US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2990

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002990 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 10/29/12 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: YORUBA TRADITIONAL RULER SAYS 
OBASANJO THE THE ONLY THING HOLDING NIGERIA TOGETHER 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reason 
1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During an October 22 meeting with 
Ambassador Jeter, the Ooni of Ife declared that 
Nigeria would disintegrate if President Obasanjo were 
not reelected.  The most influential Yoruba 
traditional ruler, Ooni Sijuwade claimed that the 
desire of Northern politicians to control national 
politics and the government bursary fueled the current 
opposition to Obasanjo.  Sijuwade claimed, however, 
that many traditional rulers, including the North's 
most influential leader, the Emir of Kano, backed 
Obasanjo.  Despite his incessant legerdemain, former 
Head of State Babangida eventually would back 
Obasanjo, and VP Atiku would not try to supplant the 
President.  The claim that failure to reelect Obasanjo 
would be Nigeria's death knell raises concern but is 
less an objective assessment than an example of the 
exaggerated lexicon of Southern Nigerian politics; 
yet,  Sijuwade's observations are those of an long- 
time insider and an accomplished political player. 
While inflated for effect, his remarks demonstrate 
that regional competition and tensions are 
intensifying as 2003 elections approach.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (U) During an October 20-23 visit to Lagos, 
Ambassador Jeter traveled to Ile-Ife, the legendary 
home of the Yoruba ethnic group, to officially call on 
the Ooni of Ife, the Southwest's most influential 
traditional ruler.  Ambassador Jeter was accompanied 
by his Staff Assistant and PolCouns.  Receiving 
Ambassador Jeter and party at his shaded poolside 
patio and hosting them for a mid-afternoon lunch, Ooni 
Sijuwade discussed national politics for the better 
part of four hours. The Ooni clearly had prepared for 
the visit. Beside his imperial chair was a stack of 
letters, newspapers and other documents he repeatedly 
referred to during the course of the session in order 
to confirm or emphasize a matter he thought important. 
 
 
3.  (C) Straight to the point, Sijuwade declared that 
Nigeria risked secession and disintegration if 
Obasanjo did not return in 2003. The Ooni revisited 
this theme over and over during the lengthy meeting, 
at one point exclaiming that "if Obasanjo were not on 
seat in 2003, there will not be a Nigeria!"  The Ooni 
contended that Obasanjo's high integrity was the cause 
of his low popularity.  The expectations of too many 
Nigerian politicians was "to rob" government coffers. 
Politicians expected Obasanjo to throw open the doors 
to the vault; however, he has frustrated their greed 
by standing in the way, Sijuwade contended.  Because 
of his stand for fiscal probity, Obasanjo was under 
intense political heat.  Sijuwade claimed that, as 
spiritual head of the Yorubas, he had predicted to 
Obasanjo a rough reelection campaign after the latter 
had announced his reelection bid in April. 
 
 
4.  (C) Sijuwade pointed to the President's tussle 
with the National Assembly over the budget as 
confirming his assessment of the pervasiveness of 
political greed. The Ooni chastised the National 
Assembly for trying to force Obasanjo to implement 
their highly inflated budget that would have resulted 
in a massive deficit.  The reason the Legislature's 
proposed budget was so massively in the red was that 
the Assembly sought an additional 240 billion Naira in 
special projects so that each Member could access one 
half billion Naira.  Because many of these Members 
were facing tough reelection battles or were 
unelectable, the proposed outlay would help some eke 
out victory or constitute a lucrative golden handshake 
for others.  Sijuwade scoffed that House Speaker Ghali 
Na'Abba sponsorship of the impeachment threat was pure 
hypocrisy because Na'Abba was a wastrel, guilty of 
scores of financial improprieties in funding his and 
his crony's spendthrift ways. 
 
 
5.  (C) Making a spirited pitch for USG support for 
Obasanjo, Sijuwade claimed most Nigerians were 
unfamiliar with the US-style presidential system of 
government, but that Obasanjo had brought it to 
Nigeria.  To most Nigerians, Obasanjo was "regarded as 
America," he asserted.  (Comment: This reference was 
to Obasanjo's tenure as military Head of State from 
1976-79.  Obasanjo shepherded the 1979 constitution 
that introduced Nigeria to the presidential system. 
The Ooni may have been guilty of hyperbole by saying 
that Obasanjo represented America to most Nigerians; 
however, there is an association in the public mind of 
Obasanjo with the United States.  Many Nigerians 
believe Obasanjo is "our man."  Moreover, Sijuwade 
probably intended his characterization of Obasanjo to 
convey to us that, among the major political figures, 
Obasanjo is the one who most closely approaches 
American ideals of priority and governance.  End 
comment.) 
 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador Jeter told the Ooni that USG would 
neither endorse nor oppose any  candidate -- that 
decision was the exclusive preserve of the Nigerian 
electorate.   Sijuwade responded that if the USG did 
not back Obasanjo it would be complicit in Nigeria's 
dismemberment.  "If not Obasanjo, who will rule 
Nigeria? From where would he come?," the Ooni asked. 
 
 
7.  (C) Sijuwade insisted the reports of a chasm 
separating  Obasanjo from former Head of State 
Babangida and VP Atiku were untrue.  The Ooni 
unconvincingly referred to Babangida as Obasanjo's 
"good boy" who still looked up to Obasanjo as his 
superior as he did when they were in the military a 
quarter century ago.  Also claiming a close personal 
relationship with Babangida, Sijuwade stated he had 
met Babangida recently, with Babangida indicating he 
preferred Obasanjo to the other prospective 
candidates.  Sijuwade predicted VP Atiku would not 
challenge Obasanjo.  Atiku's greatest enemy was 
Babangida who would actively block Atiku's run for the 
presidency, Sijuwade stressed. In fact, the real 
schism was between Atiku and Babangida, with Obasanjo 
working assiduously to reconcile the two, according to 
Sijuwade.  (Comment:  This rendition of Obasanjo as 
mediating between Atiku and Babangida may have been 
credible a year ago; however, the weight of current 
information suggests that trust among the three is 
minimal and none of the three can act as a referee for 
the others.  End Comment.) 
 
 
8.  (C) Regarding former Head of State Mohammedu 
Buhari, Sijuwade claimed Buhari "might wind up in jail 
if he is not careful."  This was an allusion to recent 
media coverage of an audit uncovering the loss of 
millions of dollars during Buhari's tenure as head of 
the Petroleum Trust Fund during the Abacha regime. 
Moreover, Sijuwade declared that Buhari's candidacy 
was doomed because no self- respecting Southerner 
would vote for such a regional (Northern) and 
religious (Moslem) chauvinist.  Sijuwade scoffed at 
House Speaker Na'Abba's presidential ambitions, 
severely chiding the Speaker for overplaying his hand 
by authoring the impeachment threat.  Sijuwade said 
the Emir of Kano related to him a recent conversation 
with Na'Abba.  The Speaker confided to the Emir Bayero 
that his major gripe was with the President's 
frugality. "The President knows I need money," Na'Abba 
purportedly told the Emir, who, in turn, admonished 
Na'Abba for his venality. 
 
 
9.   (C) Criticism of Na'Abba lead Sijuwade to 
criticism of Northern politicians in general.  The 
Ooni attacked the Northern elite as believing control 
of national political power and the country's 
pocketbook was their birthright.  Since Nigeria was 
founded in 1914 by fusing South and North together for 
the administrative convenience of the British Colonial 
Office, the North has been surviving on resources and 
money generated by the South.  Northerners erroneously 
thought they could manipulate Obasanjo to allow their 
continual access to the national treasury. However, 
Obasanjo  tried to balance the equation by ending 
business  as usual.  Now that access has been denied, 
Northern carpetbaggers were angry.  Sijuwade 
emphasized that Obasanjo's actions were justified. 
Business as usual was wrecking the nation and causing 
a small pool of the very rich to coexist beside an 
expanding reservoir of desperately poor Nigerians. 
This trend had to be checked  or, otherwise, it would 
explode.  Only Obasanjo was up to the task of 
remedying the inequity by keeping the greedy veteran 
hands out of the vault, asserted the Ooni. 
 
 
10.  (C) Because of his reformist policy, Obasanjo was 
being served up by professional politicians as a 
sacrificial lamb. For example, Sijuwade claimed, the 
North feared Obasanjo's policy promoting national 
identification cards because it would undermine the 
purported numerical superiority upon which the North 
bases its claim for political power. Sijuwade posited 
Northern politicians were eager to shift the 
presidency back to their region so they could have 
unfettered access to government coffers once again. 
 
 
11.  (C) The Ooni declared Northern politicians were 
making a serious strategic mistake in thinking they 
could perpetuate a tight grip on national power.  The 
South would no longer tolerate Northern dominance. 
Sijuwade claimed that Yorubas were prepared to "stand 
on their own" and that the Igbos had indicated they 
would follow suit if the North tried to reassert 
hegemony. 
 
 
12.  (C) Differentiating between Northern traditional 
leaders and politicians, Sijuwade claimed close 
contact with Emir Bayero of Kano, whom he described as 
an Obasanjo supporter.  He stated the Emir understood 
both the centrifugal implications and the implications 
for governmental reform of a power shift to the North 
at this time.  Sijuwade added that Bayero had recently 
apologized to Obasanjo for his role in persuading the 
President to release Mohammed Abacha, the son of the 
late military leader Sani Abacha.  Sijuwade said that 
Bayero had realized too late he had been used but 
unscrupulous politicians to gain Abacha's release so 
that the family would not have to relinquish the 1.2 
billion dollars to the Federal Government. Instead , 
those politicians had in mind using a portion of that 
ill-gotten  money to fund efforts to unseat Obasanjo, 
during or before the upcoming presidential race. 
 
 
13. (C) The Ooni stated that Emir Bayero, the Obi of 
Onitsha (the most influential Igbo ruler) and he 
conferred recently, with the outcome being supportive 
of Obasanjo.  Sijuwade said that traditional rulers 
were the strongest moderating force in politics today. 
Despite the divisive misbehavior and waywardness of 
the political class in general, Sijuwade stated that 
Nigeria would likely stay united because of the 
efforts of traditional leaders.  "Traditional rulers 
own Nigeria," he concluded. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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14.  (C) Sijuwade's remarks must be viewed through a 
decidely Yoruba, Southwestern prism. As spiritual 
leader of this ancient group, Sijuwade takes seriously 
his ability to divine what will unfold.  As a 
traditional ruler of a group that generally has sat on 
the losing side of contest for national power, he 
cannot help but believe national power was destined to 
rest with the Yoruba for a sustained period during his 
reign as Ooni.  After a long dry spell of twenty years 
between 1979 and 1999, he understandably believes the 
Presidency should stay in the Southwest four more 
years. Also, his personal interests are served by an 
Obasanjo return to office. With a Yoruba President, 
Sijuwade's strong status among the traditional rulers 
becomes further enhanced and elevated. 
 
 
15. (C) Still, Sijuwade has not survived this long by 
being just the "spiritual guide" for the Yorubas.  He 
is an astute politician who does his homework.  He 
knows there is little downside to supporting Obasanjo 
at this time, especially among the Yoruba. There are 
no visible challenges to his reign as Ooni and there 
is scant chance of the Yoruba rebelling against him 
for backing Obasanjo, who ,if not highly popular, is 
still one of their own and the only Yoruba to become 
Head of State. 
 
 
16. (C) If Obasanjo wins, Sijuwade's status in the 
Southwest will be enhanced which will help him check 
the influence of socio-cultural groups like Afenifere. 
Moreover, because the Ooni has staked out such a 
public position, some Obasanjo opponents would view 
his defection as a mortal blow to the President. 
Sijuwade knows some of these foes will court him; they 
also know that convincing Sijuwade to back off or do 
less will come at a high price. While Sijuwade spoke 
in near absolutes, there was the sense that he was 
staking out a maximalist position from which he will 
probe and negotiate as the electoral process unfolds. 
(His call for USG to support Obasanjo should be viewed 
in this light. What he knows about our position 
regarding Obasanjo probably will be a factor the Ooni 
will be weigh in determining how far and hard he 
pushes for Obasanjo.) 
 
 
17.  (C) The Ooni's warning on secession should not be 
taken too seriously. However, it cannot be totally 
dismissed.  The warning reflects the real and mounting 
ethnic and regional tension that accompany the 
oncoming election.  While Nigeria's disintegration is 
unlikely, its political class must exercise extreme 
caution to avoid missteps that could further divide a 
sometimes already deeply divided nation. 
 
 
JETER