US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4045

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BAGHDAD 004045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EAID, KDEM, IZ, Reconstruction 
SUBJECT: ACTION PLAN TO BUILD CAPACITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY WITHIN IRAQ'S PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 81769 
B. BAGHDAD 02052 
C. MNF-I FRAGO 05-120 
 
1.  (U) This is a U.S. Mission Baghdad/MNF-I 
coordinated cable. 
 
2.  (SBU) Summary.  As directed by the references, 
Provincial Support Teams (PST) and Provincial 
Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDC) 
were established by June 2005 in all 15 non-KRG 
provinces to accomplish their stated mission. 
Efforts met with varied success in the provinces, 
but PST's were generally unable to accomplish all 
actions mandated.  A comprehensive review of 
actions taken to implement the initiative was 
undertaken and the results, supported by weekly 
assessments, revealed key weaknesses.  In 
conjunction with the review, U.S. Mission and MNF- 
I jointly developed a follow-on initiative to 
ensure unity of MNF-I and Mission effort in the 
field in strengthening the capabilities of 
provincial governments, assisting in the 
coordination of USG reconstruction and development 
assistance efforts, and providing enhanced 
reporting on political developments and advocacy 
of coalition political and economic policy goals. 
The result of this effort is the recommendation to 
deploy joint, civil-military Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams to each of the 15 non-KRG 
provinces, as well as a Regional Reconstruction 
Team to the KRG.   This cable lays out the 
mission, tasks and goals related to implementation 
of this new initiative.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
3.  (SBU) An interim review of efforts, successes 
and weaknesses relating to the PRDC initiative was 
conducted in late July by Mission that identified 
problem areas related to procedures, 
infrastructure and resource allocation.  In 
August, MNF-I and Mission further evaluated the 
impact that PSTs were having on developing the 
capacity of provincial governments, as well as the 
specific needs of the governmental elements. 
Consensus was that PSTs were not effectively 
developing governance capacity in the provinces, 
but only on a very small scale, and that 
fundamental change would be required in order to 
accomplish priorities of action identified in 
reference (B).  Key factors in limiting the 
successes of the PSTs included gaps in DOS 
staffing and skill sets, limited PSD support, and 
inconsistent support from MNF-I elements to the 
initiative.  In addition, the lack of a standing 
body at the Mission/MNF-I level to support, 
coordinate and guide activities of the PSTs was 
identified as a key weakness. 
 
4.  (U) As a result of the review, the Mission and 
MNF-I have jointly developed an initiative to 
strengthen our support to provincial governments 
during this critical period in the development of 
Iraq's democratic institutions.  We started with a 
revised mission statement to focus clearly on the 
objectives of the new effort. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Newly Defined Mission and End State Goals 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) The proposed new mission statement for the 
USG/Coalition effort to build capability and 
sustainability of Iraq's provincial governments 
is: 
 
"To assist Iraq's provincial governments with 
developing a transparent and sustained capability 
to govern, promote increased security and rule of 
law, promote political and economic development, 
and provide provincial administration necessary to 
meet the basic needs of the population." 
 
6.  (SBU) The mission statement of our provincial 
initiative is intended to focus the effort on 
reaching an end state - or goals - that are 
achievable, well-defined and measurable, based on 
sound metrics.  Accomplishment of these goals is 
essential to the evolution of a stable democracy 
in Iraq and facilitates increased stability 
throughout the Middle East.  These goals are: 
 
--Provincial governments that have a stabilized, 
transparent process for identifying redevelopment 
needs throughout their province, and a solid 
program to address redevelopment issues; 
 
--Provincial governments that are confident and 
transparent in the execution of their duties and 
responsibilities; 
 
--Provincial governments that have the support of 
their citizenry; 
 
--Provincial governments that have increased 
efficiency and capability in the delivery of 
services to their citizens, and that are 
increasingly self-sufficient; 
 
--Provincial governments that have regularized 
mechanisms for citizen participation in 
governmental decision-making processes; 
 
--Provincial governments that have increased core 
competencies (public administration, finance and 
budgeting, urban/municipal planning) and 
accountability; 
 
--Provincial governments that foster stability and 
security throughout their provinces; and 
 
--Enhanced reporting and assessment on political 
and economic developments, and strategic 
activities at the local level, and advocacy of 
Coalition political and economic policy goals. 
 
------------- 
Mission Tasks 
------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The U.S. Mission and MNF-I have 
identified eight primary components inherent to 
the mission statement that serve to focus 
Coalition efforts and achieve the desired end 
state; these are: 
 
--Facilitate achievement of Coalition goals in 
Iraq by enhancing the capabilities of provincial 
governments, with emphasis on capacity building 
and sustainability; 
 
--Promote government reform at the provincial 
level and develop self-sufficiency; 
 
--Assist provincial governments and local ministry 
representatives with developing a comprehensive 
strategy that results in a capable and accountable 
local government; 
 
--Develop the ability of provincial governments to 
identify and prioritize the needs of their 
citizens, and to address those needs via Iraqi 
Government, Coalition, Donor, NGO and private 
resources; 
 
--Develop the ability of provincial governments to 
devise short and long-term strategies for economic 
programs, and provide training and mentoring that 
will assist with their implementation; 
 
--Assess and report political and economic 
developments at the local level, and advocate 
Coalition goals and objectives; 
 
--Develop a phased plan for transition from heavy 
civil-military assistance to traditional post- 
conflict assistance, and finally to self-reliance; 
 
--Coordinate all USG reconstruction, development 
and humanitarian assistance in the field; and 
 
--Coordinate provincial governance capacity- 
building efforts with Coalition forces, in order 
to synchronize activities with stability 
operations. 
--------------------------- 
Transition to Self-Reliance 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) An Iraq that is democratic, stable, and 
economically viable in the free-market economy is 
key to its self-reliance and future role in Middle 
East and world affairs.  The provincial 
development aspect of this initiative is to be 
coupled with a similar Mission/MNF-I initiative at 
the national/ministerial level geared toward 
developing a democratic, cohesive and capable 
government that fully integrates the cultural, 
religious and regional needs and desires of all of 
its citizenry.  Both initiatives consider and plan 
for a phased transition to self-reliance that 
decreases the requirement for security forces to 
conduct stability operations, while the local and 
national governments increase their capability to 
govern and manage security. 
 
9.  (U) Inherent to developing the capacity and 
sustainability of the national and local 
governments are the civilian subject-matter 
experts available through MNC-I Civil Affairs 
elements and USAID programs, such as the Local 
Governance Program (LGP).  In the provinces, LGP 
will form the heart of our efforts in a phased 
approach taking us out over the next four years. 
The LGP Work Plan will form the baseline document 
from which our efforts at training, mentoring and 
coaching will evolve. 
 
10.  (SBU) In executing this phased approach, we 
anticipate the necessity for a robust civil- 
military capability in each of the 15 non-KRG 
provinces for approximately two years, and in the 
KRG (based in Arbil) for a lesser period of time. 
During this timeframe - varying by province - we 
anticipate the security needs of the province 
diminishing as provincial governments demonstrate 
an increasing capability to govern and manage 
elements affecting their security environment.  As 
this occurs, we will begin reducing the military 
role in the provincial teams and increasingly move 
the LGP elements toward a capability to continue 
with the initiative independent of Coalition 
Forces support. 
 
11.  (U) The focus of main effort at the 
provincial level will be in providing training, 
mentoring and coaching to provincial government 
entities, in order to develop their capacity to: 
 
--Develop core competencies; 
 
--Establish effective provincial linkages with 
ministries and the central government; 
 
--Plan and prioritize provincial government 
direction and activities; 
 
--Prepare budgets, identify funding needs, and 
develop fiscal responsibility; 
 
--Determine government staffing requirements and 
address these via government code; 
 
--Plan and coordinate civil construction and 
development activities, and coordinate 
support by Iraqi national and local government 
resources, donors, NGOs and private 
capital investment; 
 
--Communicate with constituents via effective 
public affairs initiatives; 
 
--Provide and enhance the delivery of provincial 
and municipal services; 
 
--Develop by-laws and effective committee 
structures; and 
--Conduct local elections using uniformly applied 
model elections ordinance. 
12.  (U) Determining successful achievement of 
this initiative's goals will be based on 
qualitative measurements against established 
benchmarks.  Mission and MNF-I are currently 
developing metrics that will cover three general 
areas: governance, infrastructure, and security. 
Each broad area will have sub-categories and 
indicators sufficient to provide a clear 
assessment that supports decision-making at the 
Mission, MNF-I and NCA level.  Provincial teams 
will develop baseline assessments and follow with 
monthly assessments to the Mission/MNF-I. 
 
--------------------- 
Concept of Operations 
--------------------- 
 
13.  (U) U.S. Mission and MNF-I, in coordination 
with Coalition partners, will establish joint, 
civil-military teams in each of the 15 non-KRG 
provinces, and one regional team for the KRG. 
Teams will be named Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRT) and Regional Reconstruction Teams 
(RRT) respectively.  Each team will be modular in 
nature, built around a standard core structure, 
and tailored to the specific needs of each 
province and region.  In support of the PRT/RRTs, 
Mission/MNF-I will establish a National 
Coordination Team (NCT) to provide strategic 
guidance, direct operational activities, and 
provide direct and indirect logistics and 
administrative support to the PRT/RRTs. 
 
14.  (U) This is a coordinated U.S. Mission/MNF-I 
initiative that will fully integrate Coalition 
partners.  It will be a DOS lead and with IRMO 
functioning as the executive agent.  While the 
intention is to have a civilian Team Leader for 
each PRT/RRT, experience indicates that there will 
be circumstances where MNF-I will have the most 
experienced officer present.  In such 
circumstances, and as directed by the NCT, the 
senior civilian will serve as the Deputy Team 
Leader.  The PRT/RRT Team Leader will be 
responsible for all facets of the initiative at 
the provincial level, to include political 
liaison, governance development, reconstruction 
and Coalition assistance, assessments and 
reporting.  The PRT/RRT will be subordinate to the 
NCT, and team members and elements of the PRT/RRT 
will be under operational control of the PRT Team 
Leader; administrative control will be retained by 
the parent unit/organization.  The DOS Regional 
Coordinator, in collaboration with Coalition 
partners (where appropriate) and coordination with 
the NCT, will provide guidance regarding regional 
political and economic issues and initiatives. 
 
15.  (U) PRT/RRTs will be reliant on in-place REO 
and MNF-I/FOB support for housing, administration, 
logistics and security, where available; but, will 
have organic elements to support personnel 
movement security, communications and 
transportation.  In remote areas, additional 
assets will be attached for force protection, 
logistics, vehicle maintenance, etc., as 
necessary.  Where necessary, contract security 
assets will be under the operational control of 
the PRT/RRTs.  State Embedded Teams (SET) will be 
absorbed into PRTs in provinces where SETs 
currently exist.  In establishing PRT/RRTs, the 
intent is to build sufficient flexibility that 
will enable them to outlive current REO and MNF-I 
force positioning, as well as adapt to FOB 
closures. 
 
16.  (U) The National Coordination Team (NCT) will 
coordinate with Mission, MNF-I, Coalition 
Diplomatic Missions and Iraq's national 
government, under the direction of the NCT's 
Executive Committee.  The Executive Committee will 
approve assignments of all Team Leader and Deputy 
Team Leader positions to PRT/RRTs. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PRT/RRT Structure and Organization 
---------------------------------- 
 
17.  (U) The organization of the PRT/RRTs will be 
tailored to the specific needs of each province, 
built around a core structure.  Additional 
personnel or elements will be detailed as 
required.  The basic core structure of a PRT/RRT 
is as follows: 
 
No.: Position Title, No. Pers., Mil/Civ/Cont/LN, 
Source 
 
1: PRT/RRT Team Leader, 1, Civilian (OC equiv), 
DOS-IRMO/Coalition Partner 
 
2: Assistant Team Leader, 1, Military Officer (0- 
5), MNF-I 
 
3: Provincial Program Manager, 1, Civilian, (GS- 
14), DOS-IRMO 
 
4: Political Officer, 1, Civilian (FS-02), DOS/Pol 
 
5: USAID/DFID Officer, 1, Civilian/Contractor, 
USAID/DFID 
 
6: MSC Liaison Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4), 
MSC 
 
7: Engineer Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4), 
MNF-I 
 
8: Personal Security Det (Desig Sites only), 17, 
Civilian Contractor, DOS 
 
9: Movement Security Team, 17-26, Military 
Officer/Enlisted, MSC 
 
10: Civil Affairs/CIMIC Team(s), 4-20, Military 
Officer/Enlisted, MSC 
 
11: Provincial Partnership Program (P3), 2, 
Military Officer/Civilian, MNSTC-I 
 
12: Local Governance Team, 18-30, Civilian 
Contractor/LN, USAID/LGP 
 
13: Local national (LN) Translators, 4, Local 
Nationals, DOS/USAID 
 
 
18.  (U) The core structure of the PRT/RRT will be 
augmented, as required by the unique security 
requirements, governance needs and in-place 
support structures (FOB, REO, Iraqi Base) existing 
in each province.  This will include additional 
subject-matter experts that are needed for a 
particular province or region, force protection 
elements for site security and logistics support 
elements for remote sites located on non-Coalition 
facilities. 
 
-------------------------- 
National Coordination Team 
-------------------------- 
 
19.  (U) The mission and purpose of the NCT will 
be to support the PRT/RRTs by synchronizing 
governance, reconstruction, security and economic 
development assistance, and providing coordination 
and deconfliction of provincial efforts with 
efforts of the Mission, Coalition partners and the 
Iraqi government.  The Executive Committee of the 
NCT will be chaired by the Deputy Chief of 
Mission, and will provide strategic guidance to 
the NCT, develop and review policy, and resolve 
significant issues.  Inherent tasks of the NCT are 
to: 
 
--Coordinate with Iraqi ministries for development 
of sustainable support to provincial governments; 
 
--Provide strategic guidance and direction to 
PRTs, based on Coalition priorities; 
 
--Synchronize PRT/RRT regional efforts with Iraqi 
ministries, the US Mission and Coalition partners; 
 
--Facilitate lines of communication between Iraq's 
provincial and national governments; 
 
--Liaise and coordinate with Mission, Coalition 
Partners and MNF-I for logistics and 
administrative support to the PRT/RRTs; 
 
--Coordinate with Mission, Coalition partners, 
Iraqi Government and MNF-I for liaison with Donor 
nations; 
 
--Oversee political and economic reporting, and 
strategic advocacy efforts. 
 
20.  (U) The organization of the NCT will be built 
around a core structure, with additional 
representatives participating on an as-needed 
basis.  The core structure of the NCT is as 
follows: 
 
No.: Position Title, No. Pers., Mil/Civ/Cont/LN, 
Source 
 
1: Team Leader, 1, Civilian (OC), DOS/IRMO 
 
2: Deputy Team Leader, 1, Military Officer (0-6), 
MNF-I 
 
3: Operations Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-5), 
MNF-I 
 
4: Political Advisor, 1, Civilian (FS-02), DOS 
 
5: Public Diplomacy Advisor, 1, Civilian (GS-14), 
DOS 
 
6: USAID Coordinator, 1, Civilian (GS-14), USAID 
 
7: Plans Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-5), MNF-I 
 
8: Assistant Operations Officer, 1, Military 
Officer (0-4), MNF-I 
 
9: Assistant Plans Officer, 1, Military Officer (0- 
4), MNF-I 
 
10: Administrative Specialist, 1, Military 
Enlisted (E-6), MNF-I 
 
11: Administrative Specialist, 1, Military 
Enlisted (E-4), MNF-I 
 
12: Office Manager, 1, Contractor, DOS/IRMO 
 
------------- 
Relationships 
------------- 
 
21.  (U) The National Coordination Team provides 
strategic guidance, directs operational 
activities, and provides direct and indirect 
support to PRT/RRTs.  The NCT is directed by the 
Executive Committee, who - in turn - reports to 
the Chief of Mission and CG, MNF-I. 
 
22.  (SBU) The DOS Regional Coordinator provides 
guidance, in coordination with the NCT, regarding 
regional political activities and regionally cross- 
cutting issues for the PRT/RRTs.  This recognizes 
the need to maintain a regional perspective, in 
addition to a provincial focus. 
 
23.  (SBU) The PRT/RRT and MSC relationship is one 
of coordination and consultation.  They will 
maintain close and constant communication, in 
order to ensure that security, governance and 
economic lines of operation are mutually 
reinforcing.  The MSC commander will retain 
responsibility for security and stability 
operations, while the governance and economic 
lines of operation will become the responsibility 
of the PRT/RRT Team Leader. 
 
24.  (U) The PRT/RRT Team Leader has operational 
control (OPCON) over all assigned personnel and 
elements.  Administrative Control (ADCON) will be 
retained by the parent organization (DOS, USAID, 
LGP, MNF-I, etc.) 
 
25.  (U) MSCs will be responsible for providing 
logistics, housing, security and transportation 
support to the PRT/RRTs from organic assets in all 
locations where DOS REO or SET facilities are 
insufficient to support PRT/RRT requirements. 
 
26.  (U) REOs will be responsible for providing 
logistics, housing, security and transportation 
support to the PRT/RRTs, within currently existing 
capabilities.  In order to support this 
initiative, all SET assets will be absorbed by the 
provincial PRT. 
 
-------------- 
Implementation 
-------------- 
 
27.  (SBU) The first step of this initiative will 
begin 01 Oct 05, with stand-up of the National 
Coordination Team (NCT), out of existing 
resources.   The NCT will conduct planning 
necessary to begin phasing the deployment of 
PRT/RRTs on 01 Nov 05, to include coordinating 
with MSCs, RCs and supporting agencies, conducting 
site surveys and developing baseline assessments 
to guide stand-up planning. 
 
28.  (SBU) Provincial/Regional Reconstruction 
Teams will rolled out on an incremental basis, 
beginning with establishment of the first three 
"proof of concept" teams on 01 Nov 05, conditions 
permitting.  We will roll out remaining teams 
incrementally, at an estimated rate of three per 
month.  This incremental approach will allow us to 
make timely adjustments to the deployment 
sequencing and packaging of follow-on teams.  The 
initial teams will stand-up for Anbar, Ninawa and 
Sala ad Din provinces. 
 
29.  (SBU) While proactive efforts will be taken 
to reassign and pre-stage elements to support this 
initiative, active engagement of local governments 
by the teams will not begin until teams have 
sufficient assets on hand to begin execution of 
the mission, and the NCT's Executive Committee has 
concurred.   As the actual commencement of 
operational engagement of local government has 
significant political and diplomatic implications, 
this will be a coordinated decision involving 
senior Mission staff.  Appropriate meetings 
between senior Mission staff and local government 
officials will be conducted in advance of each 
team becoming operationally active. 
 
----------------- 
Personnel Support 
----------------- 
 
30.  (U) DOS Team Leader positions (16) will be 
filled from a variety of sources, to include DOS 
FSOs, 3161 civil service personnel and WAEs, if 
available.  IRMO's existing authority to hire 3161 
civil service personnel will be used, in 
conjunction with USAID contractor recruitment 
system, to reach out to the best qualified 
personnel experienced in post-conflict 
redevelopment, diplomacy and nation-building.  In- 
place IRMO recruiting assets in Washington will 
coordinate with USAID for access to their cadre of 
former PSC personnel, etc., and DOS-HR for access 
to WAEs and FSOs. 
 
31.  Action Request.  Request DOS-HR coordinate 
with USAID and IRMO recruiting staff to identify 
16 qualified FSOs or WAEs for assignment to Team 
Leader positions. 
 
32.  (U) USAID Officer positions will be filled by 
a USAID officer. 
 
33.  (U) Political Officer positions will be 
filled by absorbing all IPAO positions currently 
resident at REOs into the PRT/RRTs, augmented by 
designated SET officers.  Political Officers will 
continue to provide PolAd services to MSCs, as 
coordinated by the PRT/RRT Team Leader. 
 
34.  (U) IRMO Provincial Program Manager positions 
will continue to be filled via in-place IRMO 
recruiting assets, and will be supplemented by 
Bearing Point contractors, if necessary. 
 
35.  (U) Local Governance Program civilian 
personnel will be filled via standing USAID 
contract with Research triangle Institute under 
the LGP-II contract. 
 
36.  (U) MNF-I personnel assigned in support of 
this initiative will be as designated by MNF-I 
FRAGO.  Personnel will be assigned OPCON to the 
PRT/RRT, while remaining ADCON to their parent 
organization. 
 
Khalilzad