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| Identifier: | 02HARARE2372 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 02HARARE2372 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Harare |
| Created: | 2002-10-31 13:04:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV EAID ZI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002372 SIPDIS FOR AF/FO KANSTEINER AND BELLAMY AND DRL FOR A/S CRANER NSC FOR AFRICA SRDIR FRAZER AID FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS AND A/A NEWMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2012 TAGS: PGOV, EAID, ZI SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE FACES MULTIPLE AND INTER-RELATED CRISES Classified By: JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D 1.(C) Summary: Zimbabwe is in the midst of inter-related and deepening political, economic, social and humanitarian crises which are steadily spiraling downward. We do not believe that there are separate solutions to these crises and are convinced that any effective remedy must address all the crises, including the political one. The only consolation in this sorry picture is that more top ZANU-PF leaders recognize the seriousness of the crisis and comprehend that they might not have the solutions to the problems working alone. There is not yet any signal, however, that the top leadership is prepared to address these deep crises in any way that might compromise its increasingly absolutist power. Zimbabwe's neighbors are increasingly cognizant of the depth of Zimbabwe's crises and the potential implications for themselves, but their responses remain mostly timid and tentative. End Summary 2. (U) As detailed in other reporting, Zimbabwe's social, humanitarian, economic and political crises continue to deepen and are increasingly and inextricably related. -- (U) Social Disintegration: The most quantifiable element of this crisis is an HIV-AIDS rate among the adult population of about 34 per cent, with over 3,000 AIDS related deaths per week, 800,000 AIDS orphans and life expectancy shortened to 38 years. These horrific statistics relate closely to other crises, since food shortages and impoverishment due to economic decline ensure earlier deaths for the infected and make the task of supporting HIV-infected families much more difficult. The degradation of the health system, due to emigration of skilled personnel and shortages of medicines, is dramatic. Fixed pension rates and high inflation have impoverished most pensioners. While family support networks continue to function in many cases, they are being stretched beyond the limits. There are previously unheard of cases of city relatives unable to support their rural families or even turning away their rural relatives coming to stay near town and orphans being rejected by their extended families. The part of the traditional family support network which is probably most effective is the remittances sent home by Zimbabweans working overseas. While the Government's political rhetoric defends the poorest Zimbabweans, ineffective economic policies are the largest contributors to the population's poverty. All of these problems are worsening, and are unlikely to improve absent a major economic and political turnaround. Moreover,the Government's single-minded political focus on the land issue, and concomitantly to retaining power relegates its focus on HIV/AIDS to a health problem to be dealt with by the Health Ministry with only occasional lip service by higher-ups. -- (U) Economic Collapse: Zimbabwe's economy is arguably in the most rapid freefall of any country on earth not at war. GDP has declined by about a quarter in the last three years and GDP per capita has declined to levels below those of its historically much poorer neighbor Mozambique. Inflation is conservatively pegged at 140 per cent per annum and the national currency has lost 77 per cent of its value in a year. The GOZ is virtually bereft of foreign currency as the tobacco season comes to an end, unable to pay for the fuel, food and spare part imports it desperately needs. Zimbabweans are demonstrating legendary resilience in coping in their businesses and personal lives, and the informal sector has exploded in recent years to compensate for the tremendous decline in the formal economy and increased unemployment. Even if Zimbabwe avoids another drought, next year's tobacco crop will be drastically reduced and overall agricultural production is crippled for years to come due to the disruption of the commercial farms and the Government's inability to provide necessary inputs to new farmers. Similarly, Zimbabwe's wildlife resources and tourism sectors are being depleted at alarming rates. The GOZ's "optimistic" forecast for 2003 calls for a further 5 per cent GDP retraction. -- (U) Humanitarian crisis: Food shortages are the most evident manifestation of an enormous humanitarian crisis. Over half the Zimbabwean population is short of food. Almost every area of the country will be needy in the months before next March's maize harvest. The Government has long been over-confident of its ability to import enough maize to meet this emergency, but does not have the foreign exchange nor the time/logisitics to meet the need. The GOZ has also declined to change its monopolistic practices, its 40 per cent duty on imported maize meal or its price controls on cereals, or adjust exchange rate policies which currently prevent the private sector from importing food for those Zimbabweans who could buy their own maize. International food assistance is also likely to fall considerably short of WFP Director Morris's delivery target of 55,000 MT's per month by December due to government obstacles to the presence of NGO's, the delays resulting from controversy over biotech food and mediocre donor response to a Zimbabwean food crisis caused largely by retrograde Government policies. Government policies driven by political considerations continue to impede international assistance and to direct GOZ food in a blatantly partisan manner. There are as yet no mass migrations of hungry people, only a few of the swollen bellies and emaciated children characteristic of famine and only a small number of deaths clearly attributed to starvation. We do believe, however, that there are numerous people dying quietly in their villages from HIV- and non-HIV related illnesses compounded by poor nutrition. And with the worst five months in Zimbabwe's agricultural cycle still ahead, these problems will grow more acute, with an as yet unassessed risk of a much more serious humanitarian crisis. -- (C) Political crisis: Zimbabwe's political crisis is worsening steadily as the ZANU-PF utilizes the advantages of governmental control to orchestrate a campaign of violence and intimidation against the opposition leadership and supporters, influential civic organizations, the judiciary and all other individuals and institutions perceived as a threat. The MDC is portrayed in the state media, to voters and even to other Africans as an illegitimate, foreign-sponsored party that can and will be defeated with every imaginable method from violence and threats to deprivation or reward with food and public projects explicitly linked to the constituency's support for the ZANU-PF. MDC leaders and parliamentarians are prosecuted on trumped-up charges and lower-level MDC candidates or supporters are beaten, threatened and, at times killed for supporting the opposition. MDC rallies and political campaigning are largely barred by new repressive legislation. NGO's which have links to the MDC or provide the documentation of GOZ human rights abuses are increasingly under siege. Independent media are also under siege by the state with editors and journalists being prosecuted on multiple charges of violating repressive new media legislation, which also increases government controls over all journalists -- foreign or domestic. The message from Government and ZANU leaders and from all-pervasive state media is that support for the opposition, and even failure to support the Government is illegitimate and will be punished by either withdrawal of state benefits or more direct measures. 3. (C) While Government leaders remain triumphalist in public, some Party and Government heavies are beginning to acknowledge privately the depth of the crisis they face and their inability to resolve it themselves. While this is progress, it comes late and is thus far inadequate to reflect a serious opportunity for engagement. For instance, the GOZ recently wrote the UN ResRep to suggest cooperation to assist displaced commercial farm workers, compensate displaced commercial farmers and provide agricultural assistance for new farmers. Putative GOZ concern for displaced commercial farm workers and farmers is both hypocritical and transparent, but the appeal for agricultural assistance to new farmers recognizes that the GOZ does not have the means to support these new farmers to make the land resettlement exercise a success. The UN will not take up this half-hearted GOZ appeal but will continue to test when the Government might be more sincere in its approaches. The GOZ, which for some four months after the election appeared to glory in its isolation and defiance of international opinion, has been of late on a largely unsuccessful charm offensive to show off its successes and to reopen channels of communication. For instance, ZANU-PF recently reached out through intermediaries to the Australian Government and the Commonwealth; the GOZ welcomed South African re-engagement on Zimbabwe perhaps through a November bilateral commission (although it is unclear whether the GOZ will be any more flexible than it has in the past) and the SADC Committee for Zimbabwe is sue to visit in the coming months. 4. (C) Some influential members of the ruling party politburo acknowledge privately that President Mugabe is a liability and have quietly discussed a post-Mugabe era, but no one seems willing to press the President too hard on his retirement plans. Moreover, these discussions are mostly focused on how to ensure ZANU-PF's hold on power rather than on working with the MDC to extricate Zimbabwe from its current predicament. Some high-ranking GOZ officials have also reached out to us, directly and indirectly. We have stressed to them the depth of the crises facing the country, the need to address the political crisis in order to resolve the country's other problems and the need to find solutions together with other Zimbabweans rather than expect that a separate deal is possible with the US or other countries. 5. (C) Comment: While it is encouraging that more GOZ and ZANU officials have begun to recognize the depth of the problems, we have not yet seen signals that they are prepared to change their political approach of crushing the opposition and ruling through whatever violent or repressive means are necessary with increasing reliance on the security forces. Nonetheless, the depth of the country's problems will make this a calculation to be tested regularly in the months ahead. As repression intensifies and the economy contracts, prospects for civil unrest increase. Most Zimbabweans seem more concerned, however, with keeping their heads down and making ends meet. Ultimately, any sustainable solution to this country's political crisis and the economic, social and humanitarian crises it has spawned, must address the question of the Government's legitimacy and ensure respect for genuine political competition. , . SULLIVAN
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