US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1584

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PREL, KPKO, CG, UG 
SUBJECT: LRA UPDATE: KABILA PERSONALLY ENGAGED, URGANDAN 
TROOPS IN DRC? 
 
REF: A. (A) KINSHASA 1579 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. (B) KAMPALA 2067 
     C. (C) STATE 177083 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C)  During a rancorous seven-hour meeting September 26 of 
the Supreme Defense Council (chaired by President Kabila and 
composed of senior government officials responsible for 
security issues), the normally soft-spoken Kabila 
uncharacteristically took Army Chief of Staff Kisempia and 
Air Force Commander Numbi to public task.  Minister of 
Interior Mbemba told PolCouns that Kabila ordered Kisempia to 
ensure that the LRA elements are promptly disarmed and 
"neutralized," using any and all measures necessary, 
including force.  Likewise, Kabila demanded to know why the 
500 commandos destined for Aba were still in Kinshasa, and 
asked Kisempia why the First Integrated Brigade had not 
completed its mobilization for movement to Aba.  Kabila 
ordered Numbi to ensure that the troops from Kinshasa were 
dispatched the morning of September 27, using whatever means 
necessary.  Numbi told PolCouns September 26 that the troops 
will fly from Kinshasa to Kisangani September 27.  He then 
envisions moving them on directly to Aba either via FARDC 
Antonovs (if they are able to land on the grass strip at 
Aba), or via MONUC helicopter from Aru (which will require 
multiple trips). Other key members of the Supreme Defense 
Council, notably including Vice Presidents Ruberwa and Bemba, 
also reportedly insisted on rapid resolution of the LRA 
situation through repatriation or at least disarmament. 
 
2. (C)  MONUC is trying to check reports that some or all of 
the approximately 3,000 Ugandan troops who had been stationed 
at the DRC-Uganda border entered the DRC early morning of 
September 27.  The MONUC Kampala office believes this to be 
the case.  MONUC Kinshasa, through the MONUC divisional 
headquarters at Kisangani, is trying to send a helicopter air 
mission to confirm or disprove these reports.  MONUC has left 
one DDRRR person in Aba, and one UNHCR person also remained, 
but the rest of the September 25 mission, including General 
Padiri, have returned to Aru.  (Note:  Padiri may be en route 
to Kisangani, his headquarters.  End Note.)  There was no 
progress with the negotiations on September 26, as the LRA 
leaders in Aba continued to insist that they were awaiting 
instructions from Kony. 
 
3. (C)  Presidential Private Secretary Kikaya spoke to 
PolCouns (septel) before departing on a visit to Zimbabwe, 
South Africa and Ethiopia to brief these countries on the 
current situation with the LRA in the DRC.  He told PolCouns 
that President Kabila is ordering his diplomatic advisor (who 
apparently is still in New York) to prepare a diplomatic note 
to President Museveni, welcoming Museveni's proposed visit 
sometime before December -- but not this week. 
 
Comment: 
 
4. (C) All indications here are that President Kabila and the 
two most important Vice Presidents, Bemba and Ruberwa, are 
seized with the importance of the LRA problem and want to see 
it resolved.  It is also clear from the reports of 
yesterday's difficult meeting that there is a good deal of 
frustration with the slow and thus far ineffective response 
of the Congolese military.  The FARDC, hobbled by its 
long-standing pay, support and general logistics issues, is 
hard-pressed to react in an effective military fashion to 
problems under the best of circumstances.  Aba, remote and 
relatively inaccessible, represents a locale far from the 
best of circumstances.  Nonetheless, in this case there is a 
reasonably consistent message apparently coming from the 
major centers of power within the GDRC Transition government, 
a rare circumstance, and thus broad and high-level pressure 
on the senior FARDC officers to act.  Sixth Military District 
Commander General Padiri played his initial role, but FARDC 
troops are needed on the ground to move things forward. 
 
5. (C) Comment, cont.  There is little reliable information 
out of Aba at this point, and little access other than via 
Sudan, but we are somewhat skeptical of the reports of an 
UPDF incursion into the DRC already.  Nonetheless, the 
prospects for UPDF or SPLA or other foreign action directed 
against the LRA in Aba is an obvious concern and we should 
remind both of the need for restraint. 
MEECE