US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4087

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PROGRESS IN IRAQI DETAINEE TRANSITION TALKS

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD4087
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD4087 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-10-03 16:22:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER IZ Detainees
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2015 
TAGS: MOPS, PHUM, PINS, PTER, IZ, Detainees 
SUBJECT: PROGRESS IN IRAQI DETAINEE TRANSITION TALKS 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by David C. Litt, Political- 
Military Affairs Counselor, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Post and MNF-I's most recent meeting 
with Dr. Safa al-Safi, designated ITG interlocutor on 
the transition of detention operations, was in many 
respects encouraging.  Dr. al-Safi seemed to accept 
the need for the ITG and its successor to assume 
responsibility for the detention mission, and focused 
conversation on the logistical details of transition 
and the current legal status of Coalition detainees. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) At our meeting with Dr. Safa al-Safi on 
October 2, 2005, he expressed an improved 
understanding of the detainee transition mission, 
asked a number of questions about CPA Order No. 3 
(including whether MNF-I is following it in practice), 
and noted that it might be necessary to discuss - in 
the context of legal authorities - what ministry would 
handle oversight of security detainees. 
 
3.  (C) We explained again, using concrete examples, 
situations in which security detention proves 
necessary. Dr. al-Safi listened carefully to MNF-I's 
proposal that our joint working group play a role in 
teeing up the cases of detainees held for more than 
eighteen months to the Joint Detainee Commission for 
consideration if and when the need arises (which will 
be no earlier than January 2006). 
 
4.  (C) Al-Safi showed some concern (partly in jest) 
at the fact that ITG would need to fund the salaries 
of Iraqi guards to be trained by the USG and deployed 
at existing facilities in the first step of 
transition.  "How will we pay?" he protested, 
laughing.  "We have no money. It is enough that we 
will take them after you are gone, which will cause us 
all kinds of problems." 
 
5.  (C) MNF-I is finalizing budgeting, personnel, and 
facilities issues separately with the Minister of 
Justice; we expect (and recommended to al-Safi) that 
MOJ will be represented on the Working Group. 
Construction at the MNF-I facility at Fort Suse, which 
will be the first to transition, is on schedule, as is 
initial correction training for personnel to man it. 
 
6. (C)  We have scheduled three additional meetings in 
rapid succession, and have agreed to establish 
timelines and finalize membership of the broader USG- 
Iraqi Detainee Working Group.  We intend to start 
discussions of Iraqi legal authorities for detention 
as soon as the full group is assembled, and have 
prepared specific variants consistent with the points 
raised in Reftel for ITG consideration. 
 
7.  (C) However, we will face a challenge in 
maintaining momentum in discussions on legal 
authorities from mid-October onwards.  Al-Safi plans 
to be in Kuwait with family from October 13 - November 
8, and we expect that, like many of our interlocutors, 
his campaigning for his seat in Basra may cause his 
frequent absence from the capital for the remainder of 
the year. 
Satterfield 

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