US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7549

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SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO EGYPT OF IRAQ POLICY COORDINATOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY

Identifier: 05CAIRO7549
Wikileaks: View 05CAIRO7549 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Cairo
Created: 2005-09-29 14:31:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS EG IZ OVIP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, EG, IZ, OVIP 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO EGYPT OF IRAQ POLICY 
COORDINATOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY 
 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Ambassador Jeffrey, we are looking forward to hosting 
you and your delegation here in Cairo to pursue the first 
phase of your Arab outreach strategy on Iraq.  Your visit 
provides an opportunity to consult with the GOE on Iraq at a 
critical time.  We believe you should use your visit to 
encourage the GOE to press the Sunnis to participate in the 
referendum and December elections and to invite senior Iraqi 
officials to Cairo for discussions on furthering cooperation. 
 
 
2.  (C)  The GOE is focused closely on Iraq's impact on 
regional stability and on the Iranian element in particular. 
President Mubarak and his key advisors will need to be 
convinced that stepped-up GOE engagement with the GOI, so 
close to the October 15 referendum and the December 
elections, will have an impact, particularly given the 
potential negative domestic consequences of greater 
engagement.  Because of the security and political situation 
following the killing of Ambassador Ihab al Sherif, the GOE 
is unlikely to send an Ambassador to Bahgdad now. Foreign 
Minister Aboul Gheit, in particular, was stung by virulent 
press criticism that, in caving to USG pressure to boost 
Egypt's presence in Iraq, he had gotten one of his diplomats 
killed. 
 
3.  (C)  Egypt's engagement on Iraq since the start of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been sporadic but 
significant during key diplomatic efforts.  The GOE supported 
the effort to re-seat Iraq in the Arab League and elicited 
international cooperation at the November, 2004 Sharm El 
Sheikh conference and the Brussels conference.  The GOE's 
facilitation of U.S. aircraft overflights and Suez canal ship 
transits is critical to OIF.  Egypt was also among the few 
Arab states to send an Ambassador to Baghdad and to welcome 
senior Iraqis to Cairo for discussions.  The GOE has also 
contributed to feasibility studies regarding the possibility 
of extending the unified electrical grid to Iraq and has 
trained Iraqi military officers, diplomats, and civil 
servants from the Inspector General's office at various sites 
in Egypt. 
 
4.  (S)  Although your GOE interlocutors will be polite, you 
can expect them to offer straightforward advice.  The 
consistent message we have received from the GOE, including 
from President Mubarak himself, has been that the USG should 
remove U.S. soldiers from the front lines, reinstate 
ex-Ba'athist officials without blood on their hands, and 
engage seriously with the Sunni community. Among the GOE's 
deepest concerns is that Iraq will be broken up into its 
ethnic constituent parts, and that Iran will be the primary 
beneficiary of the division.  Soliman may suggest that USG 
should open a backchannel with the Sunnis in order to 
establish a dialogue and possibly persuade Sunni insurgents 
to stop their attacks.  Soliman will likely also urge the USG 
to bolster its humanitarian support in peaceful areas in 
order to improve its public image among the Iraqi people. 
 
5.  (S)  You can expect Arab League Secretary General Amre 
Moussa to complain that the USG's Iraq policy has increased 
sectarian division in Iraq and strengthened Iran's influence 
in the region.  You should press Moussa and the League to 
follow through on its promise to support Iraq's political 
transition, to provide economic reconstruction assistance, 
and to facilitate greater Arab representatation in Baghdad. 
You can also remind Moussa of his pledge to make positive 
statements on the Iraq consitution as soon as it is released. 
 Although Moussa will likely report that he is having trouble 
identifying staff willing to serve in Baghdad, you should 
encourage him to open the AL Baghdad office at the earliest 
opportunity. 
 
6.  (S)  We expect that your meeting with Directorate of 
Military Intelligence (DMI) and MoD officials will allow for 
a frank exchange both on areas for GOE engagement with Iraq 
and on the USG's Iraq policy.  MG Fouad Abdel Halim, the 
Field Marshal's senior advisor, will likely offer again to 
fund fully the training of Iraqi security forces here in 
Egypt.  He will also highlight the nature and extent of the 
GOE's military support for OIF (primarily through overflights 
and Suez canal transits) and will stress the importace of the 
USG-GOE bilateral relationship.  DMI's MG Murad Mowafy may 
assert that our policy in Iraq is alienating the Sunni 
population.  During a recent USG-GOE intelligence exchange, 
DMI officers reported that military operations such as took 
place in Tel Affar are driving a wedge between the population 
and the coalition.  They also believe that the Sunni 
leadership is too fractioned to participate effectively in 
the political process and think that the USG is 
overestimating the threat posed by foreign fighters in Iraq. 
 
7.  (S)  Some areas of potential GOE interaction with Iraq 
that you may wish to highlight during your discussions 
include: 
 
--outreach to key Sunnis to encourage participation in the 
referendum and elections 
 
--pressure on Syria to take seriously the USG's request for 
cooperation on border security/counter-terrorism 
 
--invitations to Iraqi officials to Egypt to explore 
furthering cooperation (Iraqi Interior Minister Jabr would be 
a candidate for such an invitation to discuss security force 
training) 
 
--invitations to Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders for 
meetings in Cairo to improve public understanding and promote 
balanced media coverage of the new government 
 
--positive statements on the Iraqi constitution 
 
--holding security discussions with the GOI in preparation 
for a return of Egyptian diplomats to Baghdad 
 
--continuing discussions regarding the feasibility of 
extending the unified electrical grid to Iraq 
 
--exploring the feasibility of training Iraqis at the 
Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority in techniques for safe 
handling of nuclear material, and 
 
--facilitating MOI approval of an offer from the Egyptian 
Anti-Narcotics General Administration to train GOI police 
officials in Cairo in October. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
JONES 

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