US embassy cable - 02ABUJA3029

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 003029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY - PASS TO A/S KANSTEINER AND AMB. 
JETER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/12 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PREL, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PDP CHAIRMAN SAYS OBASANJO IS THE 
ONLY GENUINE REFORM CANDIDATE 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASON: 
1.5(B AND D). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 31 meeting with 
Ambassador Jeter, PDP National Chairman Audu Ogbeh 
correctly predicted the impeachment threat against 
President Obasanjo would soon be resolved. 
Nevertheless, the dispute had exacerbated North-South 
tensions.  Despite the President's lack of a 
politician's charm, Ogbeh viewed Obasanjo as the only 
leader with the fortitude and commitment to reform the 
economy. Acknowledging the split between Obasanjo and 
VP Atiku, Ogbeh believed that Atiku had not 
conclusively decided to run, but was under heavy 
pressure from his supporters to challenge Obasanjo. 
Ogbeh planned to talk to Atiku in the next few days to 
ascertain his intentions and counsel that challenging 
Obasanjo could be destructive to the party and, 
possibly, to the nation.  Cautiously optimistic, Ogbeh 
thought that the PDP would remain in tact despite its 
feuding factions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2.  (C) During an October 30 late evening conversation 
with Ambassador Jeter at the PDP Chairman's residence, 
a relaxed but reflective Audu Ogbeh predicted the 
impeachment threat was in its last days.  He claimed 
that many late nights counseling sessions with the 
House leadership and the President had helped break 
the impasse. Ogbeh recalled a late evening meeting a 
few days earlier with House Speaker Na'Abba where the 
recalcitrant parliamentarian signaled his willingness 
to bury the impeachment hatchet.  Ogbeh had also met 
several other Northern legislators, warning them the 
impeachment threat was accentuating North-South 
antagonism at a time when Nigeria could ill afford 
extra tension in the political arena.  While Obasanjo 
might not have won the Southwest in the 1999 election, 
Yorubas saw the impeachment as much as an attack 
against them as against Obasanjo, Ogbeh explained. 
They felt the impeachment was an offspring of the same 
Northern prejudice that annulled the June 1993 
election won by a Yoruba, Moshood Abiola.  (Comment: 
On November 1, the impeachment drive came to an anti- 
climatic end.  That day an accord was reached whereby 
the House agreed to shelve the impeachment threat 
while the Presidency agreed to fund certain capital 
projects and suspend some contentious privatization 
sales. This agreement will be reported in greater 
detail septel. End Comment.) 
 
 
3.  (C) Viewing impeachment from another angle, Ogbeh 
contended that perhaps everyone had expected too much 
of Obasanjo. Here was a man who, as military Head of 
State, was chief executive, legislature and judiciary 
merged into one. People correctly praised Obasanjo for 
handing over to elected civilian government in 1979 
because that act signified his respect for democracy. 
However, it did not mean Obasanjo understood the day 
to day practice of democracy, posited Ogbeh.  It had 
taken three years, capped by the latest impeachment 
saga, but Obasanjo now was coming to terms with the 
limitations of being an elected President. 
 
 
4.  (C) Ogbeh acknowledged that Obasanjo's gruff 
manner has placed the President at odds with members 
of the political elite. Nonetheless, he identified 
Obasanjo as probably the only politician who would 
implement reforms needed to diversify the economy, 
address unemployment and make politics less of a zero- 
sum contest by energizing and expanding the private 
sector.  Currently, most major businesses depend on 
government contracts for their lifeblood.  This 
situation could not endure, Ogbeh warned.  Already 
over 80 percent of government's budget goes to 
recurrent expenses, mostly salaries and pensions. Not 
enough is devoted to productive, wealth-generating 
activities.  The amount required for recurrent 
expenses would only grow over time, shrinking the 
funds that could be devoted to capital projects and 
needed construction. 
 
 
5.  (C) Ogbeh stressed that Nigeria gained 
approximately 11 billion dollars annually from oil 
exports, "4 billion less than the New York City's Fire 
Department's annual budget."  Over the long run, the 
competition for oil money will become keener due to 
population growth and the growth in the numbers of 
businesses.  We cannot run a government or a nation as 
big as Nigeria on a budget smaller than that of a city 
fire department, he asserted.  It would be inimical 
for the GON to solely rely on oil money as the 
backbone of the national treasury in the long-term. 
To escape this predicament, the nation and its people 
needed to get to work, Ogbeh declared. 
 
 
6.  (C) Ogbeh claimed Obasanjo clearly understood the 
need for economic growth and wealth creation. 
Notwithstanding his reputation as a know-it-all, the 
President was open to ideas for generating income, 
especially in the agricultural sector.  Conversely, 
the twin concepts of economic reform and wealth 
creation had escaped most Northern politicians, 
including Vice President Atiku, Ogbeh contended.  Save 
for a few notable exceptions such as business magnate 
Aliko Dangote, most Northerners thought that the 
wealth was cash and they were singularly disinterested 
in the prosaic drudgery of business development and 
investment. Recalling a meeting with mostly Northern 
PDP lawmakers, Ogbeh was ignored as he explained the 
economic benefits of a cassava project the government 
wanted to fund. The parliamentarians were bored with 
talk about investment, agricultural production, export 
earnings and the like.  They only wanted to know 
whether the project has money in it for them, Ogebeh 
sadly recounted. 
 
 
7. (C) Instead of investing in the productive economy, 
Northerners would rather amass cash to engage in 
conspicuous consumption.  Because they spend money at 
a handsome clip, the need to refill their pocketbooks 
was incessant, continued Ogbeh. This cycle of 
consumption and spending lent itself to a dependency 
on government patronage and other loose practices to 
extract money quickly from the public weal. Obasanjo's 
attempt to close the spigot, reducing the generous 
flow of public funds into unproductive and undeserving 
private hands, threatened the way these Northern 
politicians maintained both influence and affluence, 
the PDP Chairman asserted.  This reality underlies 
much of the opposition to Obasanjo. Consequently, many 
in the political elite would rejoice if Obasanjo were 
replaced by a practitioner of politics-as-usual such 
as VP Atiku, Ogbeh believed.  However, the masses 
would suffer more then they now do because Atiku's 
commitment to economic reform was questionable.  Since 
he views Obasanjo as the only candidate sufficiently 
wedded to transforming the economy, Ogbeh suggested he 
might resign should Obasanjo not return as the PDP 
standard-bearer. 
 
 
8.  (C) The PDP Chairman thought Atiku would challenge 
Obasanjo for the PDP nomination.  He also understood 
an Obasanjo-Atiku tussle would severely test party 
cohesion and exacerbate regional tensions within and 
outside the party. Atiku was under intense pressure to 
run, Ogbeh observed.  This pressure might be causing 
Atiku to overestimate his strength within the party. 
Atiku thought he had the Southeast's support, but 
three of the five governors in that zone supported 
Obasanjo, according to the Chairman.  Moreover, 
Atiku's support in his own Northeastern region was not 
deep.  Atiku may get support from the Tivs in Benue 
State who continue to seethe over the October 2001 
killings in Zaki Biam and blame Obasanjo; however, 
Atiku could not assume the entire Middle Belt had 
moved into his corner.  Atiku would have to write off 
the Southwest, albeit that region might not be 
critical. The Southwest will not produce many 
convention delegates because the rival Alliance for 
Democracy political party controlled Yorubaland 
although it was Obasanjo's own ethnic backyard. 
 
 
9. (C) However, Obasanjo recently gained support in 
the South-South because of his sponsorship of the 
recent resource allocation bill restoring to that area 
revenues previously jeopardized as a result of a 
Supreme Court decision earlier this year. 
Furthermore, Ogbeh contended that many people would 
view Atiku's challenge to Obasanjo as crass betrayal. 
They would not want to reward him for attempting to 
supplant his boss and, in doing so, setting a sad 
precedent for Nigeria's new democracy.  Perhaps, most 
importantly, Atiku could not count on the Northwest. 
 
 
10. (C) Ogbeh subscribed to the idea that key players 
in the Northwest were cynically spurring Atiku's 
candidacy in an attempt to ruin him politically.  It 
was possibly that a trap, to be sprung by Atiku's own 
ambition, was being set.  Many of Atiku's ersatz 
supporters were bona fide Babangida men, detected 
Ogbeh. The former Head of State and his minions wanted 
to draw Atiku into the open field then scuttle his 
drive for the PDP nomination. Babangida hoped to 
eliminate Atiku presently and not contend with an 
Atiku in 2007 who would be much stronger after 
amassing four additional years of clout and resources 
as the Vice President. If Atiku managed to capture the 
PDP nomination, Ogbeh thought Babangida would then 
enter the race as a candidate of one or an alliance of 
the opposition parties.  In addition to undermining 
the chance for progress on economic and governmental 
reform, a presidential contest reduced to these two 
Northerners after only four years of Southern rule 
would spark resentment in the South, Ogbeh maintained. 
 
 
11. (C) Ogbeh noted that Atiku would have to resign if 
he broke from Obasanjo.  The resignation would give 
Atiku more freedom to campaign, but he would also risk 
losing relevance during the next few months.  Atiku 
had to realize that much of his influence derived from 
his position; once the position was gone, some 
influence and status would vanish with it. Moreover, 
Atiku should expect Obasanjo and his new Vice 
President to concentrate on dismantling Atiku's 
machinery and support within the GON.  The power of 
incumbency would no longer be his; instead, it would 
be used against him. 
 
 
12. (C) Because he thought Atiku's candidacy would be 
unwise, Ogbeh indicated he might seek a private 
meeting with the VP to present his concerns about 
Atiku running at this time. 
 
 
13. (C) Despite the internecine wrestling within the 
PDP, Ogbeh was confident the party would remain the 
majority party provided it could patch some of its 
differences and that the presidential race did not 
become a genuine donnybrook.  He saw the AD and ANPP 
as weak and wracked by their fair share of internal 
discord.  The NPD and UNPP he described as artificial 
parties waiting on Babangida to decide what he and 
they should do. 
 
 
14.  (C) Ogbeh also discounted the recent clamor to 
amend the constitution to provide for single five-year 
terms for the president and state governors.  While 
this fix might reduce some of the current tension, its 
passage was unlikely. Even if adopted by the National 
Assembly, most State Governors opposed it and would 
not pressure their State Assemblies no to pass it. 
(Without the concurrence of 24 State Houses, the 
measure will die.)  For Ogbeh, the real problem was 
not the term of office but more the commitment to good 
governance of politicians.  A politician faced with 
one term could use the five years to enrich himself, 
knowing he could not run again and thus did not have 
to worry about his image with the electorate. 
Morever, changing hands and, possibly, policy 
direction every five years would undermine the 
continuity that Nigeria's political system needed at 
this juncture. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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15. (C) Ogbeh is astute and, as PDP Chairman, realizes 
he is in the middle of a brewing storm unless the 
President and Vice President mend fences.  Odds favor 
continued discord and an Atiku challenge for the PDP 
nomination. Ogbeh knows that a hard-fought Atiku- 
Obasanjo contest can fragment the party.  Even if the 
party remained intact, such a contest will likely 
leave the President and the VP as bitter enemies who 
would continue to work against one another after the 
PDP nomination was decided.  Ogbeh holds economic 
growth as the key to Nigeria's stability and future. 
He might have stretched a bit in stating that Obasanjo 
was the only reform-minded one among the major players 
but Ogbeh is generally frank; we think he believed 
what he said. Thus, he sees the upcoming election as 
an implicit referendum on reform.  Should Obasanjo eke 
out victory, Nigeria will continue along this path, 
albeit probably at its own halting pace. If Atiku, 
Babangida or someone from the den of Nigeria's 
traditional political elite captures national power, 
economic and governmental reform will take a distant 
back seat to the return of business and politics as 
usual. 
 
 
ANDREWS