US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS2059

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, PHUM, PTER, AG, MO, WI, UN, Polisario 
SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BASTAGLI'S MEETING WITH 
AMBASSADOR ON WESTERN SAHARA ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1.  (C) UN Special Representative to the Secretary General 
for the Western Sahara Francesco Bastagli briefed Ambassador 
October 1 on his meetings in the region since taking up his 
new duties.  He expressed appreciation for the U.S. 
contribution to resolving Western Sahara issues; spoke of the 
need to bolster Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between 
the parties; said the Moroccan Minister of Interior had 
offered to work out an arrangement for visits to Sahrawi 
prisoners; thought Algeria could be more helpful on CBMs, 
though Morocco remained the "main obstacle" to progress; 
advocated the need for practical steps forward; and indicated 
he was prepared to interpret his mandate broadly.  Bastagli 
said he worried that there was potential for unrest if the 
dispute remained unresolved and warned that the status quo 
could not last.  (End Summary.) 
 
BASTAGLI IN REGION TO LISTEN AND LEARN 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In an October 1 courtesy call, UN Special 
Representative to the Secretary General for the Western 
Sahara Francesco Bastagli briefed Ambassador, accompanied by 
DCM and PolEc Chief, on his meetings with the key players in 
the region.  MINURSO Political Officer Carmen Johns and 
Tindouf Liaison Office Head Ingunde Suchlau accompanied 
Bastagli.  Bastagli said he had been in Tindouf the previous 
day (September 30) and in Rabat earlier in the week.  His 
next stop would be Mauritania before returning to Laayoune. 
He began his mission by having consultations at the UN in New 
York and came to the region to "listen and learn."  He 
commented that the Algerian MFA had its own "political 
archeology" on the Western Sahara, which he discovered in the 
course of his conversations with that Ministry.  Having come 
from the Balkans, where he served for three years in Pristina 
on Kosovo issues, Bastagli professed to understanding the 
importance of memory.   He also expressed his appreciation 
for the U.S. contribution to resolving Western Sahara issues, 
including the August release of Moroccan prisoners as an 
outcome of Senator Lugar's presidential mission. 
 
MOROCCO MAIN OBSTACLE, BUT ALGERIA COULD DO MORE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3.  (C) Addressing the climate within the UN on the Western 
Sahara, Bastagli said the UNSC wanted to be informed on the 
monitoring of the cease-fire and was re-deploying military 
observers to facilitate this.  Confidence Building Measures 
(CBM) between Morocco and the Polisario needed to be 
implemented.  Bastagli said there were positive signs in 
Rabat based on his meetings there.  He wanted to pursue every 
opportunity for progress with Morocco, Algeria, and the 
Polisario.  Asked by Ambassador for examples of positive 
signs, Bastagli cited his meeting with the Moroccan Interior 
Minister, whom he had asked to resume family visits to the 
Sahrawi prisoners on humanitarian grounds.  Absent progress 
on CBMs, Bastagli reminded his Moroccan interlocutor, the 
next Secretary General's report to the UNSC would cast 
Morocco as the party blocking progress.  That could alienate 
donors, argued Bastagli in Rabat.  A positive signal from 
Morocco was especially needed following the Polisario's 
release of all the remaining Moroccan prisoners.  Bastagli 
said his Moroccan interlocutor took the point and gave him a 
"small present," offering to work out a visitation 
arrangement.  In contrast to the Moroccan Interior Ministry, 
continued Bastagli, the MFA in Rabat was more guarded. 
Bastagli was also conferring with UNHCR, since it was 
important that all parties agreed to the formula.  Turning to 
Algeria, Bastagli said Algeria as the host country for a 
large portion of the refugee community could be of more help 
in bolstering CBMs, even though Morocco was the main obstacle 
to progress.  Algeria, observed Bastagli, saw the dispute as 
one between Morocco and the Polisario to which Algeria was 
not a party. 
 
NEED TO FOCUS ON PRACTICAL STEPS 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) On the Algerian side, reported Bastagli, the GOA was 
upset that MINURSO was not denouncing the abuses of Sahrawi 
prisoners by Morocco, even though the GOA knew full well that 
was not part of MINURSO's mandate.  Ambassador commented that 
each party wanted MINURSO to exceed its mandate only when it 
suited its purposes.  MINURSO raised human rights concerns 
informally, responded Bastagli.  This was the most practical 
way forward.  Although Algeria wanted Morocco to implement 
the Baker Plan, Morocco clearly had other ideas.  MINURSO had 
a very limited mandate and could not carry out its main 
function, which was the organization of the referendum. 
Bastagli said there had been no discussion of this, since 
Morocco vehemently opposed a referendum.  Bastagli saw his 
role as implementing any referendum, not deciding the 
politics of holding one.  His primary focus was to focus on 
the practical steps that could be taken now, such as CBMs. 
There was a sense of urgency, since the passage of time was 
an active ingredient in the conflict.  Perhaps, Bastagli 
wondered aloud, the time factor would convince the U.S. to 
become more actively engaged.  The possibility for unrest was 
always present.  He said a Polisario official had told him 
because the Sahrawis were Muslims and did not engage in 
terrorist activity, no one worked actively to resolve their 
dispute with Morocco. 
 
HOW MANY REFUGEES ARE THERE? 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Turning to the camps in Tindouf and noting that 
Morocco publicly spoke about Moroccan Sahrawi prisoners being 
held by the Polisario, Ambassador asked if the refugees could 
leave the camps freely.  Suchlau said she personally did not 
see how it was possible to contain them.  There was much 
traffic between the camps and Tindouf and between the camps 
and Mauritania.  The desert was wide open for anyone wanting 
to leave the camps.  Nonetheless, added Bastagli, there were 
evident economic and practical constraints to leaving the 
camps.  Suchlau noted that it was not difficult to obtain a 
residency permit for Mauritania; there was a large Sahrawi 
community in that country.  Bastagli then commented that the 
number of refugees, according to the Moroccans, had been 
falling.  It was not just the Sahrawis resident in the camps 
who required a political resolution; the situation affected 
others as well.  DCM asked how the World Food Program derived 
its reduced estimate of residents in the camps.  Suchlau said 
the figures came basically from the UNHCR, but since there 
had been no formal census, it was hard to establish a valid 
estimate of the population. 
 
STATUS QUO CANNOT LAST 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Bastagli, who (unlike his predecessor) was received 
in Algiers by both the Algerian Foreign Minister and the MFA 
Secretary General, said he encouraged the GOA to assume its 
 
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responsibilities as a nation hosting refugees.  While 
Algerians naturally were interested in the situation, both 
officials had agreed the dispute was between the Polisario 
and Morocco.  Bastagli said although it was hard to convince 
key member states to engage again on this issue at a high 
level, it was a mistake to think that the status quo could 
last.  It was sad, he said, that it sometimes took violence 
to generate action by the international community.  Morocco, 
he continued, had invested much in the economic development 
of the Western Sahara under its control, but it clumsily 
handled the local Sahrawi population.  Citing his visit to 
the port of Dakhla, Bastagli said Moroccan authorities often 
chopped in half the boats of local fishermen operating 
without licenses. 
 
7.  (C) Bastagli said that despite their presence in 
Laayoune, MINURSO staff were in fact effectively cut off from 
the local population and unable to talk directly to Sahrawis. 
 The Moroccan police presence in Laayoune was pervasive and 
the all-Morocco composition of MINURSO's local staff further 
limited unfiltered contact. Overall, Bastagli commented, the 
extent of Moroccan Government control exceeded what Bastagli 
had seen elsewhere.  MINURSO staffer Johns added that 
demonstrations such as those in May and June always seemed to 
take place at times when she was on leave or on a mission, 
again limiting her ability to form an independent judgment of 
the situation.  A joint civilian-military cell to monitor the 
situation was being established, even though that was outside 
MINURSO's formal mandate, Johns added. 
 
ERDMAN