US embassy cable - 05ALMATY3450

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 003450 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, AND EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, KDEM, KZ, POLITICAL 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. A. STATE 169627 
     B. B. ALMATY 3301 
     C. C. ALMATY 3245 
 
Classified By: Qb. John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) SumQry:  Post welcomes the selection of Kazakhstan as 
an EUR focus country for the democracy promotion strategy 
(Ref A).  Kazakhstan is preparing for what could be its first 
truly contested presidential race this December, against the 
backdrop of serious GOK concerns about U.S. intentions and 
the potential for another "color revolution."  At the same 
time, President Nazarbayev has publicly committed himself to 
pursuing further democratic reform -- albeit at a rather 
unambitious pace -- following the election (Ref B).  Post 
engages in regular, high-level dialogue with the GOK about 
the need to complement sound economic policies with real 
political reform.  This dialogue intensified after the May 
decision not to certify Kazakhstan for Foreign Operations 
Apropriations Act (FOAA) spending for the first time.  The 
increased high-level USG engagement with the GOK and program 
initiatives made possible by the democracy promotion strategy 
will permit us to capitalize on Kazakhstan's present economic 
strength and stability and encourage bold progress.  In the 
near term, post will focus on presidential elections, better 
conditions for NGOs and journalists, increased transparency 
of the judicial system, and expanded civic education.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Post's Democracy Working Group convened on September 
22 to outline a democracy promotion strategy for Kazakhstan. 
Information below is keyed to para. 6 of reftel. 
 
A.  Deficit areas:  The main areas of democratic deficit in 
Kazakhstan are well documented, and the GOK is doing little 
to address them.  They include insufficient political 
representation due to falsified national elections and the 
limited powers of the parliament; government pressure on the 
independent media; a judiciary that lacks independence; 
restrictions on freedom of assembly; and pervasive corruption 
which corrodes democratic values at all levels of society. 
Appointment of regional and local executives and 
institutionally weak elected councils are also a serious 
problem in the Kazakhstani context.  With the proper USG 
coordination and resources, it is possible to achieve 
tangible results in certain of these areas over the next six 
to eight months.  Post intends to focus its efforts on 
support for presidential elections which are substantially 
better than previous elections and which come significantly 
closer to meeting international standards, blocking new 
damaging legislation such as the NGO laws, increasing public 
dialogue about the merits of direct election of regional and 
local leaders, decreasing the pressure on independent media, 
increasing the professionalism of Kazakhstani journalists to 
serve as more effective advocates of the public good, 
promoting incremental improvement in the transparency of the 
judiciary, and institutionalizing civic education in schools. 
 
B.  Strategy:  The period up until December 4 presidential 
elections will be politically sensitive, with the GOK on 
particular alert for any U.S. initiatives that appear 
designed to "mobilize" the Kazakhstani public.  We expect our 
assistance partners to come under particularly close scrutiny 
in the coming months.  However, President Nazarbayev's 
repeated public commitment to ensure free and fair elections 
has created a relatively favorable environment for assistance 
efforts aimed directly at the electoral process.  Once the 
elections are over and, presumably, President Nazarbayev is 
reelected to his final term, we expect much greater openness 
on the part of the GOK to other U.S. proposals.  Nazarbayev 
has already publicly committed himself to further democratic 
reform, he knows that progress is necessary for Kazakhstan to 
receive support for its OSCE CiO bid, and most importantly, 
he will be concerned with his legacy and with ensuring a 
smooth exit from the political scene.  For that reason, post 
envisions a two-stage strategy:  intense diplomatic and 
programmatic focus on presidential elections until December, 
followed by a broadened agenda of proposals to address other 
areas of democratic deficit. 
 
C.  Needs:  In cooperation with EUR/ACE, post has already 
designed a strategy to support a free and fair presidential 
election process and identified the necessary funding ($1.3 
million) to support international and domestic election 
observation, voter education, media activities, and exit 
polling. The engagement of the Carter Foundation (Ref C) in 
election monitoring would be a welcome addition to this 
effort.  Upcoming high-level visits, including by EUR A/S 
Fried, U/S Joseph, and SecDef, will provide valuable 
opportunities to reinforce the USG's message on elections and 
 
to publicly highlight President Nazarbayev's own commitments 
to good elections and further reform. 
 
C. Needs, continued:  For the second phase of the strategy, 
post proposes the following initiatives to address the most 
pressing areas of democratic deficit in concrete and 
achievable ways: 
 
-- A coordinated diplomatic effort to hold President 
Nazarbayev to his public promise to establish and chair a 
Democratization Commission, which will propose substantial 
reforms.  As part of this, we should seek a commitment that 
the NGO legislation ruled unconstitutional in August will not 
be resurrected.  If December presidential elections meet our 
expectations, this effort could be capped by a Nazarbayev 
visit to Washington. 
 
--  Establishment of a more robust media training program for 
local independent print journalists.  The lack of training 
and professionalism among Kazakhstani journalists renders 
them particularly vulnerable to the GOK's attempts to 
pressure them and encourage self-censorship.  The Public 
Affairs Section would work with a local organization such as 
MediaNet to establish an intensive, long-term (i.e. nine 
month) program for journalists.  Estimated annual cost for a 
program to train 20 journalists would be $545,000 the first 
year and $522,000 thereafter.  Post would seek to identify 
funding partners. 
 
-- Successful launch of a satellite broadcast program to 
increase the availability of independent media programming. 
This three-year, $1.6 million regional project is already 
underway, with broadcasts expected to begin in January. 
Through the project, the  Internews Network will support the 
satellite transmission throughout Central Asia of news and 
informational television programs from a transmission base in 
Almaty 
 
-- Engagement with the GOK to amend the civil code to 
prohibit state organs from filing civil code "honor and 
dignity" lawsuits, and to protect journalists against 
criminal libel lawsuits.  The Embassy will also continue to 
provide technical advice on potential new media legislation 
through Internews. 
 
-- Expansion of USAID's pilot court recording project 
nationwide.  As the Kazakhstani judicial system currently has 
no mechanism to provide transcripts of court proceedings, 
this program provides a greatly increased level of 
transparency for all parties.  The Ministry of Justice has 
budgeted some funds to support expansion of the program in 
2006.  Post estimates that an additional $200,000 will be 
needed to provide the necessary training and technical 
assistance in these sites.  This would be complemented longer 
term by curriculum reform in the Judicial Academy to 
emphasize ethics, accountability, and transparency. 
 
-- High-level engagement with the Ministry of Education and 
Science to convince the GOK to adopt USAID's highly 
successful civic education program for use nationwide as an 
established part of the national curriculum. 
 
-- Restoring the number of IVLP exchange program slots to the 
previous FSA-funded level of 80 per year; there are now 38. 
Post would use the additional exchange slots to significantly 
increase the number of programs for judges and local leaders 
in order to increase their exposure to the U.S. judiciary and 
local self-government. 
 
D.  Impediments:  Assuming resources are available to 
implement the programmatic suggestions, the main impediments 
to these initiatives will be persistent distrust of U.S. 
motivations by many elites, hesitancy to embrace real change, 
and the GOK's inability to reach interagency decisions in a 
reasonable timeframe.  While post expects the level of GOK 
and public concern about alleged U.S. efforts to provoke a 
"color revolution" to drop considerably after the 
presidential elections, residual doubts and distrust will 
remain.  The likely appearance of out of context excerpts 
from the recent USAID publication "Democracy Rising" in the 
Kazakhstani press is also likely to exacerbate the situation. 
 
E.  Allies/opponents:  As with all human rights issues in 
Kazakhstan, the EU (particularly under the current UK 
presidency) will likely be our strongest and most vocal ally 
in these efforts.  The UK and Dutch embassies and the 
European Commission representation are generally the most 
outspoken here on the ground.  Although less vocal in public, 
the OSCE Center is almost always willing to work with us 
behind the scenes to influence the GOK on human rights 
 
issues.  We would hope that ODIHR, which is already fully 
engaged in preparations for the presidential elections, would 
be willing to support a coordinated push for further reforms 
in the new year.  Russia, both bilaterally and through the 
CIS and SCO, is likely to be vociferously critical and to do 
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the campaign and the announcement of results; and national 
security amendments which imposed limits on political 
activity, the media, and religious groups.  Kazakhstan's 
fervent desire to chair the OSCE in 2009 is the one area of 
international engagement which can provide a useful lever to 
push for real reforms.  Once a decision is reached, either 
positive or negative, that leverage will be lost.  Kazakhstan 
seeks the CiO not as a mechanism to force needed domestic 
reforms, but rather as a way to increase its own 
international standing.  FM Tokayev has spoken publicly of 
the GOK's desire to place more emphasis on the security 
"basket" and less on human dimension issues if the GOK 
obtains the chairmanship. 
 
G.  Consequences:  Kazakhstan is at a crossroads, clearly 
vacillating between an impulse to restrain civil society and 
the growing realization that political reform is the only 
sure path to continued prosperity and stability.  There are 
advocates for both of these paths.  Post believes that a 
properly calibrated and coordinated USG approach to a 
democracy strategy for Kazakhstan could result in tangible 
progress within the next six to eight months, thereby 
insuring that the GOK takes the fundamental decision for 
reform.  The possible consequences of an unsuccessful 
strategy, i.e. one that was perceived as too heavy-handed or 
didactic, could include accusations by the GOK that the U.S. 
is trying to undermine regional stability and the U.S.-KZ 
"strategic partnership" in order to increase its control over 
the region and its natural resources. 
 
3. (SBU) Post looks forward to Department feedback on the 
strategy and specific proposals. 
ORDWAY 
 
 
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