US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS2058

S E C R E T ALGIERS 002058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015 
TAGS: ETTC, KOMC, MASS, AG, Blue Lantern 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES BLUE LANTERN IMPASSE WITH MFA 
SECRETARY GENERAL 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REF: STATE 160827 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
1. (S) In an October 4 meeting with MFA Secretary General 
Lamamra on other issues, Ambassador pushed hard on the Blue 
Lantern impasse, frankly cautioning that this issue was 
damaging perceptions of Algeria in Washington and 
jeopardizing possibilities for increased military 
cooperation.  Ambassador explained that the State 
Department's Blue Lantern program was established to protect 
sensitive technologies from being transferred to unauthorized 
parties.  Protecting these technologies was important not 
only to the United States but to our friends.  For some time, 
both the MFA and the Algerian Ministry of Defense had 
cooperated fully with our requirements. 
 
2. (S) About a year ago, Ambassador continued, we asked the 
GOA to verify the receipt of equipment (containing sensitive 
U.S. technologies) sold by a South African firm.  We 
requested confirmation from Algeria because we had come to 
have doubts about the reliability of the South African firm 
and knew we could trust Algeria.  Despite our having raised 
this issue on numerous occasions with MFA and MOD officials, 
the GOA has not provided a response.  Ambassador said we were 
perplexed by this and felt there must be a misunderstanding 
in view of Algeria's previous cooperation with the Blue 
Lantern program. 
 
3. (S) The Ambassador explained to Lamamra that the State 
Department had a legal requirement to protect commercial 
sales of sensitive U.S. technologies via the Blue Lantern 
program.  In the absence of Algerian cooperation, we had been 
forced to suspend license approval for sensitive exports to 
Algeria.  To date, over a billion dollars of actual or 
potential sales were being held up.  This was good for 
neither Algeria nor the United States.  Ambassador said that 
on the tactical level, he was sure we would get through this 
largely technical problem sooner or later.  The more 
strategic concern, however, was that Algerian non-cooperation 
with this program was creating negative perceptions of 
Algeria. 
 
4. (S) Ambassador noted this was happening at a time when 
Algeria was interested in taking our military cooperation and 
military sales relationship to the next higher level and when 
he and others were urging closer cooperation.  Algeria's 
non-cooperation was undercutting these efforts and meant that 
Algeria would have to work three times as hard to erase the 
negative perceptions it was creating.  Our inability to 
process requests because of continued non-cooperation with 
Blue Lantern would also have ramifications for Algeria's 
ability to upgrade its C-130 fleet, upgrades that were 
necessary in order for Algerian C-130s to meet European 
avionics standards and continue to be able to fly in Europe. 
Only the U.S. was able to supply the required technology. 
Such a technology transfer was inconceivable as long as Blue 
Lantern issues remained unresolved.  It was in both our 
interests to avoid such a problem. 
 
5. (S) Given the increasing seriousness of this issue, 
Ambassador said he was also personally disturbed that in 
response to his request to meet with Minister-Delegate of 
Defense Guenaizia to discuss this issue, the MOD had replied 
with a note to our defense attache indicating the issue was 
being handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Ambassador 
said it was quite possible that the request for a meeting 
could be bottled up at the same level in the MOD where we 
believe the Blue Lantern problem originated.  In this regard, 
he noted that he had earlier raised his concerns with 
(outgoing) presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir and that the 
latter had subsequently called to say he had spoken to 
Guenaizia and that the Minister-Delegate would be happy to 
see the Ambassador.  Ambassador said he would be returning to 
Washington for consultations for several days in the first 
part of October and, on his return, would seek a meeting with 
Guenaizia in order to discuss our military cooperation in 
light of his consultations.  Lamamra responded that "God 
willing" Ambassador would have his meeting. 
ERDMAN