US embassy cable - 05ALMATY3604

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 003604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015 
TAGS: KZ, MARR, PGOV, PREL, POLITICAL 
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED,S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER 
TOKAYEV ON SEPTEMBER 30, 2005 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S.:  EUR A/S Fried 
       Ambassador Ordway 
       SA DAS Gastright 
       DASD MacDougall 
       NSC Director Merkel 
       Astana PO Tracy (notetaker) 
 
Kazakhstan:  Foreign Minister Tokayev 
             First Deputy Foreign Minister Aliyev 
             MFA Chief of Staff Ashkybayev 
             MFA Americas Director Asanov 
 
2. (C) Summary.  A/S Fried and Foreign Minister Tokayev met 
over lunch on September 30.  While the FM saw some prospects 
for stability in Kyrygzstan, Tokayev echoed President 
Nazarbayev's pessimism over the situation in Uzbekistan. 
Tokayev indicated readiness to expand security cooperation 
via NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP).  The FM 
assured A/S Fried that Kazakhstan had rejected any 
anti-American tone for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO).  DAS Gastright welcomed Kazakhstan's interest in 
greater engagement in Afghanistan.  A/S Fried pressed for 
strengthening the legitimacy of the elections process as a 
necessary precursor to Kazakhstan's long-term stability. 
Tokayev commented on increasing pressure by the Chinese to 
obtain oil assets and discussions over gas for Georgia.  End 
Summary. 
 
Regional Stability 
------------------ 
 
3. (C) A/S Fried expressed appreciation for President 
Nazarbayev's commitment to helping Kyrgyzstan get through the 
winter (A/S Fried's September 30 meeting with Nazarbayev 
reported septel).  President Bakiyev and Prime Minister 
Kulov, he said, were working to address key issues -- 
corruption and building up the economy.  Fried said he 
feared, however, that Nazarbayev's pessimism over 
Uzbekistan's direction was well founded.  President Karimov 
was now accusing the United States of engineering the May 
violence in Andijon. 
 
4. (C) Nazarbayev, Tokayev said, had hoped that Karimov could 
be persuaded to reverse Uzbekistan's heavy reliance on 
repression.  That prospect, however, seemed increasingly 
unlikely.  The FM also noted Nazarbayev's concern over recent 
friction between Bakiyev and Kulov.  Astana had been relieved 
to see that the two had managed to avoid a public split. 
Kulov was a charismatic figure and increasingly popular, but 
he was wise to avert a break with Bakiyev.  Kyrgyzstan, the 
FM remarked, is "too small for two leaders."  A/S Fried 
agreed that Kulov appeared to be keeping his options open but 
maintained that Kyrgyzstan would benefit by having more than 
one personality capable of leading the country. 
 
Security Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
6. (C) A/S Fried emphasized U.S. interest in  greater 
security cooperation between the United States and Kazakhstan 
and recommended NATO's PfP program as a vehicle for expanded 
engagement.  Kazakhstan's interests and geography, DASD 
MacDougall commented, provided an unusual opportunity for 
Astana to play important roles in Euro-Atlantic and Asian 
security institutions. 
 
7. (C) Tokayev expressed satisfaction with Kazakhstan's 
progress on bolstering its NATO Individual Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP).  Kazakhstan was also ready to advance 
cooperation on Caspian security.  While Kazakhstan had a 
strong interest in maintaining the SCO framework as a 
consulting mechanism, Astana did not see any contradiction in 
also pursuing a strong partnership with NATO. 
 
8. (C) A/S Fried responded that there was no question of 
choice between NATO and the SCO.  The United States 
recognized Kazakhstan's need for good relations with its 
neighbors, particularly China and Russia.  However, an 
anti-American SCO would be counter-productive.  Tokayev 
insisted that this would not be the case and that Kazakhstan 
was making this point to SCO members. 
 
Engagement in Afghanistan 
------------------------- 
 
 
9. (C) DAS Gastright welcomed Nazarbayev's comments on 
Kazakhstan's ability to provide Afghanistan with technical 
and financial support.  With Afghanistan's limited local 
capacity to carry out projects such as road building, the 
United States was looking for partners and offered to 
coordinate Kazakhstan's interest in Washington. 
 
10. (C) Afghanistan, the FM responded, remains unstable, and 
Coalition operations must continue.  The FM had provided 
Foreign Minister Abdullah with a list of possible areas for 
engagement.  Astana wanted to assist Kazakhstani companies to 
tap into existing credit lines (NFI) to take advantage of 
commercial opportunities on a larger scale.  Kazakhstan had 
also recently beefed up its profile in Afghanistan by posting 
an Ambassador in Kabul.  Tokayev expressed frustration that 
Kazakhstan has resources to invest in Afghanistan but that 
Uzbekistan's draconian border practices impede the 
development of commercial ties southward. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
11. (C) A/S Fried emphasized the importance of a legitimate 
process in Kazakhstan's December presidential elections.  A 
winning percentage, whatever its size, backed by free and 
fair elections provided a mandate that no illegitimately 
inflated vote count ever could.  Media access on an equal 
basis for all candidates was also critical.  A/S Fried 
welcomed the news that  opposition newspapers had reached 
agreement with a new printer after their contracts with 
Vremya Print were terminated.  Ambassador added that the 
government's attention to the incident is the type of action 
that will reinforce the integrity of the elections. 
 
12. (C) Tokayev maintained that the government wishes to 
avoid incidents that will tarnish the legitimacy of the 
elections.  However, Astana wants to see an OSCE that is 
neutral in its observations.  The minority must be heard, the 
FM continued, but the minority should not be permitted to 
impose its view on the majority.  NSC Director Merkel 
responded that while standards are important, perceptions 
also play a role in assessing elections.  The quality of 
access for local observers therefore will be important. 
 
13. (C) ODIHR understands, A/S Fried pointed out, how to 
distinguish between serious questions and minor issues in an 
assessment -- and that is the opinion to which the 
international community will turn for gauging the elections. 
Nazarbayev understands, he continued, that Kazakhstan's 
future depends on more than oil and a strong economy.  The 
long-term goal is a political process that can survive any 
particular individual.  A/S Fried also noted that following 
the December elections would be the right moment for the 
United States to begin closing in on the question of 
Kazakhstan's bid to be OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2009. 
 
Oil and Gas 
----------- 
 
14. (C) The FM remarked on the growing aggressiveness of 
Russian and Chinese oil companies in the Kazakhstani market. 
China is still pursuing purchase of Petro-Kazakhstan although 
an Indian company (NFI) has also expressed interest. 
(Comment:  The purchase of PK remains a sensitive issue since 
it would provide access to refining capacity as well as to 
crude.)  NSC Merkel asked about gas for Georgia. 
Negotiators, Tokayev responded, were looking at commercially 
viable options, but Kazakhstan would not supply gas without 
an expectation of return on the investment. 
 
15. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message. 
 
16. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered. 
ORDWAY 
 
 
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