US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1649

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001649 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, CG 
SUBJECT: VP RUBERWA MUSES ON ELECTIONS, CONGO'S FUTURE 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C)  During an October 2 dinner, VP Ruberwa shared his 
insights on his evaluation of his own character and electoral 
chances/options, as well as his opinion of the other two 
likely presidential candidates, VP Jean-Pierre Bemba and 
President Joseph Kabila. 
 
A Tutsi Triumphant 
------------------ 
 
2. (C)  Ruberwa began by noting that he personally, and the 
Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) community in general, had come 
a long way in the two years of the transition.  He recalled 
his genuine fear for his safety in the first months following 
his arrival in Kinshasa at the start of the transition, and 
noted wryly that, if there had been a popularity poll 
conducted at the time (as are currently being done now), his 
rating would have been about minus two hundred.  But in the 
ensuing two years he felt that he had triumphed, to a large 
extent and with some notable exceptions, over prejudice and 
hatred.  Referring to current polling (in which he scores 
about plus four percent approval rating), he said that he 
believes his actual popularity to be much higher, noting 
(correctly) that among the four vice presidents he is widely 
considered the most moral and the most hardworking.  He 
mentioned (modesty and pride struggling for dominance on his 
face) his "fan club" in Kinshasa, composed he said of all 
elements of society and politics -- church and civil society 
leaders and people who officially belong to other parties but 
still admire his efforts to introduce change.  Ruberwa 
briefly played a video of himself addressing one of the club 
meetings, a packed gathering in a large assembly hall, and 
certainly on the video the audience seemed animated and 
interested (although of course such gatherings frequently are 
stage settings to convey exactly that impression). 
 
3. (C)  Recalling the low moments for the Banyamulenge 
community (particularly in South Kivu) in the same two-year 
period (the taking of Bukavu by Nkunda and Mutebusi -- Tutsis 
both -- and the subsequent Gatumba massacre, which Ruberwa 
remains convinced was orchestrated by elements within 
President Kabila's PPRD group), Ruberwa said that "his people 
and the Congolese society" have come a long way back toward 
tolerance and acceptance, after a long period of succumbing 
to political manipulation.  Referring specifically to the 
quiet but constant return of Banyamulenge refugees who had 
fled to Rwanda in the wake of the Bukavu attack, Ruberwa 
conceded that even eight months ago it would not have been 
possible for them to return safely.  While admitting that 
flashpoints remain which could still cause problems before 
elections (he cited in particular manipulations by PPRD 
Secretary General Vital Kamerhe and the return to the High 
 
SIPDIS 
Plateau of a group of Mutebusi's soldiers), he is optimistic 
not only that elections will take place but also that the RCD 
can do well. 
 
A Tutsi Conflicted 
------------------ 
 
4. (C)  Despite the above optimism, Ruberwa is too smart to 
believe that he could be elected president -- at least "not 
yet, but maybe in the next election in five years."  In a 
remarkably objective fashion he said that, despite his 
strengths (in order: religious, moral, intelligent, logical, 
hardworking) and despite having won over many doubters, he is 
and always will be a Tutsi and, at the moment, he has Nkunda 
and Mutebusi hanging around his neck like albatrosses. 
Clearly baffled as to how to manage this issue, Ruberwa once 
again shook his head when PolCouns suggested that he needed 
to put some political space between himself and the two 
rebellious military leaders, saying quietly that he would 
lose his tenuous control over the RCD military if he 
attempted to do so, although he did seem to take under 
consideration the possibility of announcing that he supports 
an open, complete and fair investigation of the Bukavu affair 
and would support any findings by an authorized civilian 
court. 
 
5. (C)  Ruberwa also indicated that, if he can find an 
acceptable way to do so, he will name someone else as the 
RCD's presidential candidate.  He said, however, that the 
candidate would still have to be a Banyamulenge (in order not 
to betray the community which admires his leadership), and at 
the same time sufficiently high-profile to reassure all RCD 
members that he, Ruberwa, is making the decision with the 
party's best interests in mind.  He didn't drop any names, 
but instead went on (in musing mode) to note that other 
important positions will be available after the elections, 
including (in order): head of the National Assembly (a person 
who would have to have the courage to say "no" to both the 
president and prime minister in the future government when 
necessary, a moral watchdog of the public interest -- unlike, 
he said, Olivier Kamitatu, current head of the Assembly); 
head of the Supreme Court (sharing many of the qualities 
listed above, plus of course extensive knowledge of the law); 
or the posts of Ministers of Interior or Justice.  (Comment: 
Interestingly, he did not mention the post of prime minister. 
 Current talk in Kinshasa is that the thinking on future 
prime ministers is that a candidate from the western 
provinces would be preferred if the elected president is from 
the east.  End Comment.) 
 
Looking Toward Elections 
------------------------ 
 
6. (C)  Turning his analytical eye toward President Kabila 
and VP Bemba (widely recognized as probable contenders in the 
presidential elections), Ruberwa said that Kabila's biggest 
weakness (as agreed by all) is his extremely private, even 
shy, nature.  Kabila does not like to appear in public, nor 
even to give televised speeches or radio talks.  Ruberwa 
raised another issue, however, which PolCouns had not 
previously heard, i.e., that Congolese intellectuals look 
down on Kabila as uneducated, and many will not vote for him 
for that reason.  (Note:  Unlike most Congolese in 
significant political positions, Kabila does not have a 
university degree.  End Note.)  Ruberwa said that many of 
these intellectuals attribute Kabila's unwillingness to 
appear in the public eye to his lack of education, saying 
that he does not speak or read well and attempts to hide this 
from the public.  Kabila's strength, of course, is that he is 
the sitting president, but in Ruberwa's view he is doing a 
surprisingly poor job of capitalizing on this advantage. 
 
7. (C)  Ruberwa said that in his view, and given his 
plummeting popularity even in his own province and within his 
own party, Bemba might be a candidate for the presidency but 
his chances of winning office, even with significant amounts 
of pre-election spending, seem to be declining.  PolCouns 
noted that Bemba's party, the MLC, might not even exist by 
the time elections arrive, should competing elements such as 
Jose Endundu actually formally announce a new party, which 
would attract many current MLC members (and some from the RCD 
and PPRD as well).  Ruberwa agreed, but said that, despite 
his debilitating weakness (incredible arrogance), Bemba does 
have intelligence and "lots of money" on his side, and so 
can't be ruled out. 
 
8. (C)  Finally, in terms of strengthening the RCD and its 
electoral chances, Ruberwa said that the party is working 
actively to attract voters in both Kasai provinces who 
normally would throw their support behind UDPS candidates 
but, lacking a candidate, will be looking for alternatives. 
(Note:  RCD has two strong candidates in the Kasais, Defense 
Minister Adolphe Onusumba and Vice Minister of Budget Tresor 
Kapuku, who could conceivably be the magnets for this effort. 
 End Note.)  If they succeed in "capturing" the UDPS 
elements, Ruberwa said, the RCD's own alliance negotiations 
might suddenly advance.  (Comment:  The RCD and PPRD have 
been engaged in a complicated dance for the last couple of 
months, trying to decide if reactivating old ties would be 
more advantageous than not.  If the RCD could also 
effectively bring a large UDPS segment in with them, it could 
indeed tip the balance in favor of a so-called grand 
alliance.  End Comment.) 
MEECE