US embassy cable - 05ADDISABABA3401

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 003401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, EUR/NB. LONDON FOR AFRICA 
WATCHER. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, NO, ER, ET, EE BORDER 
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BORDER: NORWEGIAN THOUGHTS 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 3316 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (B) 
 AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Oslo would support renewed, public USG 
engagement to resolve the political stalemate between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea over the border dispute, Norwegian 
Ambassador and General Jan Erik Wilhelmsen told Charge 
September 23.  However, Norway would also advise the U.S. not 
to repeat the mistakes of UNSYG Special Envoy Axworthy, but 
instead begin any initiative with low-profile groundwork in 
Eritrea.  Norway is willing to put USG representatives in 
contact with Norwegian officials who have gained Eritrean 
President Isaias' trust.  The GON would likely favor the 
creation of a "Horn of Africa Resource Group" to support USG 
efforts.  End summary. 
 
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USG INTERVENTION NEEDED, BUT HEED LESSONS LEARNED 
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2. (C) Visiting General J.E. Wilhelmsen, who met with Charge 
to discuss regional issues and the African Union (septel), 
said that he believes Norway would support a favorable USG 
response to UNMEE UNSRSG Legwaila's call for increased U.S. 
engagement to resolve the political deadlock over the border. 
 He commented that it is "ridiculous but true" that the UN is 
powerless on this front, and urged the U.S. to accept the 
UNSRSG's invitation to intervene. 
 
3. (C) Norwegian Deputy Head of Mission Simon Rye said that 
U.S. engagement would be useful, but advised the USG to first 
"take a good look at what went wrong with the Axworthy 
mission."  According to Rye, Axworthy did not properly 
understand political dynamics in the region and adopted a 
"heavy-handed" approach.  Asked by Charge to elaborate, Rye 
said that it was a "huge mistake" for Axworthy to go to Addis 
to meet with Ethiopian PM Meles first.  Because Eritrea is 
under the impression that Ethiopia attracts more positive 
attention from the international community, Rye noted, 
Eritrea always saw the Axworthy mission as an "Ethiopian 
proposal." 
 
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COFFEE HOUSE APPROACH -- A LOW-PROFILE START 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Rye expressed the view that any Special Envoy should 
first expend effort to establish good relations with several 
key individuals in Asmara.  He dubbed this the "coffee house 
approach", and noted that Norwegian Special Representative 
Colby had used the method with some success to gain the trust 
of those close to Isaias.  Rye said that it will be essential 
to ensure that Eritrea accepts the USG Special Envoy before 
going public with any nomination. 
 
5. (C) Above all, Rye advised, a low-profile start will be 
more likely to meet with success.  He said that the U.S. 
might begin by discussing "lessons learned" with UN officials 
who set up Axworthy's mission.  Rye indicated that Norway 
would likely be interested in contributing to a "Horn of 
Africa Resource Group" to help put any mission into proper 
political and cultural context.  "Norway has very good people 
who would be willing to contribute", he stated.  While noting 
that a change of government is upcoming in Norway, Rye said 
that the current Deputy PM has met Isaias several times and 
enjoys open dialogue with the Eritrean President.  Rye 
commented that Axworthy ignored Norway's advice to consult 
the Deputy PM and Colby before proceeding with his mission. 
"There are no magic bullets", Rye said, but emphasized that a 
low-profile start armed with such consultations could ensure 
the Axworthy history does not repeat itself in the form of a 
USG intervention. 
HUDDLESTON