEY OBTAINED 
PERMISSION FOR THE ENTRY OF U.S. TECHNICIANS, SPARE 
PARTS, AND MUNITIONS FOR THE A-4 PROGRAM.  THE PLANES ARE 
NOW FLYING AND PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT EXERCISE WITH 
U.S. FORCES.  A SENIOR KUWAIT OFFICIAL, WHO RECENTLY 
DISCUSSED THIS SUCCESS STORY, RELATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE 
SAUDIS HAD STRONGLY RESISTED MOVING THE A-4'S FROM 
SOUTHWESTERN SAUDI ARABIA TO THE EASTERN PROVINCE 
PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE SAUDIS WERE AFRAID THE KUWAIT AIR 
FORCE MIGHT PRECIPITATE HOSTILITIES WITH THE IRAQIS.  THE 
KUWAIT OFFICIAL SAID THE GOK BROUGHT MAJOR PRESSURE TO 
BEAR AT SENIOR LEVELS IN THE SAG TO FORCE THE SAUDIS TO 
AGREE TO THE MOVEMENT. 
 
8.  SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES REPORTEDLY CONTINUE WITH EFFORTS 
TO REORGANIZE KUWAITI LAND FORCES.  KUWAITI OFFICIALS 
COMPLAIN THE SAUDIS ARE SLOW IN ANY DECISION RELATED TO 
THIS EFFORT INCLUDING DELIVERY OF ITEMS NEEDED TO 
RE-EQUIP THE NEW BRIGADES AS WELL AS LAUNCHING THE 
TRAINING PROGRAM.  IN A RARE DISPLAY OF REAL ANGER TOWARD 
THE SAUDIS, ANOTHER KUWAITI OFFICIAL ACCUSED THE SAUDIS 
OF BLOCKING KUWAITI EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A TRAINING CAMP 
FOR UP TO 30,000 NEW RECRUITS.  THE OFFICIAL SAID THE GOK 
HAD BEEN PRESSING THE SAG FOR ALMOST TWO MONTHS TO 
PROVIDE A SITE WHERE BASIC TRAINING COULD TAKE PLACE; BUT 
THE SAUDIS SEEMED OPPOSED TO SUCH AN EFFORT.  HE SAID THE 
GOK WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SAUDIS. 
 
 
9.  OVERALL:  CLOSE COOPERATION, DESPITE A FEW FRICTIONS 
-   --------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
ALL IN ALL, GIVEN THE BIZARRE SITUATION, RELATIONS 
BETWEEN KUWAITIS AND SAUDIS - AT LEAST FROM THE KUWAITI 
PERSPECTIVE - REMAIN REMARKEDLY GOOD.  THE MANY AREAS OF 
CLOSE COOPERATION AND INTERRELATIONSHIP REFLECT THE 
FUNDAMENTAL MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE TWO AS WELL AS THE 
ADMITTEDLY DEPENDENT POSITION OF THE GOK AT THIS TIME. 
MUCH OF THE NEGATIVES WE HEAR ARE EASILY UNDERSTOOD AS 
STEMMING FROM CONTINUED KUWAITI FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE 
EVOLVING CRISIS SITUATION.  MOST ARE TO BE EXPECTED AND 
ON BALANCE IT IS SURPRISING HOW FEW PROBLEMS WE FIND.  AT 
THE SAME TIME THERE ARE SOME FRICTIONS AND THEY WILL GROW 
AS MORE TIME PASSES WITHOUT ANY DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE 
CRISIS.  WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT THESE FRICTIONS TO 
AFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY THE CLOSE COOPERATION THAT EXISTS 
BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS DURING THE CRISIS. 
 
10.  DOHA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
GRIFFIN