US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI965

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STRIKES AT DJIBOUTI PORT AND RUMORS OF EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT

Identifier: 05DJIBOUTI965
Wikileaks: View 05DJIBOUTI965 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2005-09-30 08:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV ELAB ECON ASEC SCUL DJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000965 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, DRL, AND EB 
LONDON/PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ELAB, ECON, ASEC, SCUL, DJ 
SUBJECT: STRIKES AT DJIBOUTI PORT AND RUMORS OF EMBASSY 
INVOLVEMENT 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Erinn C. Stott for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 1. (C) Summary:  On September 14, the Port of Djibouti's 
general union, Union of Port Workers (UTP), launched a strike 
denouncing what it called "catastrophic management of the 
port's Human Resources Division."  Further protests took 
place on September 24th following a breakdown in mediations 
and resulted in the arrest of 167 workers.  A primary cause 
of the strike is a build-up of anger among Djiboutian port 
workers over operational changes implemented since management 
of Djibouti Port was taken over by Dubai Ports International 
(DPI) in 2000.  The discontent may also have its origins in 
larger, unsettled political issues that continue to pierce 
Djibouti's social fabric -- such as tribal "advantage" and 
opposition participation in governance.  Pol/Econ officer's 
coincidental presence at the port for a meeting on the day of 
the strike fueled a rumor -- possibly initiated by UTP for 
its advantage-- that she had supported the striking workers. 
Ambassador raised the rumor of U.S. sanctioning of the port 
strike with the Foreign Minister, who advised that he had not 
given it any substance. (septel to follow) End summary. 
 
2. (C) During the last four months, disagreements between the 
Port of Djibouti's general union, the Union of Port Workers 
(UTP) and Dubai Ports International (DPI), the Dubai-based 
company which manages the port, have escalated over 
management procedures and rights of workers.  DPI has tried 
to modernize the port's Human Resources management; however, 
its new methods did not fit with the legacy of the French 
system of law in the Djiboutian labor code, which gives more 
protection to workers.  The first contact between labor and 
management was on June 30, 2005, when the Minister of 
Transport and the Minister of Labor first addressed social 
discontent in the port.  On August 14, the two sides began 
negotiations over various issues, but talks dissolved over 
the manner in which allowances were being calculated into 
wages, the perceived "haughty" character of management and 
other issues.  On September 7, UTP decided to launch a strike 
after facing what it termed "continuous harassment" from port 
management.  The strike was scheduled for September 14. 
 
3. (C) On September 14, the day of the strike, port 
management downgraded the positions of three people active in 
the strike.  The reasons for the downgrades are unknown.  On 
the same day, Prime Minister Dileita, acting in the absence 
of President Guelleh who was attending UNGA in New York, 
initiated a process to bring the two sides back to the 
negotiating table.  On September 17, the strike was suspended 
to hold a one-week mediation.  On the 24th, UTP decided that 
port management did not consider its Union as a serious 
interlocutor and recommenced its strike as an unlimited, 
general strike -- as opposed to a focused section-by-section 
strike.  Meanwhile, the port claimed that during the strike 
it lost five million dollars per day. (Note:  Embassy sources 
indicate that these numbers may be exaggerated because 
information available does not compute properly to break down 
annual profit to figures close to this amount.  End note.) 
 
4. (C) The real issue that divides the parties is likely the 
difference between DPI's management focus and long-standing 
French-based tradition.  On one hand, DPI uses a modern 
concept of management that supports the latest procedures in 
managing human resources.  On the other hand, Djbouti is 
operating under the Labor Convention of 1973 put in place 
during the colonial era.  UTP wants to protect a requirement 
that employees receive three-months' notice prior to 
dismissal.  DPI is reluctant to implement such practices due 
to the considerable burden it would place on efficient port 
management.  In a press release, Abdourahman Borreh, 
President of the Port and Free Zone Authority called the 
strike "illegal because the employees had no serious claims 
to present and paralyzed a vital public enterprise in an 
irresponsible way."   The statement continued that "the 
employees failed to favor the interest of the collective and 
preferred their personal interests."  He threatened to punish 
in an extreme manner any employee attempting to impede the 
economic development of the nation.  Seventeen workers were 
dismissed on September 25 because of "serious and grave 
professional faults."  (Comment: Information available to 
post indicates these firings may be retribution for the 
strike.  End comment.)  The 17 cases were transferred to the 
National Prosecutor on September 28. 
 
5. (C) Rumors about town assert that the UTP is backed by a 
"foreign power" such as France or the United States.  Other 
rumors assert that the U.S. Embassy was inciting or 
encouraging the strikes.  This reached as high as the 
Ministry of Presidential Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  There were several allegations that Embassy 
personnel, namely the Pol/Econ officer, were seen at the port 
on the days of the strikes.  Embassy sources within the Union 
of Djiboutian Workers (UDT) said that Djibouti's National 
Security Service (NSS) had asked UTP delegates "why the U.S. 
was talking to them? What did the U.S. want? Did the U.S. 
offer bribes in exchange for striking?"  In a meeting 9/29 
with Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Ali Yousuf (reported 
septel), Ambassador raised with the Minister the existence of 
the rumors and emphatically denied U.S. Embassy involvement 
in the port strike.  She noted, however, Embassy efforts to 
finalize its 2005 Human Rights Report and officers' efforts 
to be as inclusive as possible in fact-gathering.  The 
Minister responded that he had heard these rumors but had not 
taken them as of substance.  Instead, he attributed the 
strike to the difficulties workers are having grappling with 
requirements that will take port operations to a new, more 
efficient level.  (Comment: These rumors may have their 
origin, actually, in the UTP.  UTP leaders may have chosen to 
interpret Embassy officers' meeting with them, for purely 
informational purposes, as a show of support for strike 
efforts.  End comment.) 
 
6. (U) Eleven UTP members and delegates were dismissed for 
cause and arrested as a result of the strike.  They are: 
- 
Ahmed Ali Aramis, Secretary General of UTP 
Ali Ibrahim Darar, Deputy Secretary General of UTP 
Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed, Personnel Delegate 
Ibrahim Moussa Sultan, Personnel Delegate 
Kamil Mohamed Ali, Personnel Delegate 
Samira Hassan Mohamed, Personnel Delegate 
Djibril Houssein Walieh, Personnel Delegate 
Mohamed Abdillahi Dirieh, Advisor to the Secretary General of 
UTP 
Moustapha Abchir Egueh, Member UTP 
Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, Member UTP 
Koulmiyeh Houssein, Member UTP 
 
7. (C)  Embassy sources told Regional Security Officer (RSO) 
on September 27, that 25 additional firings had taken place. 
A UTP official confirmed that 24 persons were dismissed from 
their positions on the 27th.  This same source indicated that 
the second strike occurred to protest the dismissal of 11 
workers on the day of the first strike.  The exact reasons 
for dismissal are unknown. 
 
8. (C) Comment: The port of Djibouti is seen by the 
Government of Djibouti as its principal economic lifeline. 
Any serious efforts at national revitalization, income 
generation, business development and investment from outside 
will depend, for the long-term, on the port's viability. 
Realizing this, Djibouti took a giant step to improve the 
port's operational effectiveness by placing management 
responsibilities in the hands of a company with an already 
proven track record in Dubai for efficiency -- DPI. To 
achieve the same in Djibouti, especially greater fiscal 
profitability for the Djibouti port, DPI is mandating serious 
adjustments in behavior, privileges, rights and 
responsibilities of port workers.  These adjustments are not 
necessarily in parity with long-standing port practices. 
From simple measures such as banning the chewing of qat 
during working hours, to more serious measures such as longer 
worker hours, the government of Djibouti is supporting 
"positive change" as a way to win investor confidence.  DPI's 
practices are a difficult pill for many port workers to 
swallow and therein may lie the source of their discontent. 
 
9. (C) Comment continued:  The discontent may also have its 
origins in larger, unsettled political issues that continue 
to pierce Djibouti's social fabric -- such as perceived 
tribal "advantage" and opposition participation in 
government.  The Government of Djibouti realizes the 
existence of these larger issues and worries about public 
manifestations of social discontent stoking the fires of 
these unsettled issues. 
 
10. (C) Comment continued:  It is also clear that the 
Government of Djibouti is very sensitive about human rights 
and how its support, or non-support, of such rights are 
played out in the U.S. annual Human Rights Report.  Debt 
cancellation or Millennium Challenge Account eligibility 
issues could be affected by a negative report -- especially 
on governance.  Therein may lie the origins of discontent 
within some quarters of the Djiboutian government-- 
especially in the presidency -- about the perceived actions 
of the embassy Pol/Econ officer.  The officer's inquiries may 
have been seen as too pointed for comfort and too inclusive 
of those who harbor special grievance against the current 
government. 
 
11. (C) Comment continued:  It is important to note as well 
the inherent weakness of a labor institution such as UTP in 
Djibouti.  It is not surprising then that it may have 
perceived an advantage in trying to make the most, 
politically, of its American encounter.  Post will continue 
to monitor the port situation, including getting the input of 
DPI's general manager (who has been in Dubai on 
consultations) on how he sees the way forward at the port in 
the short and long-term.  End comment. 
RAGSDALE 

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