US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4073

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2015 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PGOV, PREF, PHUM, IZ, Reconstruction, Terrorism 
SUBJECT: TAL AFAR WRAP-UP: SHORT-TERM SUCCESS BUT MOMENTUM 
MUST BE MAINTAINED 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
a), (b), AND (d). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY: Major fighting in Tal Afar has concluded and 
the reconstruction process is proceeding apace.  The 
operation is considered by MNF-I to be an overall success: an 
important base for terrorists and insurgents has been 
disrupted, with a number either killed or detained.  The 
Iraqi Army (IA), supported by Police Commando units of the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), played a major and visible role 
in the operations; by all accounts they performed well. 
Relief efforts, including bilateral support from Turkey, 
generally succeeded.  Most of those who fled the city have 
returned.  Battle damage to residences and shops was minimal. 
 U.S. forces have paid out nearly $850,000 in compensation 
and have started a number of projects to help the city 
recover and move forward.  However, despite these positive 
points, there were and are important aspects of the operation 
that needed (and still need) improvement.  While the Prime 
Minister and the Ministers of Defense and Interior publicly 
played lead roles and put an Iraqi face on the operation, at 
the levels below them the Iraqis required constant coaching 
and prodding to formulate and execute plans both during the 
lead-up to the operation and to deal with humanitarian issues 
during and after combat operations.  Political reconciliation 
in Tal Afar is critical, and we judge that the Iraqis are 
moving too slowly in paying promised compensation and in 
addressing the concerns of the people.  It is critical that 
the tactical success against the insurgents be followed by 
strategic success at the political level.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
OPERATION RESTORING RIGHTS 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  The centerpiece of Operation Restoring Rights was a 
decisive combat operation to dislodge insurgents and foreign 
fighters reported to have taken over the town of Tal Afar, a 
city of 250,000 inhabited by an ethnically diverse population 
of approximately 75 percent Turkmen and 25 percent Arabs and 
Kurds.  Approximately 75 percent are Sunni and the rest are 
Shia.  Ethnic tensions, which have been exacerbated for the 
past year by the insurgency, have long created difficulties 
in the town.  In September 2004, Coalition Forces (CF) 
entered the city to dislodge insurgents who were using it as 
a base of operations.  Following the withdrawal of CF, the 
situation slowly degenerated.  As ethnic tensions flared, 
insurgents took advantage of the opportunity to return to the 
city -- some invited and sheltered by the Sunni sheiks in an 
effort to strengthen their hand against Shia rivals.  Acts of 
violence became commonplace, and many Shia left the city to 
seek shelter elsewhere.  The city's once-thriving economy 
collapsed.  The Shia turned to the Iraqi Transitional 
Government (ITG) for assistance, but when it was slow to come 
they sought other champions for their cause, including 
Moqtada al-Sadr. 
 
3.  (C) As the situation became more untenable, the decision 
was made to take military action to defeat the insurgents who 
had occupied the city.  Prior to embarking on military 
action, attempts were made to solve the problem politically. 
An ITG delegation visited Tal Afar in an effort to address 
grievances, to determine whether a negotiated settlement 
between the rival factions was possible, and to ascertain 
whether such a settlement would lead to the departure of the 
insurgents, who were thought to include a number of foreign 
fighters.  These attempts to broker a political deal 
ultimately failed, and, following a period of preparatory and 
shaping operations by the U.S. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 
(3ACR) and the 3rd IA Division, decisive combat operations 
began on September 10.  Prior to the commencement of 
operations the ITG had obtained the agreement of the Sunni 
tribal sheiks that authorities must resort to military force 
to free the city from insurgents. 
 
4. (C)  In many respects, the decisive combat operations were 
anticlimactic.  Many insurgents were engaged and killed 
during the shaping operations.  Also, despite strong 
indications that the insurgents were preparing for a 
defensive battle, by the time the operation commenced many 
had fled either by blending in with the departing masses (who 
had been warned to leave by their leaders) or by escaping 
through a network of tunnels that were discovered after CF 
and IA soldiers entered the city.  In total, according to 
MNF, the combat operations led to the death of 152 
insurgents, the capture of 703, and the discovery of 68 
caches.  Notably, of all those killed or captured, only two 
were positively identified as foreign fighters. Coalition and 
Iraqi casualties between August 26 and September 15 totaled 4 
CF killed, 11 CF wounded, 4 ISF killed, and 21 ISF wounded. 
Only 6 civilians reportedly were killed or wounded during the 
operation. 
 
5. (C)  The performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 
both IA and MOI commandos, was mostly encouraging.  The IA 
assumed a lead role in the fighting and performed extremely 
well in combined operations with CF.  They sustained 
casualties and still continued to pursue the enemy 
aggressively.  However, they required more than limited 
support.  With regard to MOI forces, there were allegations 
that the predominately Shia 4th Special Police Commando 
Brigade harassed, abused, and stole from Sunni citizens as 
they fled.  Twelve specific allegations were investigated and 
two were found to be substantiated; the others were not.  The 
Sunni sheiks were upset with the appearance of the Commando 
Brigade because they believed the ITG had promised to send a 
more balanced unit instead.  The Commando Brigade, which has 
a dubious reputation among Sunnis, was withdrawn at the 
earliest possible time to improve the situation and lower 
tensions.  A plan to replace them with Public Order 
Battalions is currently on hold for the same reason. 
 
----------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C)  During the several months leading up to the 
operation, an increasing number of people left Tal Afar as 
economic and security conditions there worsened.  The exact 
number who fled over the months and days preceding the 
operation is hard to determine, but a reasonable total 
estimate ranges between 20,000 and 40,000 people.  Most of 
these people sought shelter with relatives or friends in 
other cities throughout Iraq. Many more fled as shaping 
operations commenced in the days immediately preceding the 
assault.  Just after the launch of decisive operations, the 
tribal sheiks encouraged their people to leave.  Although 
there was not an ITG plan for humanitarian assistance, one of 
the Prime Minister's special assistants headed a team that 
met frequently in the days prior to the operation to 
coordinate the efforts of various Iraqi ministries.  In 
addition, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) 
established an operations center to coordinate relief 
activity, which -- despite being temporarily displaced by a 
fire -- proved to be highly effective and will serve as a 
model for future operations. 
 
7. (C)  By the time combat operations began, it was estimated 
that at least 20,000 people had fled the city in the 
immediately preceding days.  Again, many sought and received 
refuge with other families in the area, but many were 
sheltered in tents provided by USAID's Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Iraqi Red Crescent, and other 
NGOs.  OFDA, with its implementing partners International 
Medical Corps (IMC) and International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), worked closely with the 3rd ACR and provided 
assistance to more than 20,000 internally displaced persons. 
OFDA spent approximately $1,150,000. (See septel for further 
information on OFDA accomplishments.)  The Turkish 
Government, which was concerned that the sizeable Turkmen 
population would not receive its fair share of relief 
supplies from the Kurds, also offered and delivered aid. 
 
8. (C)  Despite initial difficulties in arranging transport 
for food and other supplies, the Embassy deems the relief 
operation a success.  There were no major problems with 
widespread hunger or disease.  The displacement lasted 
relatively briefly, and as of September 27 MNF-I reports that 
more than 21,000 internally displaced persons have returned. 
They were provided with food and water as they passed through 
U.S.-manned checkpoints on their way back.  None of the local 
sheiks who were at meetings attended by PolOff on September 
27-28 complained of issues regarding health conditions, food, 
water, or sanitation.  The sheiks were encouraging all of 
their people to return to their homes.  The MODM predicts 
that regular food distribution and city services will resume 
in approximately one week.  Emergency food distribution 
within Tal Afar has all but ended.  Some difficulties were 
encountered with the Red Crescent.  For this reason, POL, 
IRMO, and OFDA are seeking a meeting with the President of 
the Iraqi Red Crescent to discuss the importance of adhering 
to international standards of humanitarian response 
(especially sanitation) and to urge the Red Crescent to 
coordinate better with other humanitarian assistance entities 
in the future. 
 
------------------------- 
RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C)  U.S. forces initiated reconstruction efforts 
immediately following the completion of decisive combat 
operations.  MNF-I has funded 58 current projects in Tal 
Afar, totaling more than $11 million.  These projects address 
the needs of security, electricity, medical services, water, 
sanitation, education, transportation, and construction.  The 
scheduled completion date for all projects is March 2006.  In 
addition, MNF-I is compensating Tal Afar residents $200 to 
$2,000 per qualifying family for homes damaged by the 
operation.  By October 1, MNF-I will have paid out over 
$850,000 in compensation. 
 
10. (C)  In contrast, the ITG has yet to pay a single dinar 
in compensation, despite continued pledges to do so and 
continued entreaties by MNF-I and Embassy officers.  The ITG 
initially agreed to make $50 million available for 
reconstruction and compensation.  The Minister of Defense 
said that each family would be paid $1,000, but more recently 
the Prime Minister's aide for Tal Afar said the ITG would pay 
each family an initial payment that amounts to $34.  In 
addition to the promised compensation, the ITG has a "Phase 
1" proposal that calls for spending $47 million (including 
$10 million for compensation) during the next 90 days. 
However, there was no discussion of this plan during a 
September 27 meeting between the sheiks and the ITG. 
 
11. (C)  The reasons for the Iraqi delays appear to be 
bureaucratic.  The office of the Prime Minister (PM) 
initially tasked the Ministry of Planning and Development 
(MOPD) to submit a reconstruction plan for Tal Afar, which it 
quickly did.  Subsequently, the Minister of Industry and 
Minerals (MIM), a Sunni Arab from nearby Mosul who vocally 
opposed military action, was tasked to implement the plan, in 
response to complaints from senior ITG Sunni leaders 
(including Vice President Ghazi al-Yawar and Deputy Prime 
Minister Abed Mutlaq al-Jiburi) that "Shia" were in charge of 
Tal Afar reconstruction.  The PM's office has advised IRMO 
that the order has been issued by the PM to allocate $50 
million.  However, for reasons unknown to us, the PM's office 
does not want all the money to go through the MIM.  Finally, 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which will ultimately disburse 
the funds, has written to the Council of Ministers to 
indicate that it will not do so until it receives certain 
information, including the number of people killed and 
injured and the number of homes demolished and destroyed. 
Since the MOF has not yet received this information or 
further instructions from the Council, they are not moving 
the funds. 
 
12. (C)  MNF-I and Embassy both believe that unless the ITG 
quickly begins to fulfill its commitments, the people of Tal 
Afar will feel betrayed and turn to continued reliance on the 
MNF-I for assistance.  It is crucial that the ITG maintain 
the momentum and quickly produce tangible results by paying 
compensation and commencing construction projects.  Embassy 
and MNF-I will continue to press the ITG on this. 
 
------------------------------------ 
POLITICAL OUTCOME AND RECONCILIATION 
------------------------------------ 
 
13. (C)  A major reason the situation in Tal Afar 
deteriorated was the historical animosities and suspicions 
among the disparate ethnic communities who live there.  Sunni 
Arabs, Shia, Kurds, and Turkmen are all vying for their share 
(and then some).  These problems continue and must be 
resolved as much as possible if Tal Afar is to move forward. 
Initially, there was great suspicion on the part of the 
Sunnis and Turkmen that the Shia were seeking dominance and 
that the military operation was conducted on a pretext to put 
down the Sunni and gain power.  Upon the commencement of the 
combat operation, several nationally prominent Sunnis, 
including members of the Government, spoke out in harsh terms 
about the situation.  Meetings between local sheiks of 
different sectarian backgrounds, as well as meetings by 
local, provincial, and national officials, often ended with 
shouting and walkouts.  On a positive note, the majority of 
the sheiks seemed to be in agreement at the beginning of the 
operation that force must be used.  However, at a meeting one 
week ago, the Sunni sheiks refused to enter the same room as 
the Shias. 
 
14. (C)  Nonetheless, on September 27, sheiks from all groups 
met for the first time since the operation.  They all agreed 
that foreign fighters had brought on the problems.  Only the 
chief of police dissented, claiming that 95 percent of the 
combatants were locals.  Distrust and suspicion remains.  PM 
Jaafari recently received a letter from a trusted friend in 
Tal Afar alleging that atrocities and attacks on Shia homes 
were still taking place.  Minister of Defense Dulime says 
he's received similar complaints from Sunnis.  MNF-I is 
unable to either confirm or deny these reports. 
 
15. (C)  A major source of tension in the city was the 
composition of the police force, which was perceived to be 
too Shia.  In the months prior to the operation, the chief of 
police was a Shia who purged the force of all Sunnis and then 
began to target members of the Sunni community.  The police 
in Tal Afar began to be perceived as an extension of the Badr 
Corps, the armed wing of the SCIRI party.  The chief was 
fired by the Provincial Chief of Police but refused to go 
quietly.  When he finally was forced out, he was replaced by 
a chief who was seen to be effective, impartial, and 
professional.  The new chief eventually was appointed to be 
the mayor.  To further remedy the problems with the police, 
it was agreed before the operation began that a new police 
force would be recruited from across Tal Afar's population to 
reflect the town's diversity.  Each sheik was to nominate an 
equal number of tribesmen to be included in the force. 
Efforts to reconstitute the force are ongoing, with a 
majority of the recruits coming from the Sunni community. 
This process remains controversial as some Turkmen candidates 
have been disqualified by their failure to meet the 
requirement that they speak, read, and write Arabic.  Other 
leaders accuse their rivals of nominating "terrorists" to 
serve in the force.  Rigorous vetting procedures will be 
followed in an attempt to avoid recruiting unsuitable 
candidates.  The recruiting effort is a joint MNF-I and MOI 
effort.  A mobile MOI recruiting team has arrived to sign up 
additional candidates.  An 8-week course for 200 new recruits 
from all tribes begins on October 3, and a 2-week course for 
150 current officers has already begun.  CF and IA soldiers, 
along with a number of the city's existing police officers, 
are currently providing police protection for Tal Afar. 
 
16. (C) At the national level, ITG leadership took a visible 
and lead role in the operation.  The PM appeared on 
television to announce and justify the operation.  This was 
followed by several briefings by the Ministers of Defense and 
Interior in which they strongly defended the need for 
military action and called for unity against terrorists.  The 
statements and role of the Minister of Defense, who in the 
past was hesitant to take a public role during military 
operations against predominantly Sunni insurgents, were 
particularly positive.  The ITG leadership clearly views the 
Tal Afar operation as a success.  Their confidence in 
participating in necessary military operations has increased 
along with the capabilities of the ISF. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
17. (C)  Positives include: insurgents routed, low Coalition 
and ISF casualties, nearly negligible civilian injuries, 
minimal battle damage, no major humanitarian problems, and an 
emboldened Iraqi leadership and military.  Negatives include: 
a low number of foreign fighters confirmed killed or 
captured, difficulties getting the ITG to execute without 
constant mentoring, some difficulties coordinating the 
activities of NGOs during the humanitarian assistance phase, 
and ITG foot-dragging during the critical reconstruction and 
reconciliation process.  Continued sectarian suspicions and 
political animosities remain important challenges.  Also not 
to be discounted is the continued presence of insurgents in 
the area, as demonstrated by the highly unusual use of a 
female suicide bomber to attack and kill police applicants in 
Tal Afar on September 28.  Post will continue to push the ITG 
to maintain the momentum so that a short-term victory does 
not become a long-term loss.  END COMMENT. 
Satterfield