US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS2042

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

DELIVERY OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON WESTERN SAHARA/ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS

Identifier: 05ALGIERS2042
Wikileaks: View 05ALGIERS2042 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Algiers
Created: 2005-10-03 17:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MO WI AG Polisario Algeria
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

031730Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 002042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MO, WI, AG, Polisario, Algeria-Morocco Relations 
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON WESTERN 
SAHARA/ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS 
 
REF: WHITE HOUSE 301549Z 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD W. ERDMAN; REASON 1.4 (b),(d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Responding to delivery of the President's letter, 
Algerian Presidential Adviser Rahal agreed with the 
President's message and the desirability of improved 
Algerian-Moroccan relations but did not demonstrate any 
flexibility or imagination as to how Algeria might contribute 
to such a process.  Covering familiar ground, he said Algeria 
was not a party to the Western Sahara dispute, had no 
territorial claims in the Western Sahara, and did not want 
differences over this issue to prevent bilateral cooperation. 
 Interestingly, he said point blank that "we don't have a 
problem with the Western Sahara becoming part of Morocco," 
but that doing this against the wishes of the local 
population would be highly destabilizing.  In this regard, 
Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan, he claimed, missed an 
opportunity to achieve a mutually satisfactory outcome via 
referendum voting procedures favorable to Morocco.  This was 
radicalizing Sahrawi youth, something Algeria did not want to 
see.  Throughout the conversation, Ambassador expressed the 
President's hope that both sides would seize the opportunity 
created by the prisoner release to work for improved 
relations and better communication. (End Summary) 
 
PRESIDENT'S LETTER DELIVERED 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Due to the absence abroad (in Paris) of outgoing 
Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir, Ambassador called on 
Presidential Diplomatic Adviser Rahal October 2 to deliver 
the President's message of September 30 (reftel) to President 
Bouteflika urging improved Algerian-Moroccan relations. 
Ambassador read through the text, leaving the English text as 
well as an unofficial Embassy French translation. 
 
ALGERIA WANTS IMPROVED RELATIONS BUT ... 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Rahal thanked Ambassador for the letter, commenting 
that he fully agreed with the President's message.  Algeria 
wanted improved relations with Morocco, he insisted, and to 
this end President Bouteflika had sought to improve bilateral 
communication with Morocco by sending Belkheir to Rabat as 
Ambassador.  Algeria did not want differences over the 
Western Sahara to interfere with expanded trade and 
cooperation with Morocco, which was in both sides' interest. 
Algeria was disappointed that Morocco continued to act as if 
Algeria were a party to the dispute.  This complicated 
efforts to keep the Western Sahara and bilateral issues 
separate. He noted that the differences in age, personality, 
and experience between Bouteflika and Mohammed VI were 
another complicating factor, noting that the King's sudden 
turnabout in canceling PM Ouyahia's visit to Rabat last June, 
only 45 minutes after the Algerians had been informed the 
King would host Ouyahia, had given great offense. 
 
BAKER PLAN REJECTION A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
THAT IS NOW RADICALIZING SAHRAWI YOUTH 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Covering familiar ground on the Western Sahara issue, 
Rahal said that Algeria had no territorial claims there, 
would not sacrifice any Algerian lives over this issue, and 
wanted to see a settlement that respected UN resolutions and 
the principle of self-determination.  Reiterating Algeria's 
support for the Baker Plan, Rahal expressed concern that 
Morocco, by rejecting the plan and unilaterally seeking to 
assert sovereignty, had missed a real opportunity. Worse, "it 
was pushing young Sahrawis toward more radical positions, 
which Algeria did not want to see happen."  Morocco's 
rejection of Baker was also increasing demands among Sahrawi 
youth for an "independence" outcome, the opposite of what 
Morocco wanted. 
 
"WE DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH 
THE WESTERN SAHARA BECOMING PART OF MOROCCO" BUT... 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5. (C) In this regard, Rahal said, "We don't have a problem 
with the Western Sahara becoming part of Morocco.  But it 
can't happen against the wishes of the local population." 
That would be a recipe for permanent instability and tension. 
 The Baker Plan, he argued, had offered a way forward because 
it would have allowed all Moroccans present in the 
territories to vote in a self-determination referendum, not 
just the Sahrawis.  With roughly equal numbers of Moroccans 
and Sahrawis, Morocco, if it had properly managed the 
situation and demonstrated that autonomy would work, could 
have achieved the outcome it wanted.  Algeria had shown good 
will in accepting this highly unusual kind of voting process, 
he maintained.  He underscored that not a single other 
government in the world has recognized Moroccan sovereignty 
over the Western Sahara and that Algeria would never accept a 
fait accompli on this matter.  This question could only be 
resolved on the basis of self-determination. 
 
NEED FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS, GREATER 
SENSITIVITY, AND BETTER COMMUNICATION 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Ambassador throughout the conversation expressed the 
President's hope that both sides would seize the opportunity 
created by the prisoner release to work for improved 
relations and better communication.  In this regard, he noted 
that both sides seemed to be accusing the other of walking 
back on an understanding to separate bilateral and Western 
Sahara issues, dealing with the later in a UN framework. 
This underscored the need for better communication, as did 
the unfortunate misunderstandings that arose when Morocco 
announced the lifting of the visa requirement without advance 
notice.  Ambassador agreed that Morocco could have been more 
sensitive in its handling of this issue.  By the same token, 
Algeria had made a serious error in not being more sensitive 
and not responding more generously to the King's gesture in 
attending the Arab League Summit in Algiers in March.  "Why 
do we need to reward someone for attending an Arab League 
Summit?", Rahal responded not very sympathetically. 
 
COOL REACTION TO FM BENAISSA'S 
INVITATION TO FM BEJAOUI 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Again stressing both sides' interest in getting 
bilateral relations back on track via resumption of a high 
level dialogue, Ambassador hoped Algeria would respond 
positively to the invitation FM Benaissa recently extended to 
FM Bedjaoui.  Rahal, who seemed not well informed about the 
invitation, said his own personal view was that since the 
Moroccans had canceled the Prime Minister's visit, to get 
things restarted they should issue the invitation at the 
prime ministerial level. (Comment: MFA Secretary General, in 
an October 3 conversation (septel), took a completely 
different tack, dismissively arguing that the issue was not 
the level of the interlocutors but what they would say.) 
Ambassador closed the conversation reiterating the 
President's hope that Algeria would work in a positive and 
constructive spirit for improved bilateral relations with 
Morocco. 
ERDMAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04