US embassy cable - 05CAIRO7547

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR ABRAMS AND POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EG, OVIP 
SUBJECT: U/S HUGHES' MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER 
NAZIF 
 
Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and 
Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes met with Egyptian Prime 
Minister Ahmed Nazif on September 26.  Hughes asked Nazif 
what could be done to improve understanding of America in the 
Middle East.  Nazif said that Gaza presented an opportuntity 
to changes perceptions of the U.S. in the region.  Nazif 
thanked Hughes for the positive USG response to Egypt's 
recent presidential election, which had been relatively 
successful.  Hughes agreed that the election was a positive 
initial step but urged Nazif to build on the momentum and 
improve the electoral process before parliamentary elections 
in November.  Nazif explained Egypt's agenda for continued 
reform and noted that announcement of an FTA would be a 
strong signal of support for Egypt.  Hughes urged Nazif to 
drop Al Manar from NileSat and provide a timetable for 
allowing Radio Sawa to broadcast in Egypt.  Both of these 
steps were important to Congress and the Administration. 
Nazif proposed a fund for graduate level study by Egyptians 
in the U.S.  End summary. 
 
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America's Image in the Middle East 
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2.  (C) Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and 
Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes met with Egyptian Prime 
Minister Ahmed Nazif on September 26.  Hughes remarked that 
Nazif had made a good impression during his visit to the U.S. 
in May 2005, especially in his interview on Meet the Press. 
The U.S. appreciated Egypt's leadership in the Middle East, 
and the positive steps it was taking after Gaza 
disengagement.  She asked how the U.S. could better 
communicate its goals for the region.  Nazif replied that the 
U.S. needed to broaden its message.  For example, not many 
Egyptians knew about U.S. assistance to Egypt and all the 
jobs it had created.  Egyptians merely saw the U.S. as a 
superpower meddling in the region, particularly in Iraq. 
While most Egyptians liked Americans, they resented America's 
policies.  Hughes agreed that Iraq was a difficult subject. 
The perception was that the U.S. was the problem, when the 
real problem was the insurgents.  The U.S. wanted to depart 
as soon as possible, but only after Iraq could defend itself. 
 
 
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Gaza an Opportunity for the U.S. 
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3.  (C) Nazif said that concrete action was needed to improve 
America's image.  Post-disengagement Gaza offered a real 
opportunity for such action.  Positive change in Gaza would 
go a long way toward improving America's image.  He noted 
three things the U.S. could do:  1) support Abu Mazen as he 
tried to consolidate power; 2) build Gaza's infrastructure, 
focusing on projects with quick results; and 3) assure the 
Palestinians that Gaza disengagement was not the end, but the 
beginning.  The Palestinians needed to see a path for 
continued progress toward a Palestinian state.  Currently the 
message to the Palestinians was "prove yourself in Gaza 
first," which was not going over well.  A better message 
would be that disengagement was a good first step and Gaza 
could form the nucleus of a Palestinian state. 
 
4.  (C) Nazif added that, after disengagement, Egypt 
purposely let the Palestinians cross the Gaza border. 
Seventy thousand Palestinians crossed, spurred by the feeling 
of liberation that came from finally having freedom of 
movement.  As they crossed, Egyptians saw their misery in 
Gaza.  Something positive was needed to counter this image. 
Minister of Foreign Trade Rachid added that the GOE wanted to 
support the U.S. message of reform in the Middle East.  He 
understood that the U.S. was treading a fine line in Gaza, 
not wanting to pressure the Israelis but needing to show 
support for the Palestinians.  One way to support the 
Palestinians would be to change their image in the Western 
media, which portrayed them all as terrorists.  Hughes agreed 
that it was important to change this perception and explain 
how a Palestinian state would improve the lives of ordinary 
Palestinians, who just wanted jobs and family lives. 
 
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Egypt's Political Reform 
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5.  (C) Turning to political reform, Nazif noted that the 
process began in February when Mubarak announced the 
constitutional amendment on presidential candidates.  The GOE 
wanted the recent presidential election to be free and fair. 
It was difficult to convey that perception, however, when 
most Egyptians knew that Mubarak would likely win.  Even the 
opposition was pleased, however, that the GOE had remained 
neutral, especially the police, who had acted impartially on 
election day.  Nazif believed the election was relatively 
well organized.  All candidates had equal media time, and 
Mubarak was simply one of those candidates.  Nazif noted that 
President Mubarak was scheduled to be inaugurated the 
following day.  His Cabinet would tender its resignation, but 
would likely be asked to stay on until parliamentary 
elections in November.  Nazif thanked Hughes for the positive 
USG response to the election, which was helpful. 
 
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Parliamentary Elections 
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6.  (C) Hughes replied that the election got a lot of 
coverage in the U.S., and was a positive step.  The Egyptian 
people finally had a choice.  Moreover, Egyptians were now 
debating issues, which was also a positive development.  The 
U.S. would like to see Egypt build on the momentum of the 
presidential election in the run up to parliamentary 
elections by allowing greater access to the media for 
candidates and international observers, which had become the 
norm worldwide.  Nazif agreed that the GOE needed to continue 
improving Egypt's electoral process but significant change 
might not be possible before the parliamentary election.  The 
GOE was expecting more trouble with that election than it had 
with the presidential election.  Parliamentary elections 
tended to stir up "tribal" issues, which sometimes led to 
violence.  The GOE wanted to be seen as neutral and not 
blamed for rigging the election if there was violence. 
 
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Access to Media and Observers 
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7.  (C) On the issue of access to the media, Nazif noted that 
transparency had increased, and the GOE was taking an 
impartial stance.  Neither the GOE nor the government media 
were explicitly supporting the NDP.  The opposition, however, 
was still weak.  Opposition parties had not developed 
platforms and were simply criticizing the NDP.  The GOE had 
to live with this reality, and couldn't just turn the 
criticism around on the opposition parties.  It would take 
some time for opposition to develop, and the U.S. needed to 
understand that.  Regarding observers, Nazif said he favored 
allowing them for the presidential election, but the 
judiciary, which had oversight, had refused.  Claiming that 
the judiciary had "too much ego," Nazif pointed out that the 
judges had capitulated at the last minute and allowed 
observers.  For the parliamentary election, local NGOs might 
be allowed to observe, though not "officially," i.e., in the 
polls, writing reports.  International observers were more 
problematic, since they were perceived as foreign 
interference.  Nazif also pointed out that Egypt had a 7000 
year history, so "we know how to do things ourselves." 
Hughes again urged Nazif to allow official observers, and 
repeated that international monitors were now the norm 
worldwide. 
 
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The GOE's Reform Agenda 
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8.  (C) Nazif remarked that for the first time, Mubarak had 
made campaign promises for continued reform.  He promised 
devolution of power to parliament, better balance between the 
executive and legislative branches, government 
accountability, better representation for opposition parties 
and women, and cancellation of the emergency law, which would 
be replaced by anti-terrorism legislation.  The changes would 
take about two years to accomplish, but there was no turning 
back now.  The GOE had overcome skepticism of its economic 
reform program.  Nazif hoped this could be repeated in the 
political realm, but support from the U.S. would be needed. 
Announcement of an FTA would be a strong signal of support, 
as would expansion of the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ). 
The QIZs had already created new jobs, and the GOE could 
point to this as evidence of U.S. support.  The GOE hoped to 
get approval for QIZ expansion in the next few weeks. 
Expansion would have a political as well as economic effect, 
as it would show cooperation between Egypt and Israel. 
Hughes said she would like to visit a QIZ on her next trip to 
Egypt to highlight their importance. 
 
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Al Manar and Radio Sawa 
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9.  (C) Hughes urged Nazif to take Al Manar and its message 
of hate off NileSat.  This was a Hezbollah-financed station 
and its aim was to promote terror.  Ridding NileSat of Al 
Manar was a major concern for Congress and the 
Administration.  Nazif did not respond on the Al Manar issue, 
appearing to lack background on the subject.  Hughes also 
noted that the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), on 
which she served, was concerned about the terrible delay in 
getting a license for Radio Sawa to broadcast from Egypt. 
Nazif pointed out Egypt received Radio Sawa broadcasts from 
Cyprus (Note: although technically true, the signal is weak 
and only reaches Egypt's north coast).  He said the GOE could 
not accept licensing of Sawa as a condition for aid.  Egypt 
had "battles" to fight and this would place the GOE in a bad 
position, as U.S. assistance was needed to overcome 
development challenges and fight terrorism.  Nazif said he 
had made this point to many CODELS, emphasizing that Congress 
should not pass a bill conditioning aid on licensing.  In any 
event, the GOE was preparing to privatize government channels 
after the parliamentary elections.  Rachid added that the USG 
wouldn't submit to pressure for licensing of foreign media in 
the U.S.  He said allowing Sawa to broadcast was not legal 
under Egypt's current radio and television regulatory regime, 
so the U.S. was essentially asking the GOE to break its own 
law.  He allowed that the law needed to be reformed, but this 
should be done in a transparent and appropriate manner. 
 
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Exchanges 
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10.  (C) Nazif expressed regret that it had become harder for 
Egyptians to get U.S. visas.  Noting that he was an alumnus 
of the International Visitors program and that many Cabinet 
members had studied or interned in the U.S., Nazif pointed 
out that if the U.S. really wanted to help Egypt, it should 
invest in Egypt's people.  He suggested setting up a fund for 
graduate level study in the U.S. that would allow 100-200 
students per year to study in the U.S., with the caveat that 
they return to Egypt.  Hughes emphasized that the U.S. wanted 
more foreign students and visitors and that one of her goals 
in her new position was to increase the number of exchange 
programs. 
 
11.  (U) U/S Hughes has cleared this cable. 
 
 
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JONES