US embassy cable - 05AMMAN7709

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 007709 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: IRAQI SUNNI FERMENT IN AMMAN: A TALE OF THREE 
MEETINGS 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 7602 
     B. BAGHDAD 3948 
 
Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1.  (C) Several meetings of Iraq Sunni Arab personalities 
about political involvement and the new Constitution took 
place in Amman between September 21-25.  These included 
Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad,s September 21 meeting with 
tribal leaders  (ref a); a hastily-organized "Anbar 
Conference" dominated by anti-Constitutionalists Abdul Latif 
Humayum and Saleh Mutlak; a more informal series of meetings 
between Anbar figures and other Iraqi Sunnis in and out of 
government; and an effort by several Amman-based Iraqi Sunnis 
to redirect the thrust of the Anbar conference into more 
positive channels focusing on the December elections.  Amman 
remains an active locus of Iraqi Sunni political activity; 
continued efforts at effective Sunni outreach here and 
elsewhere in the region retain their worth.  End Summary. 
 
First Meeting: "Lessons" From Khalilzad Roundtable 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Feedback continues to flow in from Sunni Arab 
participants in the September 21 roundtable in Amman with 
Ambassador Khalilzad (ref a).  Sheikh Tariq al-Abdallah from 
the Fallujah area called the meeting "more than perfect."  He 
explained that unlike some previous discussions, the meeting 
was open, animated, and "practical," and crystallized several 
points.  He took away two main messages from the meeting: "we 
(the U.S. and Sunni Arabs) are friends, but many third 
parties are pushing us to be enemies," and "Sunni Arabs need 
to focus on the December election."  Abdullah Khorbit, the 
political face of the al-Khorbit clan from Ramadi, also 
strongly praised the meeting, noting its geographic balance, 
and the regional importance of many of the Sunni Arab 
attendees.  He said that the chief message he took away from 
the meeting is: "it's up to us now." 
 
3.  (C) Khorbit noted that he understood from Ambassador 
Khalilzad that the U.S. will guarantee Iraq's independence 
and unity, but will not determine how well Iraq is governed, 
or by whom.  "If we Sunnis want to influence this, we must 
vote," Khorbit asserted, adding that instead of trying to 
defeat the Constitution, Sunni Arabs need to organize voter 
turnout and ensure that there are enough polling places.  He 
said he has read the Constitution, and has no major problems 
with it.  Khorbit recommended that the draft Constitution be 
widely distributed in Anbar, but reiterated his conclusion 
that "everything of importance depends on controlling the 
next government."  On the other hand, Talal al-Gaaod stressed 
to Emboff that, while appreciating the dialogue and strongly 
warming to Ambassador Khalilzad, many of those who attended 
the meeting remain uneasy about the depth of the U.S. 
commitment to maintaining Iraq's unity, and expressed concern 
that the U.S. is effectively advocating what appears to them 
to be a bad constitution.  Al-Gaaod argued that the U.S. 
should more clearly articulate its commitment to Iraqi unity, 
and confine its constitution-related activities to 
distributing copies and ensuring security and fairness in the 
coming October plebiscite. 
 
Second Meeting: Anbar Conference 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) A second meeting dealing with Sunni Arab political 
challenges was held in Amman on September 22-23, with some 
organizational cooperation from the Jordanian government. 
Approximately 200 Anbar-origin Iraqis, including tribal 
figures, businessmen, and prior regime political 
personalities and their relatives, attended the meeting 
intermittently.  According to several sources, the meeting 
did not attract more than cameo participation from key Anbar 
personalities.  Figures such as Majid al-Suliman, Tarik 
al-Abdallah, and Sheik Sabah al-Sharqi did not attend; 
neither did any member of the al-Khorbit clan.  Talal 
al-Gaaod claimed that he attended the first two hours of the 
conference only, and that "only because of strong pressure 
from the Jordanians." A group of Iraqi Sunni politicians and 
ministers (including Minister of State Sa,ad al-Hardani and 
National Assembly Speaker Hachem al-Hassani) came to Amman 
for the meeting, but opted not to attend, holding forth 
instead in a series of informal meetings at a local hotel. 
 
5.  (C) According to al-Abdallah and al-Khorbit, many of 
those who came from Anbar were confused about the goal of the 
conference and its organizers (the expressed intent of the 
conference organizers was to help integrate disaffected 
Anbaris into the Iraq political process).  However, Khorbit 
noted that many of the attendees were Anbaris currently 
living in Syria and Jordan, and called the gathering largely 
a conglomeration of "out-of-hopers."  Note: A Ramadi-origin 
Embassy contact, Mohammed al-Hamdi (strictly protect), 
attended the conference and estimated that 40 percent of 
attendees were migrs.  Anbar-origin Iraqi tycoon Talal 
al-Gaaod claimed that he warned the Jordanian General 
Intelligence Directorate (GID) that this would be the case, 
and that the conference was insufficiently prepared.  On the 
other hand, Al-Gaaod observed that the conference had 
promoted "some useful dialogue" among attendees. 
 
A Forum for Ex-Ba,athis? 
----------------- 
 
6.  (C) According to Embassy contacts and press reports, 
Humayum called for Sunni Arabs to get involved in the 
political process, and to turn out in force to defeat the 
Constitution, which he said "divides Iraq and separates it 
from its Arab identity."  He also called for formation of an 
Anbar-based "national reconciliation committee," before 
forming one at the national level.  In addition to Humayum,s 
oratory, the conference was notable for a speech by "National 
Dialogue" member Saleh Mutlak, in which he called on all 
Sunni Arabs to actively oppose the Constitution - not only by 
voting against it (as "they will steal this from us"), but by 
signing a petition rejecting it and empowering Mutlak as 
their spokesman (ref b).  Embassy contact al-Hamdi claimed to 
have recognized several prominent former Ba,athis, including 
ex-Ambassadors and senior ministry officials, and speculated 
that the purpose of the conclave was to galvanize Ba,athis 
to re-enter the political process through a neo-Ba,athist 
political movement chaired in Anbar by Humayum (see paragraph 
below for list of prominent attendees named by al-Hamdi). 
Al-Hamdi believes that this group will seek a coalition with 
other political parties in Anbar, and try to manipulate it 
behind the scenes. 
 
Mischief from Mutlak 
--------------- 
 
7.  (C) Although Humayum reportedly dominated organization of 
the conference (e.g., controlling delegate seating and much 
of the agenda and media access), most Embassy sources depict 
him as a widely despised figure, who up to now has had 
virtually no political following.  However, as al-Hamdi 
observed, "he has (access to) guns".  Most of our contacts 
dismiss his sudden re-emergence as a transparent effort to 
promote himself and restore his family to political 
influence.  (Note: Mutlak and Humayum appear to be the only 
big names that actively participated in the conference. 
While there remains widespread apprehension among Anbaris 
about the Constitution, we understand that Mutlak got nowhere 
with his petition idea, which he also marketed at a large 
Amman social gathering that included many Sunni Arab leaders 
from around Iraq, including several who had attended the 
meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad.  An Iraqi source present 
told Emboff that Mutlak got little traction, and further 
undermined himself by his flattering response to an American 
who phoned him halfway through his presentation.  A copy of 
Mutlak,s petition text has been sent to Embassy Baghdad's 
political section as well as to NEA.  End Note.) 
 
Some Sunnis Move to Repair the Damage 
----------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) In an effort to offset the negative, occasionally 
pro-insurgent thrust reflected in media coverage of the 
Humayum conference and to stress the need for Sunni Arabs to 
focus on the December elections, Tariq al-Abdallah, Akram 
Zankana (Kurdish, but with Anbar contacts), and other Sunni 
figures met with Fallujah and Ramadi members of the 
conference committee (not Humayum) on September 24 and 
September 25 to hammer out a revised "final communiqu" from 
the conference to be released to the press.  As a result, 
al-Abdallah and others succeeded in softening the 
communiqu's message on the Constitution from "hell, no!" to 
"yes, if", and revising a statement that "resistance is 
legitimate" to "resistance is a natural reaction to occupying 
forces.")   Al-Abdallah said that he and the others drew on 
the points made by Ambassador Khalilzad and others on the 
critical importance to Sunni Arabs of mobilizing for the 
December election rather than on defeating the Constitution. 
(Original and revised texts of the conference communiqu sent 
to Embassy Baghdad and NEA). 
 
Third Meeting: Dialogue with Sunni Government Officials 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) As noted above, several Iraqi Sunni officials 
snubbed the Anbar conference but held informal talks 
(together and separately) with a variety of prominent Iraqi 
Sunnis in Amman, including many current Anbar residents. 
According to Abdullah Khorbit who attended some of the 
discussions, the government officials were asked to help 
Anbaris escape from under the "three rocks," represented by 
the insurgents, Coalition forces, and the 
(Sh,ia/Kurdish-dominated) Iraqi National Guard. 
11.  (C) Khorbit reported that several prominent Anbar 
clerics showed up, and were asked by some present if they 
could deliver a strong fatwa against suicide bombings and 
Zarqawi.  He said the clerics agreed that such activities are 
wrong, but did not agree to issue a fatwa.  He related that 
the clerics were abashed when some of those present asserted 
that Sunni Imams enjoy the heightened influence they have 
achieved as a result of the current instability, and 
therefore have no incentive to calm things down.  Khorbit 
added that "in peacetime we ignore the Imams and drink 
alcohol, and they know that."  Khorbit noted that the general 
thrust of the Anbar residents who joined these informal 
discussions was that Anbaris are sick of violence and chaos 
and want to get to the final election. 
 
Comment 
--------- 
12.  (C) Amman continues to witness significant Iraqi 
political activity, and with the coming plebiscite and 
elections this activity appears to be intensifying, making it 
an important venue for USG Sunni outreach programs.  The 
recent outreach meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad has had an 
appreciable ripple effect in encouraging more Iraqi Sunni 
Arab figures to think about the future politically, and to 
work actively to focus themselves and others on the December 
elections. 
 
13.  (C)  Prominent Anbar Conference attendees named by 
al-Hamdi - - (comments are his): 
 
Ahmed al-Kubaisi - Cleric now living in Dubai. Focused on 
election participation. 
Sadiq Mutlak - brother of Saleh 
Musdif al-Gaaod - cousin of Talal, but has bad relations with 
him.  Brother of former Anbar Governor Fassal al-Gaaod. 
Close to Humayum.) 
Tha'er al-Ani 
Ammash al-Obeidi 
Adullah Shawiash al-Issawi 
Saleh al-Noman 
Thafer al-Obeidi - encourages Islamic jihadists and promotes 
suicide missions 
Mazin al-Aloisi - Former Head of Engineering at Presidential 
Palace 
Taha Ahmed al Daoud - Saddamist Ambassador to London 
Barza'k Mujil Narjis al-Gaaod - cousin and associate of 
Fassal al-Gaaod.  Claimed that "the resistance has an 
important role to play" in future negotiations 
HALE