US embassy cable - 05NICOSIA1585

CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 001585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2020 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UNSC, CY 
SUBJECT: CHANGING THE FRAME:  HOW WE TALK ABOUT THE CYPRUS 
ISSUE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 179318 
 
Classified By: CDA Jane Zimmerman; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Since the referenda on the Annan Plan in 
April 2004, our rhetorical position on the Cyprus issue has 
been clear and consistent.  We support the UN SYG and his 
Mission of Good Offices.  We believe the Annan Plan 
represented a fair and viable settlement. And, we want the 
Greek Cypriot side -- as the rejecting party -- to articulate 
its concerns "with clarity and finality" so that the SYG 
might assess whether conditions warrant launching a new 
effort to resolve the Cyprus dispute.  While consistency is a 
virtue, this message has been twisted by the Greek Cypriot 
leadership and in the Greek Cypriot media to the point that 
it is doing damage to our interests.  We should look to 
re-frame the way in which we talk about the Cyprus issue in 
our public statements to limit the ability of the GOC and the 
Greek language press to make mischief.  Post recommends that 
we limit ourselves to expressing support for the UN SYG and 
his Mission of Good Offices, reinforcing our firm support for 
a Cyprus settlement in the generic (rather than the Annan 
Plan in the specific), and the importance of the Cypriots 
themselves taking ownership of the settlement process. 
Following delivery of the President's national day message 
for Cyprus calling for a "comprehensive solution based on the 
Annan Plan" (reftel), we should re-cast our public message 
and emphasize our support for a solution to the Cyprus 
problem under UN auspices.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) A year-and-a-half after the referenda, our public 
support for the Annan Plan as the specific basis for a Cyprus 
settlement is undercutting our efforts to get the parties 
back to the negotiating table.  The Greek Cypriot leadership 
has instrumentalized our public message to reinforce its own 
credentials in defending Greek Cypriot interests from the 
predations of foreign Turko-philes.  President Papadopoulos 
and his allies are making similar political hay from our call 
for the Greek Cypriot side to articulate its concerns "with 
clarity and finality."  This language is no longer serving 
our interests and we should consider how best to re-frame our 
public message. 
 
3.  (C)  The Greek Cypriot leadership and conservative 
commentators have poisoned the well with respect to the Annan 
Plan so effectively that any effort to defend the specifics 
of the plan is easily dismissed as part of an Anglo-American 
conspiracy to reward Turkey and punish Greek Cypriots. 
President Papadopoulos uses U.S. support for the Annan Plan 
-- and in particular any language suggesting the plan is 
"uniquely balanced" -- as a foil for his own (as he would 
have the public see it) stout defense of Cypriot Hellenism. 
Our advocacy efforts on behalf of the Annan Plan in the 
specific, as opposed to a Cyprus settlement in the generic, 
is feeding the forces of reactionary conservatism on the 
Greek Cypriot side who see political advantage in castigating 
the plan as a sell-out of Greek Cypriot interests.  The 
debate over whether the Annan Plan is "a basis for 
negotiations," "a basis for a solution," "a point of 
reference," or "a point of departure" is sterile and 
unproductive.  We do not want to fight over this ground.  The 
simple fact is that there will need to be meaningful changes 
to the UN settlement plan if it is to be made acceptable to 
the Greek Cypriot side.  We do ourselves no service by 
pretending this isn't so. 
 
4.  (C)  Similarly, the Greek Cypriot leadership is arguing 
that it has met the SYG's call for "clarity and finality" in 
the Greek Cypriot position.  Papadopoulos has argued 
effectively (at least in his own domestic context) that the 
Tzionis mission to New York last May checked this box and 
those who argue otherwise are simply carrying water for 
Ankara.  This line plays very well with the Greek Cypriot 
public. 
 
5.  (C) Post recommends that we adjust our public rhetoric to 
take these realities into account. We should continue to 
express our unwavering support for the SYG and his Mission of 
Good Offices.  The Cyprus issue should remain where it 
belongs, firmly lodged in a UN context, rather than migrating 
to the EU agenda.  Other core elements of our public message 
should include: 
 
-- The United States remains firmly committed to a Cyprus 
settlement and we will work with all concerned parties in 
pursuit of that goal; 
-- Ultimately, it is not the United States, the UN or the EU 
that will produce a Cyprus settlement.  The initiative and 
the ideas have to come from the Cypriots themselves.  We 
stand ready to support the parties in this process. 
 
 
6.  (C) Meanwhile, in our public discourse we should 
de-emphasize our support for the Annan Plan specifically and 
steer clear of language putting the onus on the Greek Cypriot 
side to present changes.  It is true that there is nothing 
inherent in the Annan Plan that necessitated a Greek Cypriot 
"no" in April 2004.  The rejection of the plan was a function 
of deliberate choices on the part of the Greek Cypriot 
leadership.  Even so, there is no utility in revisiting this 
debate.  Equally, it is true that the Greek Cypriots have not 
presented positions to the UN that could reasonably be 
considered to represent "clarity and finality" in their 
thinking.  Neither, however, is it in our interest to pick 
this fight with the Greek Cypriot side.  For the time being, 
a minimalist message better serves our purpose. 
 
7.  (C)  The President's national day message for Cyprus 
(reftel) stresses U.S. support for a "just, lasting and 
comprehensive solution in Cyprus based on the Annan Plan." 
Post recommends that this message be the last public 
endorsement of the Annan Plan as a seemingly exclusive option 
for a settlement.  Our message should simply stress U.S. 
support for a "just, lasting and comprehensive solution in 
Cyprus."  This is something everyone can agree to.  The final 
clause specific to the Annan Plan represents -- in a Greek 
Cypriot context -- fighting words. 
 
ZIMMERMAN