US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI4200

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IR, IZ, QA, TC 
SUBJECT: MINSTATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MEETS AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1. (C) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad 
visited Abu Dhabi October 4 to urge Deputy Prime 
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan 
bin Zayed (HbZ) and the UAE to support the Iraqi political 
process.  HbZ agreed that the UAEG would encourage 
Dubai-based Iraqi Sunni cleric Ahmed Qubaysi to issue a 
positive statement.  HbZ also agreed to invite former Sunni 
Waqf (Endowment) leader Adnan Duleimi, and Duleimi's 
successor, Ahmed Abd Al Ghaffour Al Samarrai, to the UAE to 
urge them to engage positively on the constitution.  HbZ 
asked that the U.S. urge Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states to stand together to counter Iranian influence in Iraq 
and to adopt a GCC statement of public support for the Iraqi 
constitution.  He suggested that television stations such as 
Abu Dhabi Television and Al Arabiya could broadcast 
statements of support for the Iraqi political process to the 
Arab street.  HbZ reiterated the UAE leadership's support for 
Iraqi PM Iyad Allawi.  HbZ invited Ambassador Khalilzad to 
return to UAE later this month to discuss Iraq issues with 
his older brother, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed, 
and Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. 
 
2. (SBU) HbZ was accompanied by his chief of staff, Sultan Al 
Romeithy, and MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad was accompanied by Ambassador Sison and Embassy 
Baghdad's Deputy Political Counselor.  End Summary. 
 
3. (C) HbZ agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad that the outcome 
of the political process in Iraq would have a strategic 
effect on the region and on U.S. policy in the region.  HbZ 
warned that a premature U.S. troop pullout would be 
"disastrous." 
 
Winning Sunni Support for the Constitutional Referendum 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4.  (C) Ambassador Khalilzad requested the UAE's help in 
encouraging Sunni Arabs not to isolate themselves.  Khalilzad 
briefed HbZ on his efforts with Shi'a and Kurdish leaders to 
obtain their agreement to modifications to the constitution 
to accommodate Sunni Arab concerns.  These four 
accommodations concern the following areas: 
 
-- New wording on official languages (alternative Article 4, 
Part 3):  "The federal and official institutions in the 
Kurdistan region will use the two languages." 
 
-- New article on Iraq's unity (proposed addition to Section 
1): "Iraq is a federal country and united unit in land, 
people, and sovereignty, and this Constitution is the 
guarantor of its unity." 
 
-- Iraq's identity (alternative wording to Article 3): "Iraq 
is a country of multiple nationalities and religions and 
sects.  It is a founding and active member of the Arab league 
and is committed to its covenant, and it is a part of the 
Islamic world." 
 
-- National reconciliation (addition to Article 7 or 131): 
"Members of the former Ba'ath Party who were not senior 
leaders and who did not commit criminal offenses shall not be 
prosecuted and shall enjoy equality and protection under the 
law along with all Iraqis." 
 
5. (C) HbZ welcomed Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts and said 
Sunni Arabs should accept that this is the "best 
constitution."   HbZ also agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad's 
suggestion that the UAE invite Sunni Arab leaders, such as 
the new and former Sunni Waqf (Endowment) leaders 
(respectively, Ahmed Abd Al Ghaffour Al Samarrai and Adnan Al 
Dulaimi) to the UAE to see if they can become "positively 
engaged" on the constitution.  He also agreed with Ambassador 
Khalilzad that it was important to encourage Sunni Arabs to 
participate in an October 10 meeting of Shi'a, Sunnis, and 
Kurds to express their support for the constitution, and for 
the Sunni to support the constitution, especially given the 
compromises Ambassador Khalilzad had successfully obtained 
from the Shi'a and Kurds to accommodate Sunni Arab concerns. 
He pledged to contact Sunni leaders in Iraq to urge their 
participation in the conference.  He also said he would speak 
to the Dubai leadership about crafting a UAE strategy on 
Iraq, but he also said he saw the need for Gulf states to 
develop a Gulf strategy for dealing with Iraq. 
 
6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad agreed on the need to develop a 
Gulf strategy.  "Given that time is short, it can't wait," he 
told HbZ.  "These countries that are like-minded about 
promoting moderate cross-sectarian Iraqi politics need to 
start working together now."  HbZ suggested bringing in Qatar 
early, adding that Doha-based Arabic-language TV station Al 
Jazeera had "great influence on the Arab street."  He said 
the Arabic-language media could "send a positive message" 
about the Iraqi constitution.  Ambassador Khalilzad agreed 
that it would be useful for the UAE leadership to urge the 
media to explain federalism and the UAE's successful 
experience with federalism. 
 
Countering Iranian Influence 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (C) HbZ agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad that if Sunni 
Arabs did not participate in the constitutional and political 
processes, it would work to the advantage of hard line Shi'a 
parties as well as Iran.  HbZ added that the hard line Sunnis 
have made it more difficult for the U.S. to cope with the 
Iranian threat.  He noted that he had met with former Iraqi 
PM Iyad Allawi and Prince Bandar, and that all had agreed 
that the next four years would be crucial for Iraq.  If the 
situation could not be addressed successfully, it would 
strengthen Iran's hand in Iraq, he cautioned.  "We need a 
Gulf strategy.  Otherwise, we will leave Iraq open for the 
Iranians," he asserted.  He criticized Saudi Prince Saud Al 
Faisal for having issued his critical statement about Iran's 
role in Iraq )- without coordination with other Gulf states. 
 Following that, Qatari Foreign Minister Hamid bin Jassim, 
because of bilateral differences with the Saudis, issued a 
more positive statement about Iranian influence in Iraq to 
counterbalance Prince Saud's statement.  "If Iran is allowed 
to influence Iraq in the short-term, they will grow 
stronger," HbZ said.  "The Gulf states need to stand 
together."  HbZ urged the U.S. to approach the Gulf countries 
about standing together, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
 
8. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad also said it was important to 
press Syria to stop causing trouble.  He and HbZ agreed that 
Iran could not be allowed "to turn Iraq into what Syria did 
to Lebanon."  He underscored the importance of watching 
developments in southern Iraq very carefully.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad and HbZ also agreed on the need to prevent further 
Iranian political encroachments into Iraq. 
 
Support for non-sectarian leaders 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Given the decisiveness of the next elections, 
Ambassador Khalilzad said cross-sectarian moderate groups can 
play an important role in affecting Iraq's future in a 
positive direction.  HbZ reiterated his support for Iyad 
Allawi.  In addition to having credibility and strength, 
Allawi is a moderate Shi'a, a liberal, and possesses good 
credentials among Sunni Arabs, he said.  Ambassador Khalilzad 
urged HbZ to encourage Allawi to spend more time in Iraq 
organizing himself for the next election.  While it was 
important to work with Allawi, it was also important to work 
with others who are non-sectarian and moderate.  He advocated 
engaging "patriotic Iraqis" who happened to flee to Iran 
during Saddam's regime, rather than "shutting the door on 
them." 
 
10. (C) HbZ raised reports of a spat between President 
Talibani and Prime Minister Jaafari.  Ambassador Khalilzad 
confirmed that the two were not happy with each other, but he 
had pressed the Kurdish leaders to engage with Jafari to 
resolve their differences to keep the government together. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation and Coordination on Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (C) HbZ undertook to take the following actions in the 
near term: 
 
-- Urge Dubai-based Sunni cleric/television commentator Ahmed 
Al Qubaysi to issue a positive statement about the Iraqi 
constitutional process; 
 
-- Invite former Waqf leader Adnan Al Dulaimi, and his 
successor, Ahmed Abd Al Ghaffour Al Samarrai, to the UAE to 
encourage them to engage on the constitution; 
 
-- Encourage the Arabic media to issue statements of support 
for the Iraq constitution. 
 
12. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad recommended the U.S. and UAE 
have a mechanism for cooperating bilaterally on Iraq issues. 
HbZ said the UAE would do "everything we can to support your 
efforts," and suggested Iraq coordination take place through 
Ambassador Sison in Abu Dhabi as well as through the Emirati 
Charge in Baghdad.  (Note: Minutes after Ambassador Khalilzad 
departed Abu Dhabi, former IGC member Adnan Pachachi, who is 
in Abu Dhabi this week, called Ambassador Sison to report 
that he had had "a good conversation" over lunch with 
President Khalifa earlier in the day and would most likely be 
seeing Sheikh Khalifa again October 4.  End note.) 
13. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this message. 
QUINN