US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS2048

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, MO, AG, UN, Algeria-Morocco Relations 
SUBJECT: MFA SECRETARY GENERAL SKEPTICAL ABOUT IMPROVING 
BILATERAL RELATIONS ABSENT CHANGE IN MOROCCAN POSITION 
 
REF: A. WHITE HOUSE 301549Z SEPT 05 
 
     B. ALGIERS 2042 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD W. ERDMAN: REASONS 1.4 (b) (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) MFA Secretary General Lamamra, in the context of 
Ambassador's delivery of the President's September 30 letter 
urging improved Moroccan-Algerian relations, showed little 
flexibility vis a vis Morocco, reinforcing our impression 
that the Algerian leadership has given up hope of any 
near-term progress with Morocco, is hunkering down for the 
long run, and believes little can change until Morocco alters 
its policies.  Lamamra argued that Morocco was responsible 
for current problems, having rejected the Baker Plan, 
self-determination, and a referendum; disregarded UNSC 
resolutions on the Western Sahara; and blocked increased 
regional cooperation by declining to attend summit meetings 
in Algiers during Algeria's presidency of the Arab Maghreb 
Union.  Lamamra said Algeria had done its part to improve 
relations with Morocco by facilitating the August prisoner 
release by the Polisario, agreeing to send PM Ouyahia to 
Rabat, and sending to Rabat as ambassador presidential Chief 
of Staff Belkheir, a key senior figure close to Bouteflika 
known to favor improved bilateral relations. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador repeatedly stressed our hope that both 
sides would work for better communication and improved 
relations in a constructive and open spirit; urged acceptance 
of Moroccan FM Benaissa's invitation to FM Bedjaoui to visit 
Rabat; and cautioned that declining an invitation to dialogue 
-- which was always Algeria's advice to us and others when 
there were important differences -- would cast Algeria as the 
obstacle to improved relations.  Arguing at first that the 
problem was not communication but what the two sides would 
have to say to each other, Lamamra in the end stopped short 
of saying the Moroccan invitation would be rejected, 
suggesting instead that a decision would await Belkheir's 
arrival in Rabat and subsequent recommendation. (End Summary) 
 
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DELIVERED 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by PolEc Chief, delivered to 
MFA Secretary General Lamamra October 3 the text of President 
Bush's message to President Bouteflika urging renewed efforts 
to improve Moroccan-Algerian relations.  Allowing Lamamra 
time to read the message, Ambassador explained that the 
President's basic message was our hope that both sides would 
build on the August POW release, to improve relations and 
create a better regional climate conducive to settlement of 
the Western Sahara issue.  Lamamra responded that while it 
was for President Bouteflika to respond to President Bush, he 
could say that Algeria hoped for deepened bilateral relations 
with the United States, improved relations with Morocco, and 
increased regional cooperation.  He agreed with the 
Ambassador's comment that in many ways, the Moroccan and 
Algerian people -- who shared a common culture, ethnicity, 
religion, dialect, music, cuisine, and history -- were ahead 
of their governments. 
 
MOROCCO'S BEHAVIOR MAKES PROGRESS ON 
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES MORE DIFFICULT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) On the personal level, Lamamra said, the two peoples 
traded, visited, or vacationed in each other's country. He 
himself enjoyed good personal relations with FM Benaissa from 
their days together as ambassadors in Washington, where their 
daughters attended the same school, were close friends, and 
slept over at each other's houses.  The problem was at the 
official level, where Morocco pursued policies that prevented 
cooperation.  While Algeria wished to keep the Western Sahara 
issue out of the bilateral context, as a practical matter, 
Morocco's unhelpful attitudes and behavior, such as the 
abrupt cancellation of the Prime Minister's planned visit to 
Rabat in June, inevitably created an atmosphere which made 
progress on other bilateral and regional issues more 
difficult.  Lamamra also noted in passing, clearly referring 
to Morocco's stepped up criticisms following the August POW 
release, that Morocco had not exactly responded positively 
with a gesture of its own. 
 
MOROCCO'S TO BLAME 
------------------ 
 
5. (C) Lamamra briefly recounted Algeria's version of 
developments in Moroccan-Algerian relations since Morocco's 
occupation of the Western Sahara in 1975, predictably and 
inaccurately placing all the blame on Morocco.  He noted that 
relations had been broken off following Morocco's move into 
the Western Sahara in 1975; that presidential Chief of Staff 
Belkheir had helped negotiate the restoration of diplomatic 
ties between the two countries in 1988; that Morocco had 
accepted the principle of self-determination and agreed to a 
referendum; that Morocco blocked progress toward greater 
regional cooperation in the mid-1990s by refusing to attend 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) meetings during Algeria's presidency 
of that organization; and that it was Morocco that had 
rejected Baker, self-determination, and a referendum.  More 
recently, Morocco had abruptly canceled Prime Minister 
Ouyahia's visit to Rabat in June, setting back efforts to 
move the bilateral process forward.  It was also unfortunate, 
Lamamra added, that Morocco always wanted to discuss a 
solution to the Western Sahara dispute with Algeria, since 
the issues requiring discussion were not between Morocco and 
Algeria but between Morocco and the Polisario. 
 
ALGERIA HAS MADE NUMEROUS GESTURES, LAMAMRA ARGUES 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6. (C) By contrast, Lamamra claimed that Algeria consistently 
supported UN Security Resolutions and the principle of 
self-determination for the Sahrawi people -- a right that 
Algerians had demanded for themselves at the time of their 
independence and could hardly deny the Sahrawis.  Algeria had 
also supported the Baker Plan.  Moreover, it had demonstrated 
its good intentions and readiness to move forward by:  1) 
lifting Algeria's visa requirement following Mohammed VI's 
visit for the Arab League Summit in March; 2) agreeing to PM 
Ouyahia's visit to Rabat to discuss the way forward in 
bilateral relations (i.e., toward the reopening of the 
borders); 3) facilitating Polisario's release of the 404 
Moroccan prisoners in August; and 4) naming Belkheir, a top 
official close to President Bouteflika known as an advocate 
of Moroccan-Algerian cooperation, as ambassador to Rabat. 
Lamamra also commented that UNSYG Kofi Anan's appointment of 
Personal Envoy Van Walsum and Special Envoy Bastagli was a 
positive development and that Algeria looked forward to 
working with them during their visits to the region. 
 
LAMAMRA COOL ON FOREIGN MINISTER 
ACCEPTING FM BENAISSA'S INVITATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Ambassador said we welcomed the positive steps Algeria 
had taken and agreed that sending Belkheir to Rabat as 
ambassador could help improve communication.  We believed the 
current impasse between Morocco and Algeria helped no one and 
it was in both sides' interest to build on the prisoner 
release to improve relations and establish better 
communication.  The latter was a serious problem, Ambassador 
said, and could only be fixed through increased dialogue.  In 
this regard, Ambassador asked about FM Benaissa's recent 
invitation to FM Bedjaoui to come to Rabat, noting the 
usefulness of high level dialogue in getting things back on 
track.  Lamamra claimed there was not a problem of 
communication.  The problem was Morocco's backtracking from 
previous positions and its efforts to unilaterally impose 
Moroccan sovereignty on the Western Sahara.  What was 
important was not just a dialogue but what would be said in a 
dialogue.  Until Morocco adjusted its behavior and attitudes, 
it was difficult to see what could be achieved by accepting 
the Benaissa invitation. 
 
AMBASSADOR PUSHES BACK 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C) Ambassador vigorously disagreed, arguing that both 
sides in fact repeatedly misread one another.  For example, 
the King's well-intended announcement in August 2004 lifting 
the visa requirement was poorly received because the GOA had 
not been notified in advance and was thus suspicious. 
Lamamra countered that Benaissa had been in Algiers the week 
before and had said nothing about this move, thus proving 
that it was in fact "a political move."  Ambassador said he 
understood the King had personally taken this decision 
without consulting his advisers and thus it was very likely 
Benaissa himself had not been aware.  Another example of 
miscommunication was the King's sudden cancellation of the 
Ouyahia visit because Algerian intentions to use that visit 
to move concretely toward a reopening of the border were not 
sufficiently understood in Rabat. 
9. (C) Improved dialogue and communication would help avoid 
such misunderstandings.  We understood there were important 
differences over the Western Sahara, Ambassador suggested, 
but the two sides should set them aside, let them be dealt 
with in a UN framework, and seek improved relations and 
dialogue that would create a regional climate more conducive 
to a Western Sahara settlement.  Returning to Morocco's 
invitation to FM Bedjaoui, Ambassador cautioned that rightly 
or wrongly, declining an invitation to dialogue -- which was 
always Algeria's advice to us and others when there were 
differences -- would give the impression that Algeria, not 
Morocco, was the obstacle to improved relations.  Taking the 
point and clearly keeping open the option of accepting the 
invitation, Lamamra said that before taking a decision they 
would wait for Belkheir to be on the ground and make a 
recommendation. 
 
 
 
 
 
ERDMAN