US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7725

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 007725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, ECON, EAID, EG, IZ, SY, OVIP 
SUBJECT: VISIT OF AMBASSADOR JEFFREY:  EGYPTIAN REACTION TO 
ARAB OUTREACH STRATEGY 
 
 
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) During meetings with key Egyptian leaders and Arab 
League Secretary General Amre Moussa, Interagency Iraq Team 
laid out the situation in Iraq, linked it with the underlying 
policy approach outlined by the Secretary at Princeton 
University, and urged more Eqyptian and Arab League 
engagement with Iraq.  Ambassador Jeffrey stressed in 
particular the criticality of success in Iraq for the entire 
region, the need for our Arab friends to act now to support 
Iraqi democratic forces and pressure Syria, encourage 
peaceful participation of Sunni Arabs in the political 
process, and on the importance of such action for our 
bilateral relations with Arab states.  Interlocutors 
displayed real concern for the situation in Iraq and a 
general willingness to be helpful.   However, the general 
sympathy with our support for democracy in Iraq was much 
dampened by concerns about the "Iranian factor," fears that 
the Sunni Arabs - and more generally the Arab world ideology 
of a unified (Sunni) Arab identity - would suffer as a result 
of "one (wo)man one vote" in Iraq, and urgings that we focus 
on regional security.  Unhelpful specific ideas including 
variants on the "issue an MNF-I withdrawal timetable" idea by 
both Aboul Gheit and Moussa, and various suggestions for 
"reconciliation gatherings" that would seemingly undercut the 
political process (and democratic legitimacy of the ITG) 
along "old Middle East thinking" lines.  Thus, we made no 
breakthroughs in the Egyptians' willingness to take major 
risks to act now.  (The killing of their ambassador in 
Baghdad and the tactless Iraqi government reaction is much on 
people's minds in Cairo.)  Nevertheless, apart from general 
understanding of the need for progress in Iraq, various 
intelocutors did agree to expand contacts, reach out to 
Sunnis, and keep pressuring Syria.  Specific steps or 
proposals forward include: 
 
-- FONMIN's confirmation that the Iraqi ambassador designate 
would receive agrement. 
 
-- Defense Ministry's commitment to high level contacts, 
including a possible invitation to Iraqi MINDEF Dulaymi. 
 
-- MOD confirmation that it is willing to provide "at no 
cost" training of Iraqi forces in Egypt. 
 
-- Willingness of Interior Minister al Adly to accept a 
counterpart visit. 
 
-- Moussa's willingness to consider a trip to Iraq (announced 
later sunday during a meeting of the AL Contact Group on Iraq 
meeting in Jedda; unfortunately coupled with emphasis on his 
idea - see below - for an Iraqi reconciliation conference). 
 
-- Commitment by Intelligence Director (and Mubarak 
confidant) Soliman to push Damascus to clearly understand USG 
views and positions, as well as a possible invitation by 
Soliman to Iraqi NSA Al Rubaie to visit Egypt. 
 
-- Interest in setting up a 'back channel' with Iraqi Sunni 
Arab rejectionists to lure them into the political process. 
 
-- Willingness of Finance Minister Boutros Ghali to reach out 
to Iraqi counterpart Allawi, and to push for Iraqi debt 
forgiveness (the final decision on this will rest with 
Mubarak).  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Egyptian General Intelligence Service discussions 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2.  (S)  After listing what the USG had done "wrong" in Iraq, 
Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director Omar 
Soliman told the delegation that it must embrace a three part 
strategy in order to "win:"  make security a priority, open a 
back channel to Sunni insurgents, and bolster economic 
support in quiet areas.  On security, Soliman said the U.S. 
erred in making border security a third or fourth priority 
and in not using the professional officer corps, and should 
increase the use of human intelligence. 
 
3.  (S)  On the back channel proposal, Soliman stressed that 
the U.S. must deal directly with Sunni insurgents because 
they are responsible for 70 percent of the violence.  Soliman 
offered to arrange a dialogue between key insurgency leaders 
and the USG and perhaps make a deal to stop their violence. 
Soliman said there is a perception that the U.S. wants a Shia 
controlled Iraq.  He advised the U.S. to use public channels 
to declare that the USG supports "the Iraqi people and not 
any particular faction." 
 
4.  (S)  Ambassador Jeffrey noted points of agreement but 
explained that Iraq's military leaders are experienced 
professionals and described USG efforts to dialogue with the 
Sunnis directly and to extract compromises from other 
factions to satisfy Sunni demands.  Ambassador Jeffrey 
underlined that the insurgents and their leaders need to 
understand that there is no going back to Saddam's Iraq. 
 
5.  (S)  The Ambassador asked Soliman to invite Iraq's 
National Security Advisor equivalent al Rubaie to Cairo for 
discussions.  Soliman agreed.  Soliman also observed that 
relations had been good during Allawi's tenure and said he 
does not understand why Ja'fari is "staying away." 
 
6.  (S)  Soliman spent much time discussing with the 
delegation and in a pull aside at the end the need to stop 
Syrian support for the insurgency and to ensure Syria is 
aware that it must act. (septel). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Ministry of Defense and Director of Military Intelligence 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
7.  (C) In their October 1 meeting, the delegation, joined by 
the Ambassador, discussed with the Director of Military 
Intelligence MG Murad Mowafy and Advisor to the Minister of 
Defense MG Fouad Abdel Halim opportunities for greater 
mil-mil cooperation between Egypt and Iraq.  MG Fouad 
reviewed GOE support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
repeated the GOE offer to train more military officers and 
bear all costs of such training (a point later emphasized by 
FM Aboul Gheit).  MG Fouad added that the GOE would explore 
the possibility of inviting the Iraqi Defense Minister to 
Cairo or perhaps sending a senior GOE officer to Baghdad. 
(Note: MG Fouad told poloff after the meeting that it would 
be highly unlikely that Field Marshal Tantawi would agree to 
visit Iraq.  End note.)  MG Murad underscored the need to 
maximize cooperation on Iraq in order to control the increase 
in sectarian and ethnic divisions, the rise in extremism, and 
the deterioration in the security situation. 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador Jeffrey and the Ambassador encouraged the 
Generals to dialogue directly the GOI and invite Minister of 
Defense Saddoun al Duleimi to Cairo and send a Defense 
Attach to Baghdad.  They were non-committal in response to 
delegation urging that they contemplate posting a DATT in 
Baghdad, but agreed to discuss with the Field Marshall.  The 
delegation also asked the GOE to convey to Syria that the USG 
expects Syria to control the flow of foreign fighters into 
Syria by tightening its borders, imposing visa requirements, 
and stopping the flow of financial assistance to former 
Ba'athists.  Iraq issues should be of vital interest to 
Syria, the delegation members stressed, because failure of 
the political process will impact all of Iraq's neighbors. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Aboul Gheit 
--------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) With Aboul Gheit, Ambassador Jeffrey suggested how 
the GOE could be helpful in bringing about the UNSCR 1546 
goal of a democratic, pluralistic, federal, united Iraq, 
which would include an exchange of ambassadors.  Aboul Gheit 
replied that Iraq had not formally named an ambassador to 
Egypt, but that the GOE would accept the name if submitted 
for agrement.  As for Egypt's diplomatic presence in Iraq, 
the Minister said that with the murder of the previous 
ambassador still on people's minds, Egypt was not in a 
position to increase its presence beyond the current staffing 
of one administrative officer and six security guards. 
(Comment:  In an emotional vein, he noted that he personally 
had been savaged in the press and that the wounds were still 
quite fresh.  End comment)  He criticized the ITG for 
exposing the Egyptian Ambassador to danger by publicizing 
that he was Egypt's first ambassador to Iraq when he in fact 
was simply replacing the retiring ambassador. 
 
10.  (C) The Minister questioned whether UNSCR 1546, even if 
carried out fully, would succeed.  Citing long-standing 
fragmentation of Iraqi society and noting that the continuing 
presence of U.S. forces feeds the insurgency, Aboul Gheit 
proposed that the U.S. set a specific date for withdrawal 
with the condition that there must be an Iraqi force ready to 
take over.  To deal with the Sunni problem, he suggested 
making them feel enfranchised by including them in an 
international conference focused on creating a new Iraq. 
Broadening the forum beyond three factions in Iraq would 
serve as an incentive for stronger Sunni engagement, he 
argued.  Aboul Gheit stressed that this was his personal 
idea, not a formal GOE proposal. 
 
11.  (C) Continuing in the "personal vein," Aboul Gheit 
stated that he agreed with the four guiding principles laid 
out by Ambassador Jeffrey (i.e, the UNSCR 1546 call for a 
"democratic, pluralistic, federal and united" Iraq), but that 
the bottom line for what he wanted in Iraq was no civil war, 
no dismemberment of the country, and no power for Iran in 
Iraq's internal affairs.  Jeffrey rejoined "that sounds like 
what we had with Saddam."  When pressed on how Egypt would 
contribute to stabilizing Iraq, Aboul Gheit refused to commit 
the GOE to any actions other than training of judges, 
diplomats, police forces, the military and meeting with 
visiting Iraqi officials.  He did, however, state that he 
would reassess the situation in light of the October 15 
referendum in Iraq. 
 
----------------------------- 
Minister of Interior, al-Adly 
----------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey and delegation urged Egyptian 
Interior Minister General Habib El-Adly to upgrade the GOE's 
engagement on Iraq.  In response to Jeffrey's presentation, 
Adly described the Iraqi situation in Iraq as having serious 
implications for the security of all the states in the 
region.  Adly recounted that he had told fellow interior 
ministers, at a meeting among states neighboring Iraq, that 
cooperation among them must be tangible and substantive. 
This message had been particularly directed toward his 
counterparts from Syria and Iran, he added.   Adly agreed 
that Iraq now had a very serious terrorism problem that 
threatened to spill over its borders, but opined that 
"Zarqawy is not able to conduct these operations on his own" 
and stressed that the GOE had found no link between Zarqawy 
or al-Qa'ida and terrorist attacks in Sinai in 2004 and 2005. 
 Nonetheless, he affirmed the Sinai attackers did share 
al-Qa'ida's basic ideology and may well have been inspired by 
their message and activities.  Adly noted that his forces 
killed in the Sinai three fugitive suspects from the July 
Sharm el-Sheikh attacks and captured a fourth.  Preliminary 
results from the questioning of the prisoner, he said, 
reinforced the GOE view that the group did not have direct 
international connections.  The Minister told Jeffrey he had 
word of a possible visit to Cairo by the Iraqi Interior 
Minister and said he would be glad to issue his counterpart a 
formal invitation.  The GOE had already trained a batch of 
Iraqi police, Adly stated, but the Iraqi government has so 
far declined to send any more. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Arab League, Secretary General Moussa 
------------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa began by 
stressing that the League was neither an enemy of the U.S., 
nor working to undermine U.S. Iraq policy.  Moussa and the 
League welcomed meaningful dialogue, which he asserted had 
been lacking.  Such dialogue, he argued, was the only way to 
bring Arab public opinion around regarding its negative views 
on U.S. policy in Iraq and the region.  Moussa asserted 
continued AL support to the new Iraqi government, citing the 
League's decision to seat the first post-Saddam government 
which he argued legitimized it within the Arab community and 
beyond.  He argued that the AL did not oppose any part of the 
political process spelled out in UNSCR 1546 (Note:  this was 
after Jeffrey stressed the goal of a pluralistic, democratic, 
federal and united Iraq contained in that document.  Moussa's 
"acceptance" was grudging and legalistic, and he spent much 
of the rest of the discussion defining the first three of 
those adjectives in ways all but unrecognizable to an 
American listener. End note.)  Moussa in particular 
complained that the U.S. stress on federalism in Iraq was 
ill-conceived, and would result in local rule by "mafias." 
Moussa sought to blame the U.S. for inciting factional, 
ethnic, and religious tensions in Iraq -- a point Ambassador 
Jeffrey strongly rejected. 
 
14.  (C) In order to counter the current violence and 
political turmoil, Moussa argued the importance of holding in 
Iraq a "national reconciliation conference" to alleviate 
current political turmoil there.  Jeffrey replied that we 
were in Cairo to learn, and didn't want to reject any ideas. 
This, however, if not done very carefully would de facto 
delegitimize the democractically elected ITG and undercut the 
UN-endorsed political process.  Moussa also argued the 
importance of the U.S. being willing to discuss a timetable 
for troop removal, in the context of UNSCR 1546, and expand 
the presence of the UN (Comment:  a good idea in principle, 
but beware Moussa's qualifier:  "To take on much of the work 
the U.S. is now doing.  End comment).  Moussa further 
complained that U.S. policy had facilitated Iran's 
"commanding position" in Iraq. 
 
15.  (C) Moussa spent much time talking opaquely about the 
need for an "Arab safety net," which we would intepret 
(perhaps unfairly) as meaning that the Arab world can be 
helpful but only if its identity needs vis-a-vis Iraq ("the 
heart of the Arab region") be taken into consideration.  This 
 apparently equates to weighing in on the side of the Sunnis 
as representing that identity -- and supposedly as the 
bulwark against the Iranians, at the expense of democratic 
principles.  In essense, Moussa at least implicitly suggested 
that Sunni Arabs are just more real or legitimate than the 
other 80% of the population.  The implications of that line 
of thinking for our democratic goals in Iraq, not to speak of 
the country's unity, are obvious and were made so back to 
Moussa.  Among his other ideas was an Arab military force for 
the country.  The Delegation reminded him of prior Iraqi 
rejection of that idea, and said it would have to be 
thoroughly discussed with both the Iraqis and the Coalition. 
Moussa at first resisted commitment to travel to Iraq, citing 
the death of the Egyptian ambassador, but eventually said he 
would consider it.  (Note:  It was apparently decided at the 
Arab League Iraq meeting in Jedda later that day that he 
would travel to Iraq.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Minster of Finance Boutros-Ghali 
-------------------------------- 
 
16.  (C) Finance Minister Boutros Ghali agreed to consider a 
request for a public GOE announcement on restructuring 
remaining Iraqi debts.  Boutros Ghali expressed his 
understanding that the majority of Iraq's remaining 
(unserviced) debt was private but with government guarantees 
that complicated matters.  Nevertheless, Boutros Ghali 
promised to raise the issue with President Mubarak and to 
follow up directly with the Iraqi Finance Minister (Note: 
Delegation members provided contacts numbers for the Iraqi 
finance minister.  End note.)  Butros Ghali also touched upon 
Egypt's offer to host a BMENA Finance Ministers meeting, 
which is of interest to Iraqi counterparts.  Egypt also 
committed to sharing its expertise (and possibly its 
software) to help create a new Iraqi banking system.  Boutros 
Ghali also explained that Egypt's exports to Iraq (primarily 
through Iraq's neighbors) had contributed greatly to Egypt's 
recent export surge. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Iraq Deputy Foreign Minister Bayati 
----------------------------------- 
 
17.  (C) Ambassador Jeffrey's delegation and DFM Bayati 
exchanged views on how to move Egypt forward on the Iraq 
front.  Little new to report.  What was significant was 
Bayati's "local color" comment.  While wandering incognito 
around the Cairo Souk, whenever Bayati (a senior member of 
SCIRI tortured by the Ba'athists) told people he was from 
Iraq, he was greeted by exclaimations of admiration for 
Saddam Hussein. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE