US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1128

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015 
TAGS: PARM, MASS, PREL, BM, RS 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ARMS TRADER TO OPEN BURMA OFFICE 
 
REF: RANGOON 989 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  A Russian diplomat in Rangoon says that a 
major state-owned Russian arms dealer, Rosoboronexport State 
Corporation, will open an office in Burma as "a natural 
presence to support Russia's growing commercial military 
relationship" with the SPDC military regime.  The diplomat 
also reported that the Burmese regime's second ranking 
official, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, postponed a trip 
last month to Moscow "without explanation."  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) A September 28 article by Mizzima News (an India-based 
Burmese exile news organization) reported that the Russian 
arms trader Rosoboronexport plans to open an office in Burma 
before the end of the year.  The article added that the 
Russian Embassy in Rangoon "had no knowledge of 
Rosoboronexport's plans for an office in (Burma) and said it 
was the company's decision whether or not to cooperate with 
the embassy." 
 
3. (C) On September 29, P/E chief met with Alexander 
Kudryashov, the Russian Embassy's counselor for information 
and political affairs.  Kudryashov, responding to an inquiry 
about the press report, said "it is absolutely true" that 
Rosoboronexport would open an office in Rangoon, and would do 
so within the coming months.  He said the new office would be 
"a natural presence to support Russia's growing commercial 
military relationship" with Burma's military regime. 
 
4. (C) Kudryashov, who described Rosoboronexport as "perhaps 
the largest" of five state-owned Russian arms companies, said 
that company representatives would likely enter Burma on 
Russian diplomatic or official service passports.  He did not 
know the specific location within Rangoon of the proposed 
office, but he opined that the arms company "had plenty of 
business to oversee" in Burma.  (DAO Comment: Russian defense 
attache contacts were less than forthcoming with information 
on the Rosoboronexport plans, only saying that the company 
"may" set up shop within the Embassy, similar to its Beijing 
operations, and would staff the office with a single company 
representative.  End Comment.) 
 
5. (C) On a separate but related topic, Kudryashov said that 
the SPDC's Deputy Chairman, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, 
had postponed an official trip to Russia, scheduled for last 
month, "without offering any explanation."  He said the 
mysterious postponement of the trip, which had been planned 
for months and would have included a large delegation, "gave 
some credence to rumors (in August) of a senior leadership 
power struggle" (reftel).  He added, however, that regime 
officials had dealt directly with the Russian Government, 
through their mission in Moscow, and "we (in Rangoon) were 
completely in the dark about the postponement of the visit." 
(Comment from DAO:  Attache sources say that Maung Aye's trip 
was postponed because President Putin would be in New York 
for the UNGA.  End Comment.) 
 
6. (C) Note: At about the same time that Maung Aye postponed 
his Russia trip, Prime Minister General Soe Win postponed an 
official visit to Beijing.  Chinese diplomats tell us, 
however, that this was a PRC decision in order to "take more 
time to prepare deliverables."  They noted that then-Prime 
Minister General Khin Nyunt had secured a dozen agreements 
during his July 2004 China trip (just months before his 
ouster) and the PRC did not want Soe Win "to lose face and 
return empty-handed from China."  End Note. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  We see a common pattern in the SPDC's 
foreign relations.  Those countries which choose to engage 
Burma do so primarily to support their own national interests 
(e.g. Russia and its commercial arms relationship).  The 
military regime welcomes the engagement, mostly as a means to 
bolster its own legitimacy, but resists any effort to 
influence its behavior or decision-making--essentially 
treating those who engage no differently than those who 
choose to isolate.  Maung Aye is likely to reschedule his 
Moscow trip and the regime is keen to maintain warm relations 
with Russia.  He and his junta brethren, however, perceive no 
repercussions in placing a low priority on such gestures. 
End Comment. 
Villarosa