US embassy cable - 02HARARE2372

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ZIMBABWE FACES MULTIPLE AND INTER-RELATED CRISES

Identifier: 02HARARE2372
Wikileaks: View 02HARARE2372 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2002-10-31 13:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV EAID ZI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/FO KANSTEINER AND BELLAMY AND DRL FOR A/S CRANER 
NSC FOR AFRICA SRDIR FRAZER 
AID FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS AND A/A NEWMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, ZI 
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE FACES MULTIPLE AND INTER-RELATED CRISES 
 
Classified By: JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D 
 
1.(C) Summary: Zimbabwe is in the midst of inter-related and 
deepening political, economic, social and humanitarian crises 
which are steadily spiraling downward.  We do not believe 
that there are separate solutions to these crises and are 
convinced that any effective remedy must address all the 
crises, including the political one.  The only consolation in 
this sorry picture is that more top ZANU-PF leaders recognize 
the seriousness of the crisis and comprehend that they might 
not have the solutions to the problems working alone.  There 
is not yet any signal, however, that the top leadership is 
prepared to address these deep crises in any way that might 
compromise its increasingly absolutist power. Zimbabwe's 
neighbors are increasingly cognizant of the depth of 
Zimbabwe's crises and the potential implications for 
themselves, but their responses remain mostly timid and 
tentative.  End Summary 
 
2. (U)  As detailed in other reporting, Zimbabwe's social, 
humanitarian, economic and political crises continue to 
deepen and are increasingly and inextricably related. 
 
-- (U) Social Disintegration: The most quantifiable element 
of this crisis is an HIV-AIDS rate among the adult population 
of about 34 per cent, with over 3,000 AIDS related deaths per 
week, 800,000 AIDS orphans and life expectancy shortened to 
38 years.  These horrific statistics relate closely to other 
crises, since food shortages and impoverishment due to 
economic decline ensure earlier deaths for the infected and 
make the task of supporting HIV-infected families much more 
difficult.  The degradation of the health system, due to 
emigration of skilled personnel and shortages of medicines, 
is dramatic. Fixed pension rates and high inflation have 
impoverished most pensioners.  While family support networks 
continue to function in many cases, they are being stretched 
beyond the limits. There are previously unheard of cases of 
city relatives unable to support their rural families or even 
turning away their rural relatives coming to stay near town 
and orphans being rejected by their extended families. The 
part of the traditional family support network which is 
probably most effective is the remittances sent home by 
Zimbabweans working overseas.  While the Government's 
political rhetoric defends the poorest Zimbabweans, 
ineffective economic policies are the largest contributors to 
the population's poverty.  All of these problems are 
worsening, and are unlikely to improve absent a major 
economic and political turnaround.  Moreover,the Government's 
single-minded political focus on the land issue, and 
concomitantly to retaining power relegates its focus on 
HIV/AIDS to a health problem to be dealt with by the Health 
Ministry with only occasional lip service by higher-ups. 
 
-- (U) Economic Collapse: Zimbabwe's economy is arguably in 
the most rapid freefall of any country on earth not at war. 
GDP has declined  by about a quarter in the last three years 
and GDP per capita has declined to levels below those of its 
historically much poorer neighbor Mozambique. Inflation is 
conservatively pegged at 140 per cent per annum and the 
national currency has lost 77 per cent of its value in a 
year.  The GOZ is virtually bereft of foreign currency as the 
tobacco season comes to an end, unable to pay for the fuel, 
food and spare part imports it desperately needs. 
Zimbabweans are demonstrating legendary resilience in coping 
in their  businesses and personal lives, and the informal 
sector has exploded in recent years to compensate for the 
tremendous decline in the formal economy and increased 
unemployment.  Even if Zimbabwe avoids another drought, next 
year's tobacco crop will be drastically reduced and overall 
agricultural production is crippled for years to come due to 
the disruption of the commercial farms and the Government's 
inability to provide necessary inputs to new farmers. 
Similarly, Zimbabwe's wildlife resources and tourism sectors 
are being depleted at alarming rates.  The GOZ's "optimistic" 
forecast for 2003 calls for a further 5 per cent GDP 
retraction. 
 
-- (U) Humanitarian crisis:  Food shortages are the most 
evident manifestation of an enormous humanitarian crisis. 
Over half the Zimbabwean population is short of food. Almost 
every area of the country will be needy in the months before 
next March's maize harvest.  The Government has long been 
over-confident of its ability to import enough maize to meet 
this emergency, but does not have the foreign exchange nor 
the time/logisitics to meet the need.  The GOZ has also 
declined to change its monopolistic practices, its 40 per 
cent duty on imported maize meal or its price controls on 
cereals, or adjust exchange rate policies which currently 
prevent the private sector from importing food for those 
Zimbabweans who could buy their own maize.  International 
food assistance is also likely to fall considerably short of 
WFP Director Morris's delivery target of 55,000 MT's per 
month by December due to government obstacles to the presence 
of NGO's, the delays resulting from controversy over biotech 
food and mediocre donor response to a Zimbabwean food crisis 
caused largely by retrograde Government policies. Government 
policies driven by political considerations continue to 
impede international assistance and to direct GOZ food in a 
blatantly partisan manner.  There are as yet no mass 
migrations of hungry people, only a few of the swollen 
bellies and emaciated children characteristic of famine and 
only a small number of deaths clearly attributed to 
starvation.  We do believe, however, that there are numerous 
people dying quietly in their villages from HIV- and non-HIV 
related illnesses compounded by poor nutrition.  And with the 
worst five months in Zimbabwe's agricultural cycle still 
ahead, these problems will grow more acute, with an as yet 
unassessed risk of a much more serious humanitarian crisis. 
-- (C) Political crisis:  Zimbabwe's political crisis is 
worsening steadily as the ZANU-PF utilizes the advantages of 
governmental control to orchestrate a campaign of violence 
and intimidation against the opposition leadership and 
supporters, influential civic organizations, the judiciary 
and all other individuals and institutions perceived as a 
threat. The MDC is portrayed in the state media, to voters 
and even to other Africans as an illegitimate, 
foreign-sponsored party that can and will be defeated with 
every imaginable method from violence and threats to 
deprivation or reward with food and public projects 
explicitly linked to the constituency's support for the 
ZANU-PF. MDC leaders and parliamentarians are prosecuted on 
trumped-up charges and lower-level MDC candidates or 
supporters are beaten, threatened and, at times killed for 
supporting the opposition.  MDC rallies and political 
campaigning are largely barred by new repressive legislation. 
 NGO's which have links to the MDC or provide the 
documentation of GOZ human rights abuses are increasingly 
under siege.  Independent media are also under siege by the 
state with editors and journalists being prosecuted on 
multiple charges of violating repressive new media 
legislation, which also increases government controls over 
all journalists -- foreign or domestic. The message from 
Government and ZANU leaders and from all-pervasive state 
media is that support for the opposition, and even failure to 
support the Government is illegitimate and will be punished 
by either withdrawal of state benefits or more direct 
measures. 
 
3. (C) While Government leaders remain triumphalist in 
public, some Party and Government heavies are beginning to 
acknowledge privately the depth of the crisis they face and 
their inability to resolve it themselves.  While this is 
progress, it comes late and is thus far inadequate to reflect 
a serious opportunity for engagement.  For instance, the GOZ 
recently wrote the UN ResRep to suggest cooperation to assist 
displaced commercial farm workers, compensate displaced 
commercial farmers and provide agricultural assistance for 
new farmers.  Putative GOZ concern for displaced commercial 
farm workers and farmers is both hypocritical and 
transparent, but the appeal for agricultural assistance to 
new farmers recognizes that the GOZ does not have the means 
to support these new farmers to make the land resettlement 
exercise a success.  The UN will not take up this 
half-hearted GOZ appeal but will continue to test when the 
Government might be more sincere in its approaches.  The GOZ, 
which for some four months after the election appeared to 
glory in its isolation and defiance of international opinion, 
has been of late on a largely unsuccessful charm offensive to 
show off its successes and to reopen channels of 
communication.  For instance, ZANU-PF recently reached out 
through intermediaries to the Australian Government and the 
Commonwealth; the GOZ welcomed South African re-engagement on 
Zimbabwe perhaps through a November bilateral commission 
(although it is unclear whether the GOZ will be any more 
flexible than it has in the past) and the SADC Committee for 
Zimbabwe is sue to visit in the coming months. 
 
4. (C) Some influential members of the ruling party politburo 
acknowledge privately that President Mugabe is a liability 
and have quietly discussed a post-Mugabe era, but no one 
seems willing to press the President too hard on his 
retirement plans. Moreover, these discussions are mostly 
focused on how to ensure ZANU-PF's hold on power rather than 
on working with the MDC to extricate Zimbabwe from its 
current predicament. Some high-ranking GOZ officials have 
also reached out to us, directly and indirectly.  We have 
stressed to them the depth of the crises facing the country, 
the need to address the political crisis in order to resolve 
the country's other problems and the need to find solutions 
together with other Zimbabweans rather than expect that a 
separate deal is possible with the US or other countries. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  While it is encouraging that more GOZ and 
ZANU officials have begun to recognize the depth of the 
problems, we have not yet seen signals that they are prepared 
to change their political approach of crushing the opposition 
and ruling through whatever violent or repressive means are 
necessary with increasing reliance on the security forces. 
Nonetheless, the depth of the country's problems will make 
this a calculation to be tested regularly in the months 
ahead.  As repression intensifies and the economy contracts, 
prospects for civil unrest increase. Most Zimbabweans seem 
more concerned, however, with keeping their heads down and 
making ends meet. Ultimately, any sustainable solution to 
this country's political crisis and the economic, social and 
humanitarian crises it has spawned, must address the question 
of the Government's legitimacy and ensure respect for genuine 
political competition. 
 
 , 
. 
SULLIVAN 

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