US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS3558

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003558 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, HR, RS, TU, IZ, IR, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU FOREIGN MINISTERS TO FOCUS ON TURKEY, IRAN, 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
REF: (A) STATE 177048 (B) BRUSSELS 3534 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF VINCENT CARVER FOR REASON 1.4 (B/D). 
 
SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) EU FMs will meet in an extraordinary session the 
evening of October 2 to focus on Turkey. On October 3 EU 
foreign ministers will hold their scheduled meeting (GAERC) 
and will focus on strategy regarding Iran, decide whether 
current Croatian cooperation with the ICTY merits a start of 
accession negotiations, and consider other issues.  ICTY 
Prosecutor del Ponte is scheduled to review Croatia with an 
EU Task Force October 2.  A Commission contact said the GAERC 
likely will agree to a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and Montenegro (SaM). END SUMMARY 
 
TURKEY:  FMs TO MEET OCT. 2 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) We presented points (REF A) on the upcoming GAERC to 
Council and Commission officials September 26. Judith 
Gebestroithner of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's cabinet 
confirmed for us September 29 that EU foreign ministers would 
meet the evening of October 2 in Luxembourg to try to 
finalize the negotiating framework text for Turkish 
accession.  Gebestroithner stressed that the Commission fully 
agreed with the U.S. that not starting talks with Turkey 
October 3 would be a strategic mistake.  Gebestroithner (an 
Austrian), noting Vienna's insistence on reference to 
alternatives to full membership, added that member-states do 
have to answer to their publics.  In any case, she 
emphasized, FM Gul's rumored plan not to fly to Luxembourg 
until he has seen the final framework text is not helping 
Ankara's case. 
 
3.  (C) Council representative for North America Margarita 
Comamala told us September 27 that Turkey remains the most 
controversial issue on the GAERC agenda and that there was 
still no guarantee that accession talks would begin October 
3.  She took our point that promoting Croatian accession 
absent full cooperation with the ICTY would send the wrong 
signal to Zagreb and Belgrade but cautioned that some 
member-states viewed Croatian cooperation as vastly improved. 
 On other issues, Comamala said there likely would be "no 
surprises" at the GAERC and that the EU generally agreed with 
our points. 
 
NO "FORMAL LINK" WITH CROATIAN ACCESSION, BUT ... 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4.  (C) Stefan Lehne, Director of the Council's Balkans Task 
Force, told us September 29 that there is no softening of the 
requirement that Croatia must be deemed "fully cooperating" 
with the ICTY for accession talks to proceed.  According to 
Lehne, however, talk of Gotovina's physical presence in The 
Hague as a precondition for such talks was beyond the most 
hardline view within the EU.  Gebestroithner and several 
contacts from the Council, Commission and member-states have 
told us they believe Austria will finally join consensus on 
the negotiating framework, but only after ensuring that 
Croatian accession moves ahead, albeit conditionally.  Our 
contacts unanimously echo the "there is no formal linkage 
between Turkey and Croatia" refrain, but even a UKEU contact 
stressed that "one must be practical."  A member of 
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn's cabinet stressed to us that 
the EU Croatia Task Force (UK, Austria, Commission and 
Council) will meet with ICTY Prosecutor del Ponte in 
Luxembourg October 2.  If del Ponte notes significant 
progress in Croatian cooperation, Austria will push for one 
of three options:  setting a date for accession to begin, 
beginning screening of Croatian legislation for compatibility 
with the Acquis, or setting an early date for another Croatia 
Task Force review of Zagreb's cooperation. 
 
MOVING FORWARD WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Heather Grabbe of Commissioner Rehn's office 
confirmed to us that the GAERC likely would approve a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) for SaM. 
According to Grabbe, no formal decision has yet been made, 
but most FMs want to provide Belgrade a tangible and positive 
development before they begin to make difficult choices 
regarding Kosovo.  Both Grabbe and Gebestroithner said FMs 
will wait for Kai Eide's report, now expected around October 
17, before reviewing Kosovo in detail.  Lehne said that SaM 
is clearly "several rungs" below Croatia on the ladder, and 
that it would be counter-productive to preclude the opening 
of SAA negotiations until Mladic is transferred to The Hague. 
 He insisted that the negotiations will make no real progress 
until the issue is resolved, but argued that the continued 
prospect of a "European perspective" was an important tool in 
gaining Belgrade's cooperation in the Kosovo status process. 
Eventually, Lehne said, the same benchmark may need to be 
applied to Serbia -- that is, full cooperation rather than 
demanding Mladic's presence in The Hague as a pre-condition. 
He noted there had been some improvement in SaM's cooperation 
with the ICTY, but it was still far from acceptable.  Lehne 
urged calm, claiming that there is no daylight between the 
U.S. and the EU on ICTY cooperation.  He acknowledged, 
however, that the horse-trading over Turkey's accession 
negotiations could have unpredictable results. 
BOSNIAN POLICE REFORM 
--------------------- 
6.  (C) Lehne said that there was no "Plan B" for bringing 
about police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He stressed that 
Paddy Ashdown has the EU's full support for his efforts to 
implement police reform and said he saw no likelihood of 
easing the EU push for such reform. Pressure on the RS 
authorities would, in fact, increase in the coming week, he 
added.  The SAA process for Bosnia-Herzogovina would be 
postponed, and the transition from OHR to an EUHR who would 
exercise fewer Bonn powers may be delayed, Lehne added. 
 
IRAN:  CONTINUE TO SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The EU-3 will review their efforts, including at the 
IAEA, to convince Iran to cooperate with the international 
community and abandon uranium enrichment.  Gebestroithner 
said the GAERC likely would issue a statement regarding the 
seriousness of Iran's continued intransigence.  She noted 
that the EU would also raise this with Putin at the EU-Russia 
Summit in London October 4, but added that the EU was under 
no illusions that it would persuade Putin to engage on Iran 
at the UNSC. 
 
MEPP:  NEED TO PRAISE ISRAEL'S SUCCESSFUL WITHDRAWAL 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
8.  (C) Gebestroithner stressed that the GAERC's statement on 
the MEPP will be positive and balanced:  The EU will 
congratulate Israel on its successful and largely peaceful 
withdrawal from Gaza, note the PA's efforts to combat 
violence, and call on both sides to do more in reviving the 
road map.  She added that the Commission is urgently trying 
to free up funds already committed to assist Wolfensohn's 
efforts in Gaza. 
 
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) According to Gebestroithner, the GAERC will spend 
more time talking about Russia's neighbors than about Russia 
itself.  The EU has already decided to focus on 
implementation of existing agreements when it holds a summit 
with Putin in London October 4 (REF B).  Expectations for the 
summit are low, she added, with Poland and a few other 
member-states still resisting easing visa requirements for 
some categories of Russians.  Gebestroithner noted Russia's 
agreement to discuss its neighbors with the EU as a "step 
forward," but added that the Commission expected Putin to 
defend the actions of leaders like Lukashenko as 
"understandable under the circumstances."  Turning to 
Uzbekistan, Gebestroithner said the GAERC's conclusions are 
set; the EU will take a tough line on Andijon but will not 
terminate the EU's PCA with Tashkent as that is the "only 
structure we have for dialogue" with the Uzbek Government. 
The EU will announce an arms embargo, a visa ban on GOU 
officials linked to the Andijon repression, a suspension of 
some assistance programs, and will encourage members to 
"support invoking" mechanisms, such as the OSCE's Moscow 
mechanism, that could lead to an independent investigation of 
the Andijon events. 
 
10.  (C) The EU will support market economy status for 
Ukraine, Gebestroithner said, but will announce this only at 
the EU-Ukraine Summit in Kiev December 1.  The GAERC will 
express support for the new Ukrainian Government, but not too 
many FMs are very optimistic about its chances to press for 
reform, she stressed. 
COMMENT 
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11.  (C) The October 2's FM pre-GAERC focus will be Turkey. 
Austria's position and a heated European Parliament (EP) 
debate on Turkish accession and its September 28 vote that, 
inter alia, Ankara "recognize the Armenian genocide" as a 
prerequisite for accession have dominated informal 
discussions on Turkey this week.  Despite these obstacles, 
most of our contacts believe Austria will relent at the last 
minute (but only if del Ponte's findings on Croatian 
cooperation  give the EU enough ambiguity to reach a 
compromise deal on Croatian accession) and the GAERC will be 
followed by a ceremony marking the start of Turkey's 
accession negotiations. 
MCKINLEY 
.