US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2599

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 002599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PTER, SOCI, SCUL, KISL, NL, KPAO 
SUBJECT: THE DUTCH MUSLIM COMMUNITY:  A PRIMER 
 
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE HANDLE 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Muslim community in the Netherlands 
is the second largest in Europe as a percentage of total 
population (5.8 percent).  It is also one of the least-well 
integrated and most alienated, and according to polls looks 
less favorably on the United States than Muslim communities 
elsewhere in Europe.  Muslims in the Netherlands are 
significantly poorer, less educated and more prone to arrest 
than native Dutch.  Their status has become the country's 
most salient political issue and will be a key factor in 
upcoming local and national elections.  This cable examines 
the Muslim community, discusses tensions between it and 
traditional Dutch society, and assesses some of the social 
and political consequences arising there from.  END SUMMARY. 
 
I. THE COMMUNITY 
---------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Muslim community in the Netherlands numbers 
approximately 945,000.  According to official GONL 
statistics, the majority are relatively recent immigrant 
"guest workers" and their descendants from Turkey (365,000) 
and Morocco (315,000). Other Muslim communities include 
Iranians (29,000), Iraqis (44,000) and Somalis (22,000). 
Unlike Turkish and Moroccan guest workers, most from these 
smaller communities came to Holland seeking political 
asylum. 
 
RAPID GROWTH 
------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Between 1970 and 1995, the number of Muslims living 
in the Netherlands rose from a few thousand to 630,000, or 
4.1 percent of the population.  Most were poor, often from 
rural areas of Turkey and Morocco.  Chosen to work in 
factory jobs, they tended to be uneducated and often 
illiterate.  Unlike many Muslim immigrants in Britain and 
France, those who came to the Netherlands had no colonial 
connection or historic ties to their new homes, and did not 
speak the language.  Assuming most would return to their 
country of origin, the Dutch made few attempts to 
incorporate them into society. 
 
4. (SBU) Between 1995 and 2004, the number of Muslims rose 
to 945,000, or 5.8 percent of the population.  Although 
fewer are immigrating for economic reasons today, the Muslim 
population continues to rise, largely because of high 
birthrates and the practice of Turkish and Moroccan 
immigrants marrying partners from their countries of origin. 
According to a September 20, 2005 report on integration in 
the Netherlands compiled by the Dutch government, almost 90 
percent of Turks and Moroccans marry spouses from their own 
communities; of those, 60 percent bring partners from their 
home countries. 
 
5. (SBU) The Dutch define "immigrants" -- in Dutch, 
"allochtonen" -- to include actual immigrants and second- 
generation descendants.  Immigrants currently comprise 
roughly 16 percent of the population; 5.8 percent of the 
population is Muslim. 
 
URBAN CONCENTRATION 
------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The largest concentrations of Muslims live in poor, 
segregated neighborhoods in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague 
and Utrecht.  A recent study characterized these 
neighborhoods as deteriorating, with rampant social 
problems.  According to the Amsterdam City Council only 51 
percent of those living in Amsterdam are "native" Dutch, 
compared to 55 percent five years ago. 
 
7. (SBU) The trend is similar in other big cities.  The 
population of Rotterdam is 621,000, of which 189,000 or 30 
percent are considered minorities.  The Hague's population 
is 469,000, of which 35 percent or 166,000 are minority. 
Utrecht's total population is 275,000, 24 percent of which 
are minority residents. The fact that Muslim minority 
populations are concentrated in cities has exacerbated 
tensions with native Dutch in these communities.  What the 
Dutch term "white flight" is a disturbing trend in major 
cities. 
 
II. SOCIAL/POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The Islamic community is served by an extensive 
network of mosques and cultural centers, the majority of 
which accommodate Turkish and Moroccan communities.  Of the 
country's 400 mosques, more than 200 serve Turks, some 140 
serve Moroccans, and roughly 50 serve Surinamese.  Mosques 
and cultural centers fall under a national system of 
subsidies that underwrites cultural activities, so nearly 
all receive government funds.  There is significant foreign 
influence: almost all imams are foreign-born and many 
mosques receive funds from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 
 
9. (SBU) Most mosques are not controversial, but there are 
exceptions.  Dutch security services have at least five 
under intense surveillance, including Al Fourqaan in 
Eindhoven, As-Soennah in The Hague and Al Tawheed in 
Amsterdam.  The government has recently taken contentious 
steps to limit the influence of such mosques, including 
proposing that foreign imams be barred from preaching. 
Last summer Immigration and Integration Minister Rita 
Verdonk declared three imams in Eindhoven personae non grata 
for allegedly recruiting members for extremist groups.  The 
three have been ordered to leave the country.  One has done 
so; the other two are appealing in court. 
10. (SBU) Despite pressure from right-wing politicians, the 
government has refrained from closing "radical" mosques. 
Many believe such a step would be perceived as a serious 
violation of Dutch religious tolerance.  Also, during a 
recent meeting with emboffs, National Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator Tjibbe Joustra said there is a debate on the 
wisdom of expelling radical imams because doing so might 
increase alienation and radicalization. 
 
ISLAMIC SCHOOLS 
--------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Under the Dutch education system, Muslim schools 
are eligible for government funding, as are Catholic and 
Protestant schools.  Holland has 47 Islamic schools, 
including two secondary schools, and there are applications 
to open at least six more.  The mainstream press regularly 
publishes sensationalist articles that such schools blacken 
their windows during Christmas, expunge references to the 
Holocaust from their texts, and so forth.  A representative 
of the Islamic Schools Administrative Organization recently 
asserted that Muslims are demanding Islamic schools because 
of growing prejudice against the community, which "feels 
that it is put offside in Dutch Society and associates less 
and less with available institutions."  Similarly, the 
Turkish Embassy reports an increase in the number of Turkish 
teenagers returning to Turkey for school to escape what they 
view as growing anti-Muslim prejudice. 
 
12. (SBU) Although many observers have expressed concern 
that Islamic schools perpetuate segregation and alienation, 
major political parties here are reluctant to cut funding 
since doing so would threaten funding for all religiously- 
affiliated institutions-- a mainstay of Dutch society. 
Instead, schools with a high-percentage of non-native Dutch 
students receive supplemental subsidies to help students 
learn Dutch and to create a "safe" environment.  Islamic 
schools must meet the same curriculum criteria as any state- 
funded school. Dutch classes are mandatory. 
 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
------------------------ 
 
13. (SBU) There is no effective political representation of 
the Dutch Muslim community on the national level.  While 
nine of the Second Chamber's 150 members are Muslim, none 
speaks for a broader Muslim constituency, and none has 
sought to play such a role.  In part, this reflects the 
Dutch political system, which discourages constituency-based 
politics in favor of disciplined national parties.  Party 
leaders usually select parliamentary candidates for their 
perceived electability and standing within the party, and 
frown on members developing separate ethnic or regional 
followings. 
 
14. (SBU) On the local level, the situation is even more 
striking.  In the three large cities where Muslims are most 
heavily concentrated, they are severely underrepresented. 
Amsterdam has one Muslim alderman; The Hague and Rotterdam 
have none.  (The Amsterdam alderman - Ahmed Aboutaleb - is 
the most popular politician among Dutch Muslims, according 
to a recent survey).  Mayors and other senior officials in 
all three cities are non-Muslim.  Despite large numbers of 
potential voters in these cities, voter turnout among 
Muslims is low. 
 
15. (SBU) Groups within the Netherlands have periodically 
floated the idea of starting a Dutch Islamic party.  In a 
recent poll of 500 Muslims, almost half believed an Islamic 
political party was desirable, but most also said it would 
be difficult for such a party to bridge the gap between 
Holland's disparate Muslim communities.  The Contact Body 
for Muslims and Government is not a political party but as 
an advisory body to the government, claims to represent 80 
percent of the Muslim community.  It acts as a sort of 
public mouthpiece for the various Muslim communities and 
dialogues with the national government on social and 
political issues.  The Dutch government does not keep 
records on the voting patterns of individual ethnic or 
religious groups in the Netherlands, so it is difficult to 
say which of the mainstream parties is most popular among 
the Muslim community. 
 
III. SOCIAL FRICTIONS 
--------------------- 
 
16. (SBU) Since the fall of 2001 and especially since the 
November 2004 killing of Theo van Gogh, resentment of 
Muslims and Islamic culture is increasingly apparent.  The 
Dutch public is moving toward the political right in their 
response to Muslim issues, and their leaders are following 
suit. Populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered in 
2002, received broad support for his characterization of 
Islam as "a backward culture."  Other politicians such as 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders regularly issue 
provocative statements about Islam that stir outrage among 
Muslims and pander to the prejudices of non-Muslims.  While 
mainstream political leaders continue to preach integration 
rather than separation, nearly all have made tougher 
integration policies and cracking down on religious 
extremism part of their platform going into the next 
elections. 
 
17. (SBU) The two main pollsters in the Netherlands recently 
wrote that "fear of Islam and irritation about insufficient 
integration of immigrants play a dominant brain position in 
the heads of native Dutch.  Whether we surveyed national 
security issues, religious statements or political 
preference, it appears again and again that negative 
sentiment towards immigrants and Muslims have the upper 
hand, and significantly influence behavior and opinion." 
 
18. (SBU) In January 2005 two-thirds of native Dutch polled 
said they feared a terrorist attack by Muslim 
fundamentalists.  Asked about Muslims in general, roughly 
one-third expressed negative opinions.  Four in ten object 
to Muslims bringing spouses from their home countries, 
arguing that such immigration hampers the integration of 
Muslims in the Netherlands. 
 
SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATION 
------------------------------ 
 
19. (SBU) For its part, the Muslim community convincingly 
argues that ingrained segregation and discrimination are 
facts of life in the Netherlands.  In a June 2005 report 
entitled "Staying from Each Other's Turf" the Dutch 
government's Social and Cultural Planning Bureau found that 
two-thirds of native Dutch have no contact with migrants 
outside work -- either because they do not live in their 
neighborhoods or because they deliberately avoid contact 
with them. 
 
20. (SBU) Seventy percent of Turks, 60 percent of Moroccans, 
and 50 percent of Somalis have limited their social contacts 
to their own communities.  The government planning bureau 
called it "worrisome" that Turks and Moroccans are 
increasingly withdrawing into their own communities and have 
less and less contact with "white" Dutch.  The lack of 
contact between communities in turn reduces incentives for 
immigrants to learn Dutch and limits their ability to find 
jobs.  Feelings of resentment are not exclusive among the 
lower and uneducated ethnic population, polls show that 
those with higher incomes and better educations who do come 
into regular contact with "white" Dutch also tend to have 
the most negative opinion of Dutch society, as they are more 
likely to experience direct discrimination on a regular 
basis both in the workplace and socially (e.g., at bars and 
clubs.) 
 
21. (SBU) The education level of non-Western immigrants lags 
significantly behind native Dutch, even though it has risen 
noticeably in the past 15 years.  In 2003, 15 percent of the 
non-western immigrants had completed higher education 
(including both college and university), compared to 25 
percent of native Dutch.  Participation of non-western 
immigrant women is higher education rose more rapidly than 
men.  Of the non-Western immigrants more than 25 percent 
completed only elementary school. 
 
22. (SBU) A recent study found that among equally qualified 
native Dutch and Moroccan students from mid-level vocational 
training colleges, Moroccan students are 30 percent less 
likely to be invited for apprentice interviews than native 
Dutch students. 
 
IV. SOCIAL/POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
--------------------------------- 
 
23. (SBU) Social statistics paint a grim picture: sixteen 
percent of the minority population is unemployed compared to 
6 percent of the majority population; 25 percent receive 
welfare benefits versus 13 percent of the majority 
population and 29 percent live in poverty compared to 8 
percent of native Dutch. 
 
24. (SBU) Dutch society is only now coming to terms with the 
fact that many of the nearly one million Muslims in the 
Netherlands have poorly integrated.  Even before the van 
Gogh murder, many Dutch privately expressed frustration that 
large segments of the Muslim and especially the Moroccan 
community have been less successful at integrating into 
Dutch society than previous immigrant groups.  This 
perception is supported by statistics; a recent INR poll, 
for example, found that nearly 80 percent of Dutch Muslims 
identified with their religion or ethnicity far more then 
the Netherlands -- the highest percentage in Europe.  Ethnic 
minorities are also severely over represented in the crime 
figures.  Younger members of first-generation non-Western 
ethnic minorities accounted for 35 percent of the prison 
population in 2004.  Not only does the lack of integration 
lead to more criminal activity, it also helps perpetuate 
stark social divides on issues such as the role of women, 
homosexual rights, and corporal punishment. 
 
25. (SBU) Polls reveal that half of the native Dutch 
population and half of the Turks and Moroccans believe that 
a Western lifestyle is incompatible with a Muslim lifestyle. 
Native Dutch are primarily concerned about the position of 
Muslim women, who they believe enjoy too few freedoms. 
Turks and Moroccans are mainly bothered by the perceived 
lack of respect for their cultures by native Dutch. 
 
26. (SBU) There is growing support within the non-Muslim 
community that integration should be mandatory rather than 
voluntary.  In this spirit, the Dutch are taking a number of 
steps to force Muslims to integrate, including obligatory 
language and integration courses for new immigrants. 
Despite the fact that 90 percent of new immigrants complete 
these courses, only 40 percent achieve sufficient language 
level to find employment. 
 
27. (SBU) The government has also tightened immigration 
requirements to limit the prevailing practice of Muslims 
bringing over partners from their home country.  Labor and 
management organizations have also been brought into the 
discussion to improve the position of minorities on the 
labor market and enhance employment opportunities. 
 
POLITICAL OUTLOOK: 
----------------- 
 
28. (SBU) All major parties recognize that "integration" 
will be a major issue in the March 2006 local elections and 
the May 2007 national vote.  The government's approach to 
integration -- which balances outreach to the Muslim 
community with tougher immigration and anti-terrorism 
legislation -- enjoys wide-spread support in parliament, but 
has failed to resonate with the public at large.  While it 
is still early, there are indications that popular pressures 
may drive most parties to the right on Muslim-related issues 
during the election campaigns. 
 
29. (SBU) Some politicians, such as Geert Wilders, advocate 
significantly stronger measures, including a temporary ban 
on immigration, deprivation of Dutch citizenship and 
expulsion of immigrants who commit serious crimes or fail to 
pass an integration exam.  Less drastic, but also 
controversial, is the proposal by Labor party opposition 
leader Wouter Bos to link access to social benefits and 
government services for immigrants to progress made 
integrating into Dutch society; eligibility for such 
benefits would be phased-in gradually rather than provided 
on arrival as is currently the case. 
 
30.  (SBU) Toughening social and political attitudes towards 
Muslims have not gone unnoticed by the Muslim community. 
Approximately 3000 Dutch Turks returned to Turkey last year, 
many claiming that they felt they no longer had a future in 
Holland (although improving economic prospects in Turkey no 
doubt also played a role.)  This fall a more boisterous 
opposition came in the form of 6,000 protestors from Muslim 
organizations proclaiming, "Enough is enough" through the 
streets of Amsterdam.  In the long term Moroccans and Turks 
may successfully integrate into Dutch society like the 
Surinamese and Indonesians before them, but in the near term 
feelings of alienation and mistrust continue to deepen and 
fester. 
Blakeman