US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV5863

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 005863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, IS, GOI INTERNAL 
SUBJECT: SHARON PUSHES BACK CONTENDERS, KEEPING PRIMARIES 
AND ELECTIONS AT BAY 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 5740 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Sharon's victory in the 
September 27 Likud Central Committee vote over early party 
primaries staunches for now the efforts of leadership 
contender Bibi Netanyahu and his anti-disengagement cohorts, 
allowing Sharon to move ahead with his political agenda -- 
and the possibility of both further movement on 
settlements/outposts and an eventual return to the roadmap. 
Sharon can now govern without serious challenge from within 
Likud until the long-scheduled primaries to be held in April, 
the Likud's mandatory six months before the November 2006 
national elections.  His Likud-Labor coalition will remain 
viable at least until the final 2006 budget vote, which must 
take place by March 31.  At that time, Labor will face the 
choice of either continuing to support the only political 
leader capable of pursuing Labor's peace process agenda, or 
leaving the coalition over the budget as a means of 
establishing its own, non-Sharon-based platform in 
preparation for the fall elections.  FM Shalom emerged as one 
of the big winners in the contest.  We recommend that the 
Department use this opportunity of Sharon's continued 
post-disengagement governance and the prospect of further 
moves toward the Palestinians to press Arab states for 
meaningful gestures to Israel.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Prime Minister Sharon's 1,433-1,329 win in the 
Central Committee, whose membership represents the more 
right-wing party elements, staved off early party primaries 
and dampened the leadership hopes of both leadership 
contender Binyamin Netanyahu and ultra-right winger Uzi 
Landau, both of whom have aggressively argued that Sharon has 
moved too far to the left to represent Likud.  Close 
associates and supporters of Sharon characterize the Central 
Committee decision as a show of confidence in both Sharon's 
leadership and the political path he has chosen, as well as a 
determination to keep the party united.  Sharon's win keeps 
him on course with breathing space to pursue his political 
agenda, whether further movement on settlements/outposts, 
less controversial "negotiated" agreements with the 
Palestinians, an eventual return to the roadmap, or some 
combination of those.  Observers are covering the map with 
speculative scenarios, from Sharon proceeding on course, to 
splitting the party, to retiring.  Long experience shows 
that, with his Central Committee win and a solid, for now, 
Likud-Labor coalition, Sharon is hardly likely to change the 
all-ahead-full course that has carried him -- and his agenda 
-- through four years and three governments. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
WINNERS AND LOSERS -- AT LEAST FOR NOW 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Sharon associates have publicly called upon Sharon's 
Likud opponents to respect the vote and not seek to further 
challenge Sharon's leadership, directing these admonitions at 
the band of some 13-18 Likud MKs -- "rebels" -- who have 
consistently opposed disengagement and who sought to unseat 
Sharon in early primaries.  Netanyahu stated publicly that he 
would respect the results, while at the same time accusing 
Sharon of using patronage to achieve his victory, and he 
pledged to continue his leadership challenge.  Sharon could 
still face challenges from the right wing, buttressed by 
Likud's disaffected MKs, once the Knesset comes back into 
session in November, in the form of no-confidence motions, 
but given the divided opposition, they are no more likely to 
succeed than the score or more of such motions over the past 
year.  This battle has generated both distinct winners and 
distinct losers, setting the landscape for the coming months, 
but, as the career of Ariel Sharon himself so clearly shows, 
political resurrection and political collapse are alternating 
companions of even the best Israeli politicians. 
 
----------- 
THE WINNERS 
----------- 
 
4.  (C) Those in Likud who supported Sharon through his 
campaign against what pundits have referred to as Netanyahu's 
"putsch" attempt, will likely be rewarded by Sharon for their 
loyalty.  They, and beneficiaries outside Likud, include: 
 
-- Likud MK Silvan Shalom, Foreign Minister.  Shalom's strong 
speech to the Central Committee and effective lobbying 
against early primaries, combined with well-acknowledged 
ward-boss-style tactics such as funding taxis to transport 
committee members to the polling place, may have tipped the 
scales against early primaries (see para 5).   Shalom 
Tourgeman of the PM's office told the Ambassador today that 
FM Shalom made the difference in 100 votes, implying that his 
stock with the PM has risen dramatically as a result. 
 
-- Likud MK Tzachi Hanegbi, Minister-Without-Portfolio.  As 
chairman of the Likud Central Committee, Hanegbi did his 
best, albeit unsuccessfully, to undermine the petition that 
brought the early primaries issue to a Central Committee vote 
and, as one pundit put it, "committed suicide" by associating 
himself with the possibility of Sharon forming a new party -- 
a threat that may have been instrumental in keeping the 
Central Committee from supporting early primaries.  Tourgeman 
said that Hanegbi would be rewarded in part by being put in 
charge of the Strategic Dialogue with the USG. 
 
-- Likud MK Ehud Olmert, Finance and Trade Minister.  A 
Sharon stalwart and the original stalking horse for Sharon's 
concept of disengagement, Olmert played a crucial role in 
keeping Likud from embracing the right wing, levied the 
public criticism of early-primaries supporters that allowed 
statesman Sharon to at least partially avoid pre-vote verbal 
slugfests, and floated the threatening possibility of Sharon 
leaving Likud and forming a new party -- the "big bang" 
theory.  Tourgeman reported that Olmert will now be given the 
finance portfolio in his own right, opening up the trade job 
for another Sharon loyalist not currently in the Cabinet, 
such as Likud MK Roni Bar'on or Deputy DefMin Ze'ev Boim. 
 
-- Likud MK Avraham Hirchson, Tourism Minister.  His strong 
public statements against early primaries helped sway 
undecideds. 
 
-- Labor Party Ministers, particularly Vice Premier Shimon 
Peres.  The Labor ministers and hangers-on, comfortable with 
their positions and perks, avoided the ideological pitfall, 
into which they could easily have fallen, of leaving the 
government over the budget and out of desire to establish a 
non-Sharon platform in advance of elections, ensuring for 
Sharon the ability to govern and disengage. 
 
-- Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who can 
expect continuity with Sharon and the possibility of further 
unilateral gestures, progress along the roadmap, or both, but 
only if Abbas manages to maintain an environment free of 
terror activity. 
 
---------- 
The Losers 
---------- 
 
5.  (C) Sharon associates have stated publicly that "no heads 
would roll," meaning Sharon will not fire those Likud 
ministers, such as Danny Naveh and Limor Livnat, who 
supported Netanyahu's call for early primaries.  Nonetheless, 
the Sharon victory diminishes his opponents, both vis-a-vis 
Sharon, and in the competition to eventually succeed the 
77-year-old party chairman.  The Prime Minister is unlikely 
to forget or truly forgive those like Netanyahu, Sa'ar and 
Landau, whose attacks have been vicious, or those, like 
Livnat, who, while less vicious, deserted Sharon at the last 
minute.  In the meantime, the budgets of their ministries 
will likely receive closer scrutiny.  Among the biggest 
losers: 
 
-- Likud MK Binyamin Netanyahu made himself a thorn in 
Sharon's side by his tactics within the Cabinet over 
disengagement, cut short his successful tenure as Finance 
Minister, resigning from the government on the eve of 
disengagement, and waged a vicious, unsuccessful bid to 
unseat Sharon months ahead of the regularly scheduled Likud 
primaries.  His erratic stands throughout the months of 
debate over disengagement and his even more convoluted 
explanations of those stands and of his reasons for 
challenging Sharon, solidify in much of the public's minds 
his reputation as a self-serving and unreliable leader.  Less 
than 24 hours after his Central Committee defeat, Netanyahu 
is facing public criticism from unnamed Likud Knesset members 
-- and, until yesterday, Netanyahu supporters -- who charge 
that "we cannot win with Bibi," and "if Bibi remains, Sharon 
will rule the Likud forever."  Bibi is not finished yet. 
That reckoning will come only after the next Likud primaries, 
where some analysts argue that he may garner more support 
from the hard-core rank and file members who will not be 
voting, as the Central Committee members did, to preserve 
their individual "perks." 
 
-- Likud MK Uzi Landau, a right-wing ideologue and Likud 
leadership aspirant, led the anti-disengagement, anti-Sharon 
faction of Likud from day one, wagering that Sharon no longer 
represents Likud, and lost. 
 
-- Likud MK Gideon Sa'ar, coalition whip and former Cabinet 
secretary for Sharon, abandoned the Prime Minister, who many 
 
SIPDIS 
would say made from scratch Sa'ar's political career, and 
tied himself to Netanyahu's coattails.  His shift smacks to 
some of betrayal, not only of his erstwhile mentor, but of 
his responsibilities as faction whip, and may have foiled his 
steady rise as an up-and-coming young Likud leader. 
 
-- Likud MK and Education Minister Limor Livnat, was 
on-again, off-again over the past year of disengagement 
debates, feverishly sniffing the wind before every vote. 
With only 36 hours to go before the Central Committee vote, 
and no critical need to do anything but remain silent, she 
mis-judged the wind, coming out strongly in favor of 
Netanyahu's initiative, and prompting Sharon ally Olmert to 
comment: "the rats swam to the sinking ship." 
 
-- Likud MK Danny Naveh, Health Minister.  With his health 
budget already evoking the ridicule of Ehud Olmert, who 
called him Israel's "worst health minister," Naveh's support 
for Netanyahu is likely to send his political stock down even 
further. 
 
-- Likud anti-disengagement foes, the so-called "rebels," 
tried for more than a year to use the right-leaning Central 
Committee as the lever by which to shift the -- overall -- 
more centrist Likud membership to the right, and away from 
disengagement.  They now face a prime minister who can 
continue to call on the center and left to govern, despite 
their inevitable continuing machinations. 
 
-- Settler leader and Likud Central Committee member Moshe 
Feiglin.  Fringe rightist Feiglin and his supporters, failed 
in their attempt to dramatically shift Likud to the far right. 
 
--------------------- 
THE REALLY BIG WINNER 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Foreign Minister Shalom's heavy lifting in the Likud 
Central Committee proved crucial to PM Sharon's success in 
yesterday's Likud Central Committee vote.  Over the past 
year, Shalom has evolved from an absolute foe of the PM's 
disengagement plan to become one of Sharon's most effective 
spokesmen and powerbrokers in the Likud party.  He 
demonstrated once again on Sunday the political skills in the 
rough-and-tumble world of the Likud party that have made him 
a Central Committee and ward-politics force, delivering an 
impassioned speech in defense of the Prime Minister's 
position on a day when Sharon himself was silenced by a 
malfunctioning -- some say sabotaged -- sound system.  Shalom 
sees himself as Sharon's successor, in competition with 
Netanyahu, who is about the same age.  By supporting Sharon, 
he puts off for a bit longer the possibility that Netanyahu 
will succeed to the premiership and -- equally worrisome -- 
hold onto it,  Shalom will remain an important Sharon ally as 
Israel heads towards primaries and parliamentary elections in 
2006, all of which Shalom will use to enhance his 
competitiveness, vis-a-vis Netanyahu, to eventually lead the 
party. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION:  In his Foreign Ministry 
hat, Shalom has evolved from awkward sloganeer to a more 
adroit champion of Israel's place in the Middle East, and the 
need for Arab and Muslim states to establish contacts -- and, 
ultimately, diplomatic relations -- with Israel.  We 
recommend that the Department consider steps to bolster 
Shalom's diplomatic outreach efforts, which have led to some 
successes in the broader Muslim world (e.g., Pakistan, 
Indonesia), but only tepid reaction from Arab states that had 
developed ties with Israel before the second Intifada (e.g., 
Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, UAE, Oman, and Bahrain).  These 
mainly Maghreb and Gulf states have reacted cautiously and 
generally quietly to PM Sharon's disengagement policy and FM 
Shalom's overtures -- with letters and private phone calls 
rather than public statements or visits.  These Arab states 
should be encouraged to attend the tenth anniversary of the 
Rabin assassination in November or to consider other 
opportunities to re-engage publicly in a dialogue with 
Israel.  At the very least, they should take less negative 
stances towards Israel in the debates in the UN and other 
international bodies such as the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement. 
 
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