US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI7505

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 007505 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, KDEM, IN, NP, PK, CH, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: NEPALESE MAOISTS STILL TOP CONCERN FOR GOI 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 6411 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The GOI still sees the Maoists as its chief 
concern in the ongoing crisis in Nepal, MEA told us on 
September 27.  However, the GOI believes the cease-fire could 
be a sign of progress toward an ultimate political solution, 
if the Maoists prove sincere in their professed commitment to 
democracy.  New Delhi assesses that the military balance 
between the RNA and Maoists remains the same since the 
February takeover thanks to the RNA's procurement of 
ammunition from Pakistan and China.  The MEA expressed 
concern that meetings between the Maoists and UN officials 
could lend the insurgents undue international legitimacy. 
End Summary. 
 
Maoists Still the Problem, but Some Hope? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) MEA Joint Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae told PolCouns 
and Poloff on September 27 that the GOI recognizes the risk 
of legitimizing the Nepalese Maoists through contacts and 
efforts to include them in settlement discussions.  India and 
the US are "equally concerned" about the Maoists, Rae said, 
but we must recognize that the insurgents must be included in 
a political settlement.  The "number one problem" in Nepal is 
the Maoist threat, Rae observed, but the King has 
superimposed on top of this the challenge of restoring 
democracy.  India is looking for a solution that will solve 
both problems, which will require the participation of all 
parties. 
 
3.  (C) New Delhi has consistently passed the message that 
the Maoists cannot win militarily, Rae added, and that the 
only way for them to achieve progress on their social and 
economic agenda is to give up violence and accept democracy. 
India uses its leverage over the Maoists in the form of 
leaders in custody and border district enforcement actions to 
apply a "carrots and stick" approach, and could crack down 
further if the Maoists do not give up violence. 
Additionally, Rae said, the GOI emphasizes to the Nepalese 
political parties that they must insist that the Maoists join 
the parties' agenda for democracy, and not the other way. 
 
4.  (C) The Maoist cease-fire should be seen as an outgrowth 
of the parties' efforts to talk with the Maoists, Rae 
suggested.  While it is too early to tell if Maoist 
statements accepting democratic government are genuine, the 
way things are developing is "not unsatisfactory" at this 
point.  If the parties can rally enough popular support to 
set the agenda in discussions with the Maoists, the King may 
see the writing on the wall and realize he must accommodate 
democracy, Rae speculated.  On the other hand, he added, New 
Delhi worries that the King may have taken the wrong message 
from his "walk about" in Kathmandu, concluding that he has 
sufficient popular backing to take more "adventurous" steps 
to crack down on political parties. 
 
RNA-Maoist Balance 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C) The security balance between the Maoists and the RNA 
looks "pretty much the same" to New Delhi since the royal 
takeover, Rae reported.  Earlier concerns about RNA 
ammunition shortfalls appear to have eased since Nepal has 
been able to procure ammunition from Chinese and Pakistani 
sources.  Although the RNA seems to be in a financial crunch, 
Rae said, it is attempting to purchase Mi-17 helicopters from 
a Kazakh company in what appears to be a murky financial deal 
involving a Kazakh business entity with investments in a 
telecom venture run by the King's family members.  Following 
the meeting, Under Secretary (Nepal) Manu Mahawar requested 
that the USG look into another reported line of credit 
offered to a Pakistani company to provide additional 5.56 mm 
ammunition for the Indian-made INSAS rifles.  PolCouns took 
note of the issue and asked if this was in addition to 
previous lines of credit (reftel).  Mahawar undertook to 
provide further details. 
 
6.  (C) PolCouns drew attention to continued speculation 
about a meeting between UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and the 
Maoists, asking for India's take on the UN role.  Rae 
acknowledged that Brahimi and the Maoists had been in contact 
via e-mail, but indicated he was out of the loop on any 
further contacts.  He expressed concern that the Maoists 
could exploit these UN feelers to project an undue impression 
of international legitimacy. 
 
Comment: Maoists Still Top Worry 
-------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) In light of continued speculation about Indian 
agencies' contacts with the Maoists, Rae's assertion that New 
Delhi still sees the threat of Maoist domination as its top 
concern is reassuring.  That said, no new ideas other than 
wishing and hoping that King will climb back from his limb 
emerged from our conversation. 
 
8.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE