US embassy cable - 05ALMATY3454

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KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Identifier: 05ALMATY3454
Wikileaks: View 05ALMATY3454 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: US Office Almaty
Created: 2005-10-04 14:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL CW KNNP KZ PARM POLITICAL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 003454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, NP/PTR ROLIVER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL, CW, KNNP, KZ, PARM, POLITICAL 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SHKOLNIK ON CANWFZ, CWC, INDIA 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
 
REF: A. STATE 40787 
     B. STATE 166864 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Ambassador Ordway met with Minister of 
Energy and Mineral Resources Vladimir Shkolnik on September 
27 in Astana.  Shkolnik assured the Ambassador that there 
will not/not be a signing ceremony for the proposed Central 
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty in the near 
term, and certainly not coincident with the visits of T and 
Codel Issa to Ust-Kamenogorsk on October 8.  In a 
wide-ranging discussion, the Ambassador also raised the 
issues of CWC compliance and the nuclear energy component of 
the U.S. - India partnership.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
CANWFZ Not Ready For Signature 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador conveyed U.S. concern over reports that 
the five Central Asian states might sign the CANWFZ in 
Semipalatinsk at the same time that NTI was organizing a 
large international event October 8 in nearby 
Ust-Kamenogorsk, which will be attended by U/S Joseph and 
other senior U.S. officials.  The Ambassador told Shkolnik 
that the U.s., in agreement with the UK and France, objects 
to the CANWFZ because it leaves open the possibility of 
outside countries' nuclear weapons being stationed on the 
soil of the ostensibly denuclearized zone.  The Ambassador 
stressed that if a signing ceremony took place in association 
with the U.S.-attended event, the Embassy would be required 
to issue public statements distancing the U.S. from the 
treaty. 
 
3. (C) Shkolnik assured the Ambassador that the treaty is not 
close to being signed and noted that he had not even seen the 
draft.  He added that what he knew of the treaty is that it 
was being pushed by Tashkent, and further stated that he 
personally found it to be a misguided idea.  In a separate 
meeting with Foreign Minister Tokayev, he said that there was 
still a dispute among the parties about the level at which it 
would be signed, with Kazakhstan insisting on Foreign 
Ministers, and Uzbekistan on Presidents.  Moreover, 
Kazakhstan wanted to have consultations with the P-3 as they 
had requested on Article 12.  He urged that Ambassador Bolton 
personally and quickly address the C-5 ambassadors in New 
York on this issue. 
 
-------------- 
CWC Compliance 
-------------- 
 
4. (C) Ambassador also inquired about the CWC compliance 
issues that were put to Kazakhstan in a March 14 demarche 
(Ref A).  Shkolnik responded by saying that the OPCW was 
putting Kazakhstan in an untenable position.  He said that 
during his trip to The Hague earlier this month, he told the 
OPCW that it would be impossible for Kazakhstan to fill out 
the questionnaire that OPCW required.  Kazakhstan has no 
specialists familiar with the chemical weapons, and no one 
who was associated with the production previously done at the 
Pavlodar facility.  In order answer OPCW's questions, he 
would have to send specialists to Russia to obtain the 
information.  Shkolnik said that to do so would amount to 
proliferation of knowledge about how to produce chemical 
weapons to Kazakhstan, which did now currently have that 
knowledge. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Nuclear Suppliers' Group and India 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Ambassador also delivered Ref B points on cooperation 
with India's civil nuclear industry in light of that 
country's commitment to certain nonproliferation safeguards. 
Shkolnik's immediate response was one of doubt.  Shkolnik 
questioned how providing nuclear fuel to India for civilian 
use would serve any nonproliferation goals.  Any external 
fuel supplied for civilian purposes would free up an 
equivalent amount of domestically produced fuel for military 
purposes, thus undermining our nonproliferation goals.  He 
noted that Kazakhstan has in the past refused to sell India 
uranium for that exact reason.  Shkolnik said that he would 
ask the head of Kazakhstan's nuclear regulatory agency, Timur 
Zhantikin, to discuss this issue with U.S. experts at the 
IAEA in October. 
ORDWAY 
 
 
NNNN 

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