US embassy cable - 05ALMATY3603

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 003603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015 
TAGS: KZ, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, POLITICAL 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT 
NAZARBAYEV 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met with Kazakhstani 
President Nazarbayev in Astana on September 30 for over an 
hour.  On the Kazakhstani side the participants included 
Presidential Administration Head Dzhaksybekov, Foreign 
Minister Tokayev, and Assistant to the President Masimov. 
Ambassador Ordway, DOD DAS Jim MacDougall, NSC Director David 
Merkel, and SA DAS John Gastright accompanied Fried.  The 
atmosphere was cordial, and Nazarbayev was relaxed and 
engaged throughout the meeting.  He made a point of referring 
to each member of the delegation and where he had met him 
before.  In the case of Merkel, this led to a retelling of a 
telephone conversation that Merkel had facilitated with 
President Bush during the 2000 election on the situation in 
Chechnya.  Nazarbayev referred to prepared papers only at the 
end to bring up some issues that had not come up in the 
course of the largely free-form conversation.  This message 
reports the conversation thematically. 
 
Democratization 
--------------- 
 
2. (C) Assistant Secretary Fried noted the strong progress 
Kazakhstan had made under President Nazarbayev's leadership 
in establishing its sovereignty, and in building a free 
market system.  Economic reforms have provided Kazakhstan 
with a strong basis to take advantage of its hydrocarbon 
resources.  The U.S. had been a partner of Kazakhstan, most 
recently in fighting terrorism, and looked forward to 
continuing this partnership.  Now, the U.S. and the entire 
world were watching to see how Kazakhstan handled the 
upcoming Presidential elections.  They represented the next 
step forward for the democratic evolution of Kazakhstan.  The 
decision about the NGO law had been a good one.  The 
President's speeches to the nation (in February) and to 
Parliament (in September) had laid out clearly where he stood 
on the issues, and the U.S. appreciated them very much.  Good 
elections would mark another step forward in our 
relationship, which must be based on the broad range of our 
shared interests:  security, the economy, and 
democratization.  Kazakhstan is poised very well compared to 
the other countries in the region:  large, wealthy, and on 
the verge of elections that can provide the winner a strong, 
democratic mandate.  The U.S. cannot build a relationship 
with any Central Asian country on the basis of security 
alone.  As Secretary Rice has said, our interest in security 
and in democracy is indivisible. 
 
3.  (C) Fried said that he wanted to express the hopes of his 
government for a deepening of our relationship, especially 
after the elections, if they are democratic.  We take 
seriously Nazarbayev's commitments that they be free and fair. 
 
4. (C) Nazarbayev said that those post-Soviet leaders who had 
put political development first had made a serious error, as 
shown by the failures of Gorbachev, as well as the leadership 
in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.  Trying to implement democratic 
reform in poor countries will end up badly.  Kazakhstan, he 
said, had chosen a different path:  first the economy, then 
politics.  The development of small and medium enterprises, 
and a middle class, sets the stage for electing 
representative who will have a stake in the system. 
Nazarbayev said that that USG would not tolerate a group of 
people trying to take over the White House, and added that 
the U.S. was trying to lecture to others without knowing the 
true situation in the countries concerned.  As a friend of 
the U.S., Nazarbayev said, this approach would only stimulate 
those like Lukashenko who criticize the U.S. 
 
5. (C) Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev said, had reached a point where 
its economic development now required liberal reforms of 
society.  His goal, he said, was a sustainable democratic 
Kazakhstan that cannot be turned back.  After the election, 
he would sit down personally with all political forces and 
seek a consensus on further democratic reforms.  If 
necessary, the constitution could be changed to accommodate 
the reforms.  (Note:  This is a nod toward two of the major 
criticisms by the opposition over the past year, who refused 
to participate in the existing commission on democratization 
because it was not chaired by Nazarbayev, and who have been 
insisting on constitutional reform to reduce executive 
powers.) 
 
6. (C) Fried told Nazarbayev that what had happened in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan was the result of political 
and economic failures.  The U.S., he said, supports 
democratic and economic reform; revolution was the result of 
 
 
failure and never the preferable route. The U.S. is not 
interested in revolution; we are interested in reforms like 
those Nazarbayev had just described. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
7. (C) On the upcoming election, Nazarbayev was supremely 
confident.  He cited Western polls that showed him with 70% 
support.  (Note:  A 2004 IRI poll did show impressively high 
approval ratings for Nazarbayev, but did not pose a direct 
election question.  Senior Presidential Administration 
officials have told us that their polls indicate electoral 
support for Nazarbayev has grown from 42% in February, to 70% 
in September.  Both have a margin of error of 3%.  End Note.) 
 In campaign mode, Nazarbayev boasted that he would not even 
leave his office in the pre-election period.  (Comment:  not 
likely.)  He continued, enthusiastically, to denigrate united 
opposition candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, calling him a 
Soviet procurator responsible for sending patriotic students 
to jail in 1986 -- and adding that they had the documents to 
prove his involvement 
 
8. (C) Note: Tuyakbay was chairman of the lower house of 
parliament, and the first candidate on the Otan party list in 
the September 2004 parliamentary elections, until he broke 
with Nazarbayev later that year, charging massive 
falsification of the results.  The reference to 1986 refers 
to massive anti-Soviet demonstrations in Almaty in December 
1986 after Gorbachev sacked long-time party boss Kunayev, an 
ethnic Kazakh, and replaced him with Gennadiy Kolbin, an 
ethnic Russian with no previous association with Kazakhstan. 
Tuyakbay's role in prosecuting the students will not play 
well with the Kazakh electorate where his primary appeal 
lies. End Note 
 
9. (C) Nazarbayev acknowledged, indirectly, that corruption 
will be a major element in the campaign.  He said, however, 
that charges against his administration would backfire as the 
opposition had truly corrupt persons in their ranks.  Turning 
strategic, Nazarbayev promised that the elections would be 
free, fair and transparent.  He said that given the strength 
of his support he did not need any "supplemental measures." 
He added that he welcomed as many international observers as 
possible, especially from the OSCE. 
 
10. (C) Fried said that he appreciated Nazarbayev's 
evaluation of elections.  It was particularly astute to 
welcome the presence of OSCE observers, since this could 
protect the government from unfounded charges of election 
manipulation.  Fried added that he knew that on December 5, 
the day after the elections, the first thing Secretary Rice 
would ask would be "what does the OSCE think" -- not what the 
opposition had charged.  Fried said that he hoped he would be 
able to say that they were pretty good elections.  If so, 
this would be the best news of the year. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
11. (C) Assistant Secretary Fried praised Kazakhstan's 
support for the war on terrorism, and for its contingent in 
Iraq.  Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan was not yet prepared 
to join NATO or to have a U.S. base, but did want a closer 
security and defense relationship.  He asked for U.S. 
assistance with Caspian security.  This would not mean 
deployed forces or bases, but would include technical 
assistance and training, and help with control of the air and 
sea.  He suggested that we might want to consider concluding 
a detailed, comprehensive, confidential action plan in this 
area. 
 
Regional Issues 
--------------- 
 
12. (C) Assistant Secretary Fried provided an overview of his 
discussions in Tashkent and Bishkek.  Nazarbayev underscored 
the risk to Kazakhstan of a breakdown in Uzbekistan.  He said 
that he had been working for some time to encourage Karimov 
to undertake reform, particularly economic reform.  Now, 
however, he has given up any hope that Karimov will be able 
to move his country forward and avoid a societal breakdown. 
Nazarbayev predicted that there would be turmoil in the 
Fergana Valley that would then spread to other cities in 
Uzbekistan.  Kazakhstan was preparing to receive refugees, 
and he noted that there are 1.5 million ethnic Kazakhs in 
Uzbekistan who are discriminated against and deprived of 
their rights. 
 
 
13. (C) Nazarbayev said that his offer of a Central Asian 
economic community remained on the table, offering open 
borders, unified tariffs, and free movement of people and 
capital.  Karimov, however, is afraid to open the border. 
Nonetheless there are already 500,000 Uzbeks working 
illegally in Kazakhstan, along with 200,000 Kyrgyz. 
Kazakhstan is prepared to establish consortia on energy and 
transportation, and to develop hydroelectric projects in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  The region is interlinked, he 
said.  Kazakhstan can provide food and meat, and will buy 
power and cotton.  He said he did not know why there was not 
agreement on this.  However, a meeting in Dushanbe had 
approved the consortia and there would be a supra-national 
body to control them.  (Note:  This initiative appears to be 
limited to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.) 
 
14. (C) Nazarbayev commented briefly on Turkmenistan, saying 
that Niyazov "is getting crazy."  Nazarbayev said Niyazov had 
renamed the first month of the year "Turkmenbashi."  Since 
then, Nazarbayev said he had been calling him "Mr. January," 
which infuriates Niyazov. 
 
15. (C) Fried asked for Kazakhstan's support for Kyrgyzstan, 
saying that the new leadership there were facing very 
difficult problems.  They were focusing on the right issues, 
but solving them would be tough.  Nazarbayev said Kyrgyzstan 
was a bankrupt country, whose external debt equalled its GDP. 
 Kazakhs consider themselves "brothers" with the Kyrgyz, and 
had already outlined a course to help them through their 
current difficulties.  Nazarbayev said he would meet with 
Bakiyev on October 6, and was ready to go to Bishkek. 
Kazakhstan was providing help to get Kyrgyzstan through the 
winter, possibly coal and oil, and had already sent grain. 
Nazarbayev said that he would take Kazakhstani bankers there 
to see opportunities, and added that Kazakhstan needed to 
export capital.  He had provided political support by 
attending Bakiyev's inauguration. 
 
16. (C) Nazarbayev expressed support for U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan.  He noted that Kazakhstani companies might be 
able to assist with reconstruction efforts.  The GOK has 
raised this issue with the GOA.  Nazarbayev noted that an 
Uzbek decree which prevents land access to Afghanistan for 
Kazakhstanis (NFI) could hamper efforts to assist with 
reconstruction. 
 
Partnership with the U.S. 
------------------------- 
 
17. (C) Nazarbayev outlined his vision of strategic 
partnership and true friendship with the U.S.  He referred 
pointedly to an old Kazakh saying said that the country is 
geographically located between the Russian bear and the 
Chinese dragon, and (mixing metaphors a bit) remarked that 
it's dangerous for a fly to be between two camels.  However, 
while Kazakhstan had some vulnerability, it must have, and 
does have, excellent relations with both of these powerful 
neighbors.  At the same time, Kazakhstan wanted to develop 
its partnership with the U.S., but the U.S. must understand 
that Kazakhstan cannot "split" with either of its neighbors. 
On the bilateral relationship, much has already been done. 
The U.S. is the largest foreign investor in Kazakhstan 
(providing 35% of all FDI).  Kazakhstan aspired to be among 
the top five oil exporters within ten years.  The fact that 
U.S. oil companies are in a very prominent position in 
Kazakhstan was the result of a deliberate choice. 
 
18. (C) Nazarbayev continued, noting that Kazakhstan is the 
"only Muslim country" with the U.S. in Iraq.  (Comment:  This 
isn't true; we've tried to gently correct the record a couple 
of times but Nazarbayev keeps repeating this.  End Comment.) 
He described the Kazakhstani contingent as a symbolic 
contribution, but important for the U.S.  When America's 
closest friends leave, he said, Kazakhstan will be there with 
the U.S.  Nazarbayev said he told Bill Clinton that 
Kazakhstan would donate $250,000 for Hurricane Katrina relief 
-- again an important symbolic gesture of support. 
Kazakhstan had supported the U.S. on terrorism from the first 
day.  Working together with the U.S., Kazakhstan had solved 
its problems with denuclearization and non-proliferation. 
 
19. (C) Kazakhstan was not asking for grants or loans; having 
paid off its IMF debt it needed no credits.  However, 
Kazakhstan was interested in true cooperation on a range of 
issues -- attracting U.S. investment in the SME sector, and 
obtaining U.S. economic and political support for 
strengthening the independence of Kazakhstan in a way not 
 
 
directed against China and Russia.  "We can do it in a smart 
way," Nazarbayev said, by making the presence of the U.S. 
"very powerful."  Nazarbayev said that the U.S. and 
Kazakhstan should sign an agreement on strategic partnership 
(as the U.S. had done with China, Russia and Uzbekistan). 
"That would be political support.  We would not ask for 
anything, just sign the agreement that would provide for 
mutual obligations which could be fulfilled. 
 
20. (C) Fried said that Nazarbayev had outlined ideas on the 
bilateral relationship in which the U.S. was very interested, 
i.e. deepening political and economic relations and security 
cooperation.  The relationship would deepen and grow as 
Kazakhstan proceeds through economic and political reforms. 
 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
21. (C) At the end of the meeting, Nazarbayev referred to 
briefing papers for the first time.  He said that Kazakhstan 
was holding a conference on Central Asia in Washington 
October 25, and was seeking high-level administration 
attendance.  The Kazakhstani delegation would be led by his 
Assistant, Karim Masimov, whom he hoped would be able to see 
Secretary Rice to deliver a letter responding to President 
 
SIPDIS 
Bush's recent letter.  He asked for U.S. assistance with WTO 
accession.  Finally, he asked for U.S. support for 
Kazakhstan's candidacy for OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2009. 
He admitted that further reform efforts would be needed, 
including strong performance on the presidential elections, 
for Kazakhstan to be a viable candidate. 
 
22. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this cable. 
 
23. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered. 
ORDWAY 
 
 
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