US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4008

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2015 
TAGS: ECON, ENRG, EPET, EFIN, MOPS, MARR, PGOV, IZ, Security, Energy Sector 
SUBJECT: LACK OF INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY DISAPPOINTS ENERGY 
COUNCIL 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3324 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: DCM DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 22, the Ministers of Oil, Water 
Resources, and Electricity reported to the National Energy 
Council (NEC) an increase in attacks against electrical power 
generation and distribution systems as well as export 
pipelines.  Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Chalabi and the 
ministers expressed disappointment at the lack of security 
for pipelines and electrical lines across Iraq.  The DPM said 
that security goals, to include the provision of essential 
services to the people of Iraq, are not being met. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) DPM Ahmed Chalabi convened a meeting of the ITG NEC 
on September 22 to review the status of energy infrastructure 
security across Iraq.  Attendees included the Minister of Oil 
(MOO) Ibrahim Bahr al-'Ulum; Minister of Water Resources 
(MOWR) Dr Abd al-Lateef Rasheed; Minister of Electricity (ME) 
Dr. Muhsin Shalash; Minister of Trade (MOT) Abd al-Basit 
Karim Mawlud; representatives for the Ministry of Industry 
and Minerals (MIM), Ministry of Transportation (MOTRANS), 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Interior (MOI) and 
National Security Advisor (NSC); LTG Abadi Deputy Commander 
of the Iraqi Armed Forces; Deputy Commander of MNC-I MG 
Parker; Deputy POLMILCOUNS; IRMO Deputy Director; and 
ECONOFF. 
 
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STATUS OF INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) DPM Chalabi reported that both 400 KV lines from 
Bayji to Baghdad are currently interdicted, and the 400 KV 
line near the Musayyib power plant also has been interdicted 
south of Baghdad.  He stated there were additional attacks 
against oil facilities north of Baghdad.  Chalabi emphasized 
the costs of a lack of security, characterizing oil and 
electrical infrastructure as important for Iraqi stability. 
He said, "When the electricity is cut off, we use more fuel; 
it costs us more.  The insurgents have found their success by 
interdicting electricity.  We understand the problem, and we 
need to solve it." 
 
4.  (C) The new deputy commander of MNC-I, MG Parker agreed 
that infrastructure protection is critical for Iraq.  He 
cited five challenges/problem areas for infrastructure:  (1) 
age of the infrastructure, (2) fragility of the 
infrastructure resulting from previous attacks, (3) 
contractual arrangements for renovation and repair, (4) 
repair systems that are not sufficiently responsive to 
attacks, and (5) insufficient security.  MG Parker explained 
that there are insufficient Coalition forces to place along 
linear infrastructure and still meet competing demands, such 
as security for the approaching referendum and the December 
elections.  MG Parker added that the Coalition has tactical 
control over all of the security forces in Iraq, with the 
exception of a few ministry fixed site guards. 
 
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SECURITY FORCES TRAINING AND OPERATIONS STATUS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5. (C) MG Parker said the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions 
(SIBs) for the Kirkuk to Bayji corridor would be completing 
their training soon.  The second group of SIBs will begin 
training during the next six months.  These lightly-armed 
units will require additional command and control 
communications.  MG Parker said the Bayji to Baghdad corridor 
poses a complicated security problem, as it is longer than 
the Kirkuk-Bayji segment and almost 60 kilometers wide. 
MNC-I will use additional reconnaissance assets to address 
this infrastructure security problem, he said, adding that 
improved coordination for infrastructure protection in the 
northern part of Iraq is necessary.  LTG Abadi explained that 
the MOD is planning for infrastructure protection but that 
organizing a joint headquarters and staffing took time. 
 
6. (C) DPM Chalabi noted that the Infrastructure Coordination 
Cell (ICC) -- set up at the MOD to coordinate the ITG's 
infrastructure security response -- is poorly resourced and 
staffed, has no communications or computers, and thus has not 
succeeded.  Chalabi cited an example of the ICC taking three 
days to find a downed electrical tower.  He added there have 
been major investments in infrastructure by the GOI and the 
Coalition, but there has been no significant progress in 
fixing the systems to provide essential services to the 
people. 
 
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SECURITY FORCES FUNDING LEVELS 
------------------------------ 
 
7.  (C) DPM Chalabi and the MOF representative told the NEC 
that the MOD should not expect additional subsidies from the 
Coalition for security operations.  Chalabi said the 2006 MOD 
budget would be $5.5-7.2 billion, while the MOI would require 
$3.0 billion -- for a total of over $8-11 billion for 
security.  He said 96-97 percent of national revenues come 
from oil exports, and these budgets cannot be funded if there 
is insufficient security for the export of oil. (NOTE: In a 
subsequent conversation with the Ambassador, Chalabi said 
that $10.4 billion for security in the 2006 budget would be 
"realistic" (Septel). END NOTE.) 
 
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CONCERNS ABOUT INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Ever dramatic, Chalabi warned, "We face chaos and 
civil war" if we do not get infrastructure security under 
control immediately, and he complained that the Coalition has 
ignored the desires of the ITG, particularly regarding the 
SIBs.  He urged MG Parker to take action. (MNF-I COMMENT: The 
inability to steadily export oil from the north is due to a 
combination of maintenance problems, aged and fragile 
infrastructure stressed in prior attacks by hydrostatic shock 
(causing leaks), as well as interdictions by insurgents.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
9.  (C) MOO al'Ulum said that the 26-inch Kirkuk to Bayji 
pipeline was flowing again and requested that the security 
for the Bayji to Baghdad corridor be the next priority for 
MNC-I.  "In the last 20 days we have lost 400,000 barrels a 
day of refining capacity due to the lack of pipeline 
security."  Al-'Ulum reported that the 18-inch pipeline was 
interdicted September 21, cutting off the Daura Refinery from 
its supply of crude oil.  "The SIBs are part of the problem, 
and you must move them away from the pipelines." 
 
10.  (C) MOWR Rasheed added, "This is the fourth time we have 
heard you (MNF-I) will go back and study infrastructure 
security and give us a plan.  I hope you really do it." He 
added that the roads into Baghdad are becoming extremely 
dangerous, in particular the key Kirkuk to Baghdad route, 
which suffers 2-3 attacks per day.  (NOTE: MNF-I reports that 
security coordination occurs at the local levels.  Local 
repair crews, however, are unwilling to coordinate with 
MNF-I, as they are afraid of being targeted along with the 
Coalition forces by the insurgents while they work on 
repairs.  The Embassy is working with MNF-I and Iraqi 
security forces to find a solution to the intimidation issue. 
END NOTE.) 
Khalilzad