US embassy cable - 05ANKARA5978

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EU, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY, THE MORNING AFTER 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 5932 
 
     B. ANKARA 1730 
     C. ANKARA 1074 
 
Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The morning after Turkish FM Gul made his 
late-evening, oft-postponed flight to Luxembourg to 
officially open Turkey's EU accession negotiations, Turkish 
officials and media alike are hailing the step as an historic 
accomplishment.  Last minute changes to the negotiating 
framework text allowed the Turks to reach consensus on two 
deal-breaker concerns and ease the national mood of wounded 
pride (ref A).  Turkish officials have expressed their thanks 
to us for U.S. support; media have been overt in their 
praise.  But the afterglow will be short, as Turkey faces a 
difficult road that will require hard work and profound 
changes in mentality.  End Summary. 
 
Real Concerns, and A Tough Slog to Consensus 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In the run-up to the hard-won consensus on the 
evening of October 3, the Turks' twin concerns over 
"privileged partnership" and being forced to drop objections 
to Republic of Cyprus (ROC) membership in international 
organizations were real.  Gaining internal consensus was a 
tough slog; the Turks' vows to walk away from negotiations 
over these issues were no bluff.  The AKP government held its 
final deliberations at AKP party headquarters to include 
party leadership - a sign of the delicate internal political 
balance. 
 
3.  (C) "Privileged partnership" cuts to the heart of 
Turkey's nationalistic pride, denoting second-class 
citizenship and discrimination.  For all their anti-EU 
rhetoric, most Turks desperately want to be seen as "good 
enough" to be part of Europe; "privileged partnership" was a 
shibboleth for even pro-EU Turks. 
 
4.  (C) The Cyprus issue, too, posed a dilemma.  MFA 
officials worried that negotiations would cease if Turkey did 
not drop objections to Cypriot membership in NATO and other 
organizations or, in the words of a sleep-deprived MFA 
official, that the AKP government would fall if Turkey did 
drop its objections.  Often uneasy AKP government-Turkish 
military relations were also certainly on their minds. 
 
5.  (C) Against the backdrop of news about back-and-forth 
negotiations that trickled in throughout the day, Erdogan and 
Gul successfully portrayed the final text as a victory both 
for Turkey and for Europe.  Reports of Austria's concession 
and of text changes eased the Turks' bruised pride that had 
prevailed in the days leading up to October 3. 
 
Erdogan and Gul Hail Beginning of Talks 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (U) PM Erdogan hailed what he termed "a gigantic step in 
line with Turkey's historical mission."  He called the 
beginning of negotiations "the most important stage in the 
ideals of our republic and the effort we made during the past 
40 years." 
 
7.  (U) Speaking at an airport news conference just before 
taking off for Luxembourg, Gul called the beginning of 
negotiations an "historic point" and a "step toward a new 
era," adding, "all the leaders in the EU have supported 
Turkey."  In a statesmanlike gesture, Gul noted that he had 
called opposition People's Republican Party leader Deniz 
Baykal, a fierce critic of Gul's AKP and the EU, to brief him 
on the details of the final framework text. 
 
Media Coverage, Transformed 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) Media coverage, which on the morning of October 3 was 
uniformly defiant about EU "demands," transformed instantly 
into glowing headlines about Turkey's new EU vocation. 
Several leading dailies carried headlines portraying the 
final negotiating framework outcome as a Turkish "win."  Even 
leftist daily "Cumhuriyet," recently the media's most 
strident anti-EU voice, settled for the tame headline of 
"Negotiations Begin." 
 
Public and Private Gratitude for U.S. Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (U) The media also praised U.S efforts on Turkey's 
behalf.  Leading television news channel NTV ran the story 
about Secretary Rice's conversation with PM Erdogan under the 
ticker "The U.S. Steps In."  After falling sharply Monday 
morning, the beginning of the Turkish financial markets' 
rebound coincided with news of the Rice/Erdogan call.  The 
call was also front page news in mass-circulation daily 
"Hurriyet," anti-EU "Cumhuriyet," and Islamist-leaning Zaman, 
under the headline "The U.S. Steps In:  We Are On Your Side." 
 Several media reports outlined U.S. efforts with Cyprus and 
other EU countries. 
 
10. (C) Turkish officials have been effusive in their thanks 
for U.S. support.  Several advisors to PM Erdogan called 
Charge immediately following the formal decision to go to 
Luxembourg and profusely thanked the U.S. for its efforts. 
An emotional MFA U/S Tuygan called Charge thereafter and 
expressed deep gratitude for years of U.S. support. 
 
Short Afterglow, A Hard Road Ahead 
---------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Comment:  The afterglow of October 3 will be 
short-lived.  Turkey's leaders must now shift gears quickly 
and do the hard work to prepare Turkey, structurally and 
mentally, for the negotiation process.  Turkey's EU General 
Secretariat needs to be re-organized and strengthened. 
 
SIPDIS 
Ministries need to set aside staff to work on the adoption of 
the 80,000-page EU aquis.  Chief EU Negotiator Babacan must 
gather capable and experienced personnel. 
 
12.  (C) The mental transformations required of Turkey are 
profound.  Turkey's leaders must make the public understand 
that there is hardly any give-and-take in EU "negotiations." 
To be successful, the Turks will have to swallow some pride; 
given Turkey's strong nationalism, this will be difficult and 
controversial.  The government's hope is that, with October 3 
behind them, much of the formal process can become 
regularized and slip under the radar screen of public 
scrutiny.  The strident and unhelpful opposition is unlikely 
to allow that. 
 
13.  (C) The EU and Turkey navigated a similarly tortuous 
path last December at the Summit when the EU established the 
October 3 negotiation date.  After the Summit, Turkey's 
reform efforts stalled and the GOT allowed its EU candidacy 
to drift politically (refs B,C).  We will immediately engage 
with the GOT about their plans for the next stage and 
strongly urge them to move forward now, while the political 
mood is still fresh.  End Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY