US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1757

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001757 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, CE, Elections 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  MINORITY HEAVYWEIGHTS COME OUT FOR 
OPPOSITION 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1730 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (U) At separate press conferences on October 5 Ceylon 
Workers Congress (CWC) head Arumugam Thondaman and Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakeem announced their 
parties' support for United National Party (UNP) presidential 
candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe.  The CWC accompanied its 
announcement with a 19-point "proposal" for a Wickremesinghe 
government, including devolution of power, "a mutually 
beneficial" relationship with India, and "proper 
implementation" of incumbent President Kumaratunga's 
agreement on tsunami aid coordination (also known as 
"P-TOMS") with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
In his press conference, the SLMC's Hakeem identified Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse's 
electoral alliances with the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) as 
serious obstacles to supporting a Rajapakse ticket.  Hakeem 
also cited the failure of the current SLFP government to 
redevelop more efficiently and equitably (predominantly 
Muslim) tsunami-stricken areas in the east.  Finally, Hakeem 
reportedly claimed that Wickremesinghe had guaranteed 
separate Muslim representation at future peace talks.  (Note: 
 We have not verified this claim with the UNP.) 
 
2.  (SBU)  Besides the CWC and SLMC, the UNP appears to have 
netted support from the Upcountry People's Front (UPF), 
which, like the CWC, represents Indian Tamil estate workers. 
(Unlike CWC, however, the UPF has a strong pro-LTTE tinge to 
its politics.)  K.T. Kurusamy, a UPF Municipal Councilor, 
told us that his party had also signed an agreement with 
Wickremesinghe on October 5.  The total Indian Tamil vote is 
estimated at just under 1 million--most of which is now 
expected to go to the UNP candidate--of 13.3 million 
registered voters.    (Comment:  The Muslim vote is far less 
monolithic.  SLMC estimates--which may be inflated--put its 
party's vote bank at 500,000.) 
 
3.  (C)  Comment:  As expected, the minority vote appears 
thus far to be lining up solidly behind the UNP's 
Wickremesinghe.  The great unknown remains, however, what 
role the LTTE may play.  The LTTE's "get-out-the-vote" effort 
is fairly straightforward:  the Tigers either give the 
estimated 600,000 or so voters living in their territory 
permission to go to polling booths in government-controlled 
territory (where Tamil voters would likely vote 
overwhelmingly for the pro-devolution Wickremesinghe) or they 
do not (thus indirectly benefiting the SLFP's Rajapakse). 
The pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) has so far 
resisted tipping its hand, as have our other 
LTTE-sympathizing contacts.  While logic would suggest that 
the LTTE would be happiest with a UNP victory, the Tigers 
have shown us time and again that they do not always follow 
the ostensibly logical path.  Unlike the last election, in 
which the candidates' positions on the peace process did not 
differ markedly, Rajapakse's decision to ally himself with 
the nationalist, anti-devolution JVP and JHU presents the 
voters with a far starker choice.  The Tigers' August 12 
assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar raised 
obvious questions about their sincerity in seeking a 
negotiated settlement to the conflict.  Whom the Tigers 
decide to support in the November 17 election will provide a 
still clearer indication of LTTE intentions in the peace 
process. 
LUNSTEAD