US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2640

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002640 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH ANTICIPATE TURKEY, CROATIA 
TO DOMINATE GAERC DISCUSSION 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 177048 
     B. BRUSSELS 03534 
     C. THE HAGUE 02374 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS Andrew J. Schofer for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Dutch anticipate Turkey and Croatia to 
dominate discussion at the October 3 GAERC, and are 
cautiously optimistic that a positive decision on Turkish 
accession talks will emerge from the meetings.  The Dutch are 
standing firm on "full cooperation" with the ICTY as a 
prerequisite for progress on Croatia, but believe ICTY Chief 
Prosecutor Carla del Ponte's October 2 report may provide the 
basis for a compromise -- in which case, they will not stand 
alone.  They anticipate the GAERC will discuss EU-Russia 
relations, but do not believe the debate will yield any 
decisions about the future of the relationship after the 
expiration of the PCA.  The Dutch will continue to support 
the EU-3 in its leadership role as negotiator with Iran and 
plan to support a tougher EU position towards Uzbekistan. 
Finally, interlocutors at the MFA suggested that other points 
of discussion may include the Middle East Peace Process, The 
EU's relationship with ASEM and the accession of Saudi Arabia 
to the WTO. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) On September 28, POLCOUNS and POLOFF met with Pim 
Dumore (MFA, Director of Political Affairs) and Bahia 
Tahzib-Lie (MFA, Deputy European Correspondent) to present 
ref A points and discuss the upcoming GAERC meeting.  On 
September 29, Desiree Kopmels (MFA, Deputy Director of 
Political Affairs) and Dirk Oldenburg (MFA, Deputy Director 
of European Integration) briefed POLOFF and representatives 
from Japan and New Zealand on the upcoming GAERC.  All Dutch 
interlocutors expected the Turkish accession issue to 
dominate discussion at the meetings, but anticipated 
Croatia's accession to be a subject of interest as well. 
 
TURKEY: DUTCH SUPPORT EU POSITION TO BEGIN ACCESSION TALKS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
3. (C) All interlocutors voiced support for the negotiating 
framework currently in place for Turkey's accession process 
and averred resistance to any changes to the framework.  All 
MFA counterparts thought that Austria, in continuing to 
support its alternative "privileged partnership" framework, 
and as the sole hold-out to the negotiating framework, had 
isolated itself on the issue.  Though Oldenburg and Kopmels 
declined to predict whether the Austrians would embrace the 
position of their EU partners, Dumore expected the Austrians 
to join the fold and the GAERC to conclude that Turkey has 
met all conditions in order to begin negotiations for EU 
accession.  All interlocutors discussed the possibility of a 
preliminary GAERC meeting on Sunday intended, according to 
Oldenburg, to "solve both issues" of Turkey and Croatia. 
(COMMENT: The likelihood of a preliminary Sunday meeting 
appears to have increased substantially after EU ambassadors 
failed to come to a decision on the negotiating framework 
Thursday morning.) 
 
4. (C) MFA counterparts explained that, while the Dutch 
support the EU position that each candidate for EU membership 
should be evaluated on its own merits, "some countries" 
(Note:  Tahzib-Lie later acknowledged this referred only to 
Austria.) continue to link Turkey's accession to Croatia's. 
Oldenburg doubted Austria would publicly espouse this notion, 
explaining that Austria had earlier explicitly denied such a 
link.  Oldenburg added that the Dutch will be closely 
watching the upcoming vote by the Turkish Parliament on 
ratification of the EU Constitution and will continue to 
insist that the Turks "make good" on their commitments for EU 
accession. 
 
WESTERN BALKANS: CROATIAN TALKS CONTINGENT ON ICTY COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
5. (C) All MFA counterparts said the item second in order of 
importance for the GAERC would be the question of Croatia's 
accession process. Although the Dutch are in line with the UK 
Presidency's position that discussion of Croatia's accession 
is contingent on a decision on Turkey, all interlocutors 
agreed that there is no guarantee that the negotiations will 
proceed in such a fashion.  Dumore and Tahzib-Lie noted, 
however, that the UK presidency's insistence on completing 
discussion on Turkey before proceeding to Croatia was a good 
sign. 
 
6. (C) The Dutch are taking a "strict" position that 
discussion of EU accession is contingent on Croatia's full 
cooperation with the ICTY.  Dumore was explicit in stating 
that, as far as the Netherlands was concerned, "good" or 
"improved" cooperation was not sufficient; only "full" 
cooperation was acceptable.  He noted, however, that only 
Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte could define "full 
cooperation" -- while it could mean the apprehension of 
Gotovina, it could also mean that the Croatians are making 
comprehensive, good faith efforts to apprehend him without 
success.  The Dutch are concerned that commencing accession 
talks on the basis of anything other than full cooperation 
would damage the credibility of the ICTY and are therefore 
waiting to receive del Ponte's assessment of Croatian 
cooperation with the Tribunal before deciding whether to 
initiate accession talks.  Del Ponte is expected to return 
from Croatia on September 30; the Dutch believe that she will 
present her findings to the Ministerial Task Force on Sunday. 
 Dumore noted that if del Ponte's report is in any way 
positive, there will be tremendous pressure on the GAERC to 
reach a "compromise" with Austria allowing progress on both 
Turkey and Croatia.  While the Dutch do not support such a 
linkage, he stressed, they also do not intend to be isolated 
on this issue. 
 
7. (C) None of the Dutch interlocutors thought the GAERC 
would devote much attention to Serbia, Kosovo, or Bosnia. 
 
UZBEKISTAN: NETHERLANDS SUPPORTS THE EU'S "TOUGHER" POSITION 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
8. (C) Tahzib-Lie and Dumore explained that the Dutch support 
the "tougher" EU position on Uzbekistan anticipated to emerge 
from the GAERC. Oldenburg suggested the Dutch would endorse a 
"gradual approach" to sanctions against Uzbekistan that may 
begin with a weapons embargo and progress to travel 
restrictions and perhaps ultimately to sanctions. All 
interlocutors refrained from speculating whether this tougher 
position would include visa refusals or travel restrictions 
and cautioned that they did not want to run the risk of 
further alienating Karimov. Tahzib-Lie said the Dutch would 
also be inclined to endorse a similar EU line on Belarus. 
 
RUSSIA 
----- 
 
9. (C) The Dutch anticipate Russia's lethargic attitude 
toward readmission requests and restrictive visa policies to 
be on the GAERC agenda. Oldenburg added that the Dutch would 
advocate for more "flexible opportunities" for EU residents 
to enter Russia and criticize Russia's policy of requiring 
visas for holders of diplomatic passports. 
 
10. (C) Although none of the MFA counterparts foresaw the 
GAERC reaching any substantive conclusions on the subject, 
all of them mentioned Dutch concern over the future of EU - 
Russia relations, particularly after the expiration in 2007 
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The Dutch 
support the EU position that the four common spaces of 
partnership should continue to be implemented under a package 
arrangement, rather than through multiple sectoral 
arrangements as the Russians have proposed (ref B). 
Moreover, the Dutch prefer to continue with a set of legally 
binding principles; all interlocutors voiced concern over 
perceived Russian preference for a looser, non-binding 
agreement. 
 
BMENA/MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY 
--------------------------- 
 
11. (C) None of the Dutch interlocutors expected BMENA or the 
topic of Middle East Democracy to be raised at the GAERC. 
Tahzib-Lie voiced general support for the points but doubted 
the GAERC would address either the Foundation for the Future 
or the Fund for the Future. 
 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
------------------------- 
 
12. (C) The Dutch believe that dialogue on the Middle East 
Peace Process at the GAERC will center primarily on James 
Wolfensohn's quick impact reconstruction program and on the 
roadmap.  While all MFA counterparts were certain that recent 
violence in Gaza would certainly be a point of concern at the 
GAERC, all voiced confidence in the roadmap and in 
Wolfensohn.  Oldenburg explained that, though the way the 
fund will be used is still a matter of debate, the Dutch have 
committed 10 million euros/year to Wolfensohn's program. 
 
IRAN: STILL STAYING THE COURSE 
------------------------------ 
 
13. (C) Tahzib-Lie posited that the GAERC would review 
current events in EU-Iran relations but would not reach any 
decisions on future policy.  The Dutch continue to defer to 
the EU-3 in negotiations with Iran and, pursuant to that 
relationship, will restate their support for the EU-3 
leadership at the upcoming GAERC (ref C).  Tahzib-Lie and 
Dumore demurred when asked whether the EU-3 was engaging 
China and Russia on Iran, pointing to general "broadening 
support" for the EU Presidency's recent statement on Iran. 
 
OTHER ISSUES: 
------------- 
 
14. (C) Though none of the Dutch interlocutors expected the 
China Arms Embargo to be on the GAERC agenda, they 
anticipated a discussion about Saudi Arabia's membership in 
the WTO, which they oppose, and a discussion on EU-ASEM 
relations.  Ukraine and Iraq were not expected to be on the 
agenda. 
BLAKEMAN