US embassy cable - 05PARIS6694

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, AF, FR, NATO 
SUBJECT: FRENCH WARY OF ISAF/OEF COMMAND PROPOSAL AND 
CONCERNED ABOUT U.S. TROOP COMMITMENTS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1 
.4 B/D 
 
 1. (C) Summary.  According to the MOD Policy Director, 
France can live with the NATO proposal for an ISAF/OEF 
integrated, but still dual-hatted command, so long as there 
is clear differentiation between the OEF and ISAF missions. 
It is for this reason that Defense Minister Alliot-Marie 
continues to speak of "synergy" (between two distinct 
operations) rather than integration.  The French are also 
worried about U.S. long-term objectives in Afghanistan, 
concerned that the U.S. may be planning to reduce its troop 
levels in Afghanistan, in conjunction with an integrated 
ISAF/OEF command.  There is a real fear that not only would 
NATO members have to fill in for departing U.S. troops, but 
that this could result in ISAF mission-creep to compensate 
for a decreasing OEF force.  That said, France remains 
committed to ISAF, OEF, and training the Afghan army, and is 
proceeding with its plans to take over the Kabul regional 
command in conjunction with Turkey.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Political Minister-Counselor and Poloff met 
September 21 with new MOD Director for Policy Jean de Ponton 
d'Amecourt to follow up on the Berlin informal defense 
ministerial meeting and to try to obtain clarification of 
French thinking in the context of Defense Minister 
Alliot-Marie's insistence that the dual-hatted commands be 
viewed as "synergy" rather than integration. 
 
3. (C) According to Ponton d'Amecourt, France is going along 
with NATO planning for an integrated ISAF-OEF command.  That 
said, Alliot-Marie's primary concern is that the ISAF and OEF 
operations be separate and distinct, and remain so.  The 
French see it as essential that there be no confusion between 
counter-terrorism operations (OEF) and NATO's stabilization 
role (ISAF).  Ponton d'Amecourt stated that, despite press 
reports to the contrary, Alliot-Marie had sought to avoid a 
confrontation on this issue at the Berlin informal 
ministerial.  However, France still needed further 
clarification as to exactly how the combined, dual-hatted 
command would work in practice.  While there are those in the 
GOF-- including the French CHOD General Bentegeat on 
September 19 -- who have cast Alliot-Marie's statements more 
in terms of semantics than substance, in fact this is not 
entirely the case. 
 
4. (C) Ponton d'Amecourt emphasized that cooperation on the 
ground in Afghanistan between U.S. forces in OEF and ISAF was 
excellent.  However, he said France remained concerned about 
U.S. long-term planning for Afghanistan, and in particular, 
that the U.S. was planning to downsize its troop presence 
once the combined ISAF/OEF command was put into place.  This 
is a concern often voiced by our MFA contacts, as well.  The 
French worry that a reduction in the U.S. presence would 
create two sets of problems for France.  In the first 
instance, it would mean by definition that France, as a major 
contributor of forces at NATO, would be under pressure to 
bear a larger burden, at a minimum proportionately.  French 
forces are already thinly stretched through their overseas 
commitments.  In the second instance, they see a risk that 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces would lead to the temptation to 
try to compensate for smaller OEF forces through an expanded 
ISAF mandate.  Alliot-Marie was putting down a marker against 
such mission-creep. 
 
5. (C) On France's own commitment to Afghanistan, Ponton 
d'Amecourt noted that France was still planning to take over 
the ISAF Kabul command next year with Turkey, and that it 
would increase its troop deployments in Kabul to some 1,000 
personnel in that context.  In response to Pol MC's queries, 
Ponton d'Amecourt said France still had a problem with PRTs, 
as it believed the NATO presence in Afghanistan should focus 
on military roles and not on reconstruction and development 
efforts, which are the domain of assistance agencies. 
(Comment:  The French want NATO to remain much more than a 
peacekeeping organization.  End Comment.)  Ponton d'Amecourt 
volunteered that MOD sensitivities on PRTs might also be 
linked to budgetary considerations, although this was not 
explicit MOD policy.  The MOD would not want to be held 
responsible for funding (French) reconstruction work out of 
its own budget. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON