US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT4209

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 004209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR R, P, NEA/ARPI, NEA/PPD, ECA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, KPAO, EAID, PHUM, KMPI, KISL, ASEC, KU, TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: COMBATING EXTREMISM IN KUWAIT 
 
REF: A. STATE 159129 - COMBATING EXTREMISM 
     B. KUWAIT 4056 - KUWAIT SEEKING INDEPENDENT AUDITOR 
        FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 
     C. KUWAIT 3583 - ANTI-WEST ANTI-ISRAEL AD MAKES 
        ROUND OF LOCAL PAPERS 
     D. KUWAIT 3266 - READING WRITING AND QUR'ANIC 
        RECITATION 
     E. KUWAIT 3552 - ISLAMISTS OFFER CRITIQUE OF U.S. 
        POLICY ADVICE ON PROMOTING MODERATION 
     F. KUWAIT 2694 - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN KUWAIT - WHAT 
        "MOVES THE NEEDLE"? 
     G. KUWAIT 1201 - GETTING FOREIGN STUDENTS BACK TO 
        U.S. UNIVERSITIES 
     H. KUWAIT 1071 - SECURITY BUREAU REPORTS 
        COUNTERTERRORISM SUCCESSES 
     I. 2004 KUWAIT 2828 - KUWAIT YOUTH TARGETED BY 
        EXTREMISTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S) Summary and Introduction: This report responds to the 
request (ref A) for information on programs for combating 
extremism.  Embassy Kuwait actively engages the Government of 
Kuwait at every opportunity on every level on ways to combat 
extremism.  Although the GOK has previously discounted the 
domestic influence of extremist groups, January terrorist 
shoot-outs have heightened the GOK's focus on home-grown 
extremism and the GOK's willingness to combat it.  All 
agencies and all mission elements are engaged in tracking and 
assisting, where possible, the GOK in its fight against 
extremist ideology.  Post activities include: education and 
international visitors programs; regular engagement with the 
media; targeted use of representational activities; economic 
reform; increased outreach to vulnerable groups, and 
judicious use of intelligence, security, and military 
channels.  As we have reported in the past, we find that the 
most effective instrument to counter extremism over the long 
term is exposure to life in the United States through study 
or exchange visits.  We need to match the build up of 
resources of intelligence and military assets combating 
terrorism with a comparable increase in our exchanges, 
scholarships, and speaker programs to combat extremism. 
(End Summary/Introduction) 
 
Education Programs 
------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) Post's Public Affairs (PA) office has implemented 
the ACCESS microscholarship program for male and female 
non-elite ninth- and tenth-graders from conservative areas 
such as Jahra, Farwaniya, and Ahmadi which are targeted by 
Islamist extremists.  One hundred and five children were 
enrolled in 2004-2005 and 180 students are scheduled to be 
enrolled in 2005-2006.  The students represent all walks of 
life and include those who favor traditional dress (the 
dishdasha for boys and the hijabs and abayas for girls) as 
well as western styles and jeans.  (ACCESS is a Bureau of 
Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) program which will be 
funded by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) for 
the 2005-2006 year.) 
 
3.  (SBU) The PA office also implemented the Partnerships for 
Learning YES program, which sent 16 male and female Kuwaiti 
students to the U.S. for their third year of high school. 
These students were from diverse socio-economic backgrounds. 
The purpose of the program is to give them a wide and diverse 
view of American society.  Several students met with NEA PDAS 
Cheney during her June visit to Kuwait, and in August the 
Ambassador hosted a reception for program alumni, departing 
students, and their parents.  The event reinforced the U.S. 
goal of building bridges between our societies, and program 
graduates were able to address the concerns of departing 
students and their parents.  Both the Cheney visit and the 
reception received ample press coverage in the Arabic and 
English dailies. 
 
4.  (C) The PA office arranged in September 2005, for a 
senior English Language Fellow to work with the Ministry of 
Education to assist it in revising its English language 
curriculum and textbooks.  The Fellow's work will ultimately 
reach all Kuwaiti students through Kuwait's English teaching 
curriculum, with the aim of stemming inaccurate pictures of 
American society and values through English-language 
teaching.  PA also sent the Chair of the English teaching 
department of the Public Authority for Applied Education and 
Training (PAAET) on an International Visitors Leadership 
Program (IVLP) on "Teaching English as a Second Language." 
PAAET trains Kuwait's teachers and PAAET has a very 
conservative student population. 
 
International Visitors Programs 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) The PA office arranged for a special, 
first-of-its-kind in Kuwait, International Visitors 
Leadership Program (IVLP) with the Bureau of Education and 
Cultural Affairs (ECA) for Kuwaiti imams to visit the United 
States on a "Religion in the U.S." program.  Two Imams 
traveled to the U.S. September 7-24 to launch a dialog with 
U.S. religious leaders.  Intolerance and religious diversity 
were the topics as they visited diverse regions of the U.S. 
and met with various American religious communities.  Post 
intends to continue and expand this program during FY-06. 
 
6.  (SBU) The PA office also sent two student leaders, a 
conservative Islamist and a moderate Muslim, on a highly 
effective IVLP "Young Leaders:  Effecting Social, Political 
and Economic Change."  Feedback from both suggested the 
program was eye-opening, particularly in regard to the 
standing and vitality of the Muslim communities in the U.S. 
 
7.  (SBU) The PA office is in the early planning stages of 
organizing a dialogue series to be held between Kuwaiti imams 
and officials from the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs 
and U.S. Military chaplains at Camp Arifjan with the 
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) with the goal 
of both sides broadening their knowledge and overcoming 
preconceived ideas about one another.  One of the chaplains 
spoke at Post's 9/11 memorial and his comments were well 
received by the invited Muslim audience. 
 
American Corners 
---------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The PA office established two American Corners in 
Kuwait, at Kuwait University and at the American University 
of Kuwait.  One goal of installing American corners at local 
universities is to create the foundation for and promote 
interest in the establishment of an American Studies major at 
the universities.  In addition to serving as a resource 
center for information on the U.S., the corners offer Embassy 
officers and other visiting Americans venues through which 
they can directly engage Kuwaiti students, conservative and 
liberal.  The programming at the American Corners has been 
successful in presenting unique aspects of American culture 
to Kuwaiti students in an open forum while offering Embassy 
staff the opportunity to speak directly with non-elite 
Kuwaitis. 
 
MEPI 
---- 
 
9.  (SBU) Post's MEPI committee encouraged a local 
organization, Cinemagic, to apply for a MEPI Small Grant to 
allow non-elite Kuwaiti boys and girls to participate in the 
film school.  Film-making gives the youth a means to express 
themselves by promoting freedom of expression as a democratic 
ideal.  Learning entrepreneurial skills allows the youth 
access to a vocation not normally available to them. 
Moreover, throughout the process, they are introduced to new 
ideas and Cinemagic's multicultural and multinational staff. 
 
10.  (SBU) Post secured a small MEPI grant for Lothan Youth 
Achievement Center's (LoYAC's) in-country entrepreneurial 
training summer programs.  The PA office also provided a 
grant for a summer internship program to the LoYAC to support 
its plans to send several Kuwaiti students to the U.S. over 
the summer of 2006 to intern at various governments and 
business offices in the U.S.  LoYAC's mission is to instill 
in Kuwaiti youth, including conservative Islamic Kuwaitis, an 
understanding of tolerance and civic participation. 
 
11.  (C) Youth programs (such as LoYAC's and ACCESS) are 
extremely important and relevant because these programs share 
the same target audience as extremist Islamists (ref I). 
Post considers it essential that we compete for the "hearts 
and minds" of this non-elite youth audience and engage them 
before they are co-opted by extremists. 
 
The Press 
--------- 
 
12.  (C) The PA office actively monitors the Arabic media and 
acts quickly to counter columns, articles, and other 
statements which are inciteful and/or dangerously inaccurate. 
 In June, a noted Kuwaiti cleric, Shaykh Dr. Jassem bin 
Muhalhal Al-Yassin, wrote a full-page article in the Arabic 
daily Al Watan, entitled, "The History of Aggression Against 
the Koran," in which he falsely criticized U.S. attitudes 
towards the Koran and Islam as being antagonistic.  The PA 
office immediately responded with a letter, signed by the 
press officer, denying the Shaykh's assertions and 
reiterating the values Americans and the U.S. government 
place on religious plurality and the respect we have for 
Islam and all religions.  The letter was printed in full the 
next day by the daily. 
 
13.  (SBU) The Minister of Information opened a case in 
August against two Arabic dailies which printed a full back 
page ad depicting an Islamic warrior holding the Koran in one 
hand and a banner in the other with anti-American statements 
printed on it (ref C).  The warrior is also stepping on the 
U.S. and Israeli flags while an inset box in the lower corner 
of the ad depicts both flags and flagpoles shoved into a 
toilet.  The case was based on Kuwait's press law which 
states that the press cannot harm relations with friendly 
nations.  One liberal columnist in Al-Watan absolved the 
newspapers for blame but excoriated the Kuwaiti who paid for 
the ads. 
 
14.  (SBU) In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, a few extreme 
Islamist columnists opined that the storm was divine 
punishment for American transgressions against Islam.  The 
Ambassador responded with a strongly worded letter addressed 
to one of the more vociferous advocates of the idea, Mohammed 
Al-Mulaifi, a columnist with Al-Seyassah newspaper and a 
Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs employee.  Al-Sayassah 
prominently printed the Ambassador's letter in full the next 
day.  PA office contacts widely praised the strong response, 
which provoked a host of columnists to criticize Al-Mulaifi's 
remarks in their own columns and stirred the Ministry of 
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs to make a public statement 
condemning the article and disassociating the Ministry from 
the writer. 
 
15.  (SBU) Finally, all PA officers conduct frequent informal 
meetings with Islamist interlocutors in the media to promote 
U.S. policy perspectives while exchanging views and sharing 
perceptions.  Interlocutors include Islamist columnists, 
publishers and officials in the major Islamic streams. 
 
Political Engagement 
-------------------- 
 
16.  (C) The Political Section continually engages all 
sectors of Kuwaiti society, including the more conservative 
element, in order to ensure an open and full dialogue.  The 
PA office, in cooperation with Political, organized Post's 
inaugural "Islamists' Tea" on July 26 hosted by the Charge 
(ref E), with a guest list including conservative and 
moderate Islamists.  Post plans on continual engagement of 
Islamists in this setting, with the hope of creating an 
informal outreach program with this group.  Traditional as 
well as Scientific Salafis attended, both conservative 
Islamist groups known to be often highly critical of U.S. 
policies in the region.  In holding this type of event, Post 
is working to engage the more conservative elements in 
dialogue and discussion with the aim of broadening their 
understanding of the U.S. and its policies.  Several invitees 
later thanked Post for the event and we gained new 
interlocutors on the issues of women's political rights, 
environmental protection, and studying in the U.S. 
 
17.  (C) The Political Section has hosted a series of 
receptions on democracy and human rights, in order to develop 
new contacts and introduce contacts to each other. The events 
serve as a forum to assess common problems in Kuwait society 
and evaluate public reaction to the GOK's response.  In 
addition, Political Section officers regularly meet with 
religious figures (Sunni, Shi'a, and various Christian) and 
NGOs to identify problems they face in dealing with extremism 
within a society which treats many of them as foreigners and 
outsiders. 
 
Economic Engagement 
------------------- 
 
18.  (C) Strengthening charity oversight remains an integral 
part of Post,s broader efforts to combat extremism in 
Kuwait.  Working with key GOK ministries, the Economic and 
Executive sections remain fully engaged, with all levels of 
the GOK, to ensure that the positive contributions of 
legitimate Kuwaiti charities are monitored closely to prevent 
exploitation by extremist elements and that illegal 
operations are closed. 
 
19.  (S) The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, serving as 
the Government's main charity oversight body, continues to 
implement new measures to further strengthen its oversight 
and control of Kuwaiti charities (ref B).  The Ministry has 
successfully removed unregulated kiosks and donation boxes 
from mosques and other public spaces and is in the process of 
implementing an accountability program for Ramadan donations. 
 In addition, charities are required to report all financial 
transactions on a monthly basis to the Government for 
reconciliation.  Additional new measures will include the 
appointment by the Government of an independent external 
auditing firm to review charity activities. 
 
Countering Extremism in the Military 
------------------------------------ 
 
20.  (C) In April 2005, the Office of Military Cooperation 
Kuwait (OMC-K) reported that the Kuwait Ministry of Defense 
(KMOD), was planning to identify and weed out extremists 
within its ranks based on their dress and length of facial 
hair.  Kuwaiti military regulations stipulate that beards had 
to be clipped so that they did not exceed three inches in 
length.  Customarily, dishdashas (male robes) are worn at 
ankle length.  More conservative individuals and 
fundamentalists keep their dishdashas short, up to mid-calf, 
while their beards may grow to six-to-eight inches in length. 
 KMOD identified those individuals whose dress was not in 
keeping with regulations and separated them into groups for 
"re-education."  Exact figures on how many military were so 
identified are not available and the plan itself was not 
publicized in the press until months after it began.  KMOD 
reportedly sent the identified individuals to classes on 
"moderate Islam" and they were lectured on the errors of 
following those who would conduct violent operations in Iraq 
and elsewhere.  (Note: KMOD's focus and concern were 
individuals who might use their military training to 
participate in jihad in Iraq against Coalition Forces. 
Although there have been only two instances that we know of 
where KMOD Forces have been found either in Iraq or on their 
way there, concern remains that some might empathize with 
foreign fighters.  End Note.) 
 
21.  (C) In November 2004, Chief of Staff of the Kuwait Armed 
Forces (KAF), LTG Fahed Al-Amir, requested assistance from 
OMC-K in obtaining media and materials for use in the support 
of internal counter-extremism education programs.  OMC-K 
requested assistance from CENTCOM in establishing means for 
such support.  Subsequently, the KAF became aware of a number 
of military members allegedly plotting attacks on U.S. 
targets.  Additionally, a number of military members were 
reportedly caught in the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
anti-terrorist operations conducted in early-2005.  As a 
result, the KAF began to develop and implement several 
programs under the J2, designed to reduce the threat of 
extremism in their ranks.  These programs included efforts to 
eliminate non-Kuwaiti or stateless Arabs (bidoons) from 
military service, to develop clandestine programs to identify 
potential extremists within KMOD, and to develop 
counter-extremism information/education programs.  The intent 
of the information programs would be to demonstrate the 
proper role of moderate Islam vis-a-vis military service, as 
well as highlight the criminal/terrorist nature of extremist 
groups operating in the region, including Iraq.  The aim was 
to establish informational programs designed to reduce 
extremist sympathies and activities among military members. 
 
22.  (S) A May 28-30 assessment by CENTCOM in Kuwait proposed 
that KMOD send staffers to the U.S Army psychological 
operations (PSYOPS) course.  Following that training, KMOD 
would establish its own capability to eliminate extremist 
elements in the Kuwait military; identify radical and 
extremist Islamic ideologies and teachings; and decrease 
support to extremist organizations and causes in order to 
convince others not to join extremist organizations and 
causes and to convince others to report extremist activity to 
proper authorities.  This program would be developed and 
implemented internally by the Kuwait Armed Forces. 
Mitigating and countering extremist tendencies in the KAF 
will help ensure U.S. freedom of action and reduce the threat 
of hostile action by Kuwaiti military members.  CENTCOM has 
approved the training but is currently waiting for funding in 
order to enroll the first KMOD staffers into the course. 
Participation is expected to last one year with indefinite 
follow-on self-sustaining programs in Kuwait. 
 
23.  (S/NF) According to SIMO, the GOK has adopted an 
approach of co-optation and reeducation as a means to combat 
radical extremism and promote tolerance.  SIMO assesses that 
this approach has only been partially effective.  Kuwait 
State Security (KSS) argues that some former extremist 
figures have changed their tone in recent years and months, 
and no longer engage in extremist activity.  Other 
individuals, however, including Mohsen Al-Fadhli and Khalid 
Al-Dosari, despite several dealings with Kuwait's legal 
system, continue to plan and facilitate terrorist activities 
with little evidence of active pursuit by Kuwaiti law 
enforcement.  The GOK policy may indeed have some merit for 
this small society, but it is clearly not a cure-all.  In 
some instances, including the cases of Al-Fadhli and 
Al-Dosari, it appears that the KSS is lacking in drive and 
ability to seriously pursue violent extremists, and that the 
Kuwait legal system is ill-equipped to deal more harshly with 
those who cannot be co-opted or reeducated.  SIMO assesses 
that the GOK is working to achieve an appearance of calm and 
stability, however this has not translated into an effective, 
sustained campaign to root out extremist elements working 
inside Kuwait, nor has it halted the involvement of Kuwaiti 
citizens in jihadist activities outside Kuwait. 
 
The GOK's Plan 
-------------- 
 
24.  (C) Since the January 2005 police shoot-outs, the GOK 
has made the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs the lead 
ministry to combat extremism, specifically among Kuwaiti 
youth.  The National Security Bureau which oversees the GOK's 
counterterrorism plan, has developed a 3-year plan against 
terrorism, of which elements address extremism (ref H).  The 
Ministry began by opening an information center in February 
to monitor and investigate extremist books, articles, groups, 
and internet sites.  The Ministry also recently released its 
strategy to "reinforce moderation" and combat extremist 
thought and action through emphasizing public discussion of 
Islamic thought in order to "achieve moderation."  Using 
imams and religious figures, the Ministry says that it would 
engage youth in discussions that would spread moderation and 
focus on the dangers of misunderstanding religion.  Working 
with the Ministries of Education, Information, and Social 
Affairs and Labor, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs 
plans on launching a number of social activities with the 
goal of redirecting and protecting Kuwaiti youth from 
extremist thought.  Included in the activities will be 
teaching Arabic, holding Islamic lectures and seminars, 
promoting national unity, and preserving Kuwaiti culture and 
history in order to "correct" misunderstandings about the 
role of Islam in Kuwait and the region. 
 
The Family Factor 
----------------- 
 
25.  (C) Kuwait has a vigorous and vibrant media, especially 
print media. The January shoot-outs spurred a vigorous debate 
in these papers' editorial pages on the roots of extremism in 
Kuwait.  While liberals blamed Islamist influence on the 
curriculum and in mosques, and Islamists argued that the 
violence was a deviant aberration, most editorials and 
articles went beyond fingerpointing to arrive at the same 
conclusion: extremist thought had to be countered within the 
home, by the family.  Even in the conservative dailies, the 
role of family was continually raised as the most important 
link for those who chose extremism.  Family members of the 
leaders of January's shoot-outs were interviewed and most 
denounced the actions of their sons and brothers while some 
remained silent.  All press gave front-page coverage to a 
statement by the cell leaders' father condemning acts of 
terror and extremism, even after both his sons died as a 
result of the shoot-outs and a third was held for twelve days 
in detention. 
 
 
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LEBARON