US embassy cable - 05WELLINGTON758

S E C R E T WELLINGTON 000758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/TRA, S/CT, CA/P/IP, DS/IP/EAP, DS/IP/ITA AND 
EAP/ANP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, CVIS, PGOV, PINR, PREL, NZ 
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND ASKS ABOUT ACCESS TO TSA'S NO FLY LIST 
 
REF: A. KONTOS-YAMAMOTO E-MAIL 9/28/05 
 
     B. WELLINGTON 739 
     C. STATE 173539 
     D. WELLINGTON 718 
     E. STATE 158827 
 
Classified by: Charge d'Affaires David R. Burnett.  Reasons: 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary: New Zealand Immigration is interested in 
possible access to the Transportation Security 
Administration's "no fly" list as a way to improve the 
country's border security.  New Zealand law enforcement 
agencies already work closely with U.S. counterparts, and New 
Zealand Immigration views possible access to the no-fly list 
as an extension of that cooperation.  Immigration's interest 
in the list is further evidence that the New Zealand 
government would be receptive to participation in the HSPD-6 
pilot project on terrorist lookout information sharing (ref 
B). End summary. 
 
2. (C) As requested in ref A, Embassy econoff met September 
29 with Arron Baker of New Zealand Immigration to discuss a 
message he sent to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
seeking information on the no-fly list.  Baker, national 
manager of border security and compliance operations, said 
that Immigration proposed to use the list to screen 
passengers flying to New Zealand.  Any individual who 
appeared on the list and was trying to enter New Zealand 
under a visa-waiver program would be told to apply for a 
visa. 
 
3. (C) Baker would like to know more about the list, 
particularly what criteria are used to place a person on it. 
If a passenger were identified as on the list, he asked 
whether New Zealand Immigration could immediately contact TSA 
or a relevant U.S. office to discuss how to proceed and the 
reasons why the passenger was on the list.  Baker would like 
to open formal discussions with the U.S. government on 
whether access to the list would be allowed and how it could 
be used by New Zealand. 
 
4. (C) New Zealand wants to keep out individuals on the 
no-fly list for obvious reasons, Baker said.  "If the U.S. 
considers them to be risks, then why are we letting them fly 
to New Zealand," he asked.  His agency's interest in the list 
stems from a case in 2004, when Air New Zealand told 
Immigration that it had identified one of the passengers it 
had carried to New Zealand as on the no-fly list.  After 
investigation, Immigration determined that the individual was 
a member of Hamas and had applied for permanent residency in 
New Zealand on the basis of what turned out to be a sham 
marriage.  If Immigration had known about the individual's 
inclusion in the list, it would have denied him entry.  Baker 
did not know whether the individual still is in New Zealand. 
 
5. (C) Baker noted that New Zealand and U.S. law enforcement 
officials already cooperate well in enhancing transnational 
security.  As an example, he said that under the APEC 
Regional Movement Alert List, Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States will be sharing data on lost and stolen 
passports.  Immigration's border security officials and DHS 
contact each other directly on individual cases. 
 
6. (U) Baker also pointed out that New Zealand uses a system 
similar to the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) 
that connects airline counters to New Zealand Immigration and 
allows for passenger screening at the time of check-in. 
(Note: The New Zealand Ministry of Transport has offered 
information and a demonstration on its Advanced Passenger 
Processing system to the U.S. government, per ref D.) 
 
7. (S) Comment: Post recommends that we pursue discussions 
with the New Zealand government on access to the no-fly list, 
because we believe it would enhance NZ border security.  New 
Zealand Immigration recognizes that important details would 
have to be worked out, including how to proceed when an 
individual is identified as on the list.  Post also believes 
this interest in the no-fly list could be used to advance 
discussions with the New Zealand government on sharing 
screening information on known and suspected terrorist 
lookouts (ref C and E).  Post awaits instructions on how the 
interagency would like to proceed on these issues. 
 
Burnett