US embassy cable - 90RIYADH10007

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 10007 
 
 
S/CT FOR BREELAND 
 
E.O. 12356:  N/A 
TAGS:  PTER, KPRP, SA 
SUBJECT:  SAUDI ARABIA: 1990 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF:  STATE 355397 
 
1.  THERE FOLLOWS DRAFT VERSION OF SAUDI ARABIAN 
COMPONENT OF THE 1990 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM, KEYED TO REFTEL. 
 
2.  A) DESCRIBE ANY HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS 
INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS 
OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM: 
 
-     THERE WERE NO GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS FOR TERRORISM 
OR TERRORIST-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 1990. 
 
-     B) DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE 
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION? 
 
-     AS THE RESULT OF THE ASSASSINATION OF THREE SAUDI 
DIPLOMATS IN BANGKOK ON FEBRUARY 1, THE THAI GOVERNMENT 
LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION WHICH RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF 
A NUMBER OF THAI SUBJECTS.  SAUDI AUTHORITIES PUBLICLY 
INDICATED A DESIRE TO QUESTION THE SUSPECTS THEMSELVES 
WHEN THE THAI GOVERNMENT COMPLETED ITS INVESTIGATION, 
BUT DID NOT FILE A FORMAL EXTRADITION REQUEST. 
 
-     C) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST 
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS: 
 
-     THERE ARE NO DOMESTIC IMPEDIMENTS TO SAUDI 
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS.  THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE 
WITH THE SLOW PACE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS NOTED UNDER 
ITEM B, BUT THAI OFFICIALS STATED THAT THIS WAS DUE TO 
PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISCARRIAGE OF 
JUSTICE.  THAI MUSLIM POLITICIANS ALSO CHARGED THE 
GOVERNMENT WITH PERSECUTING THAILAND'S SHIA COMMUNITY, TO 
WHICH ALL OF THE DETAINED SUSPECTS WERE SAID TO BELONG, 
AND SAID THEY WOULD OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO EXTRADITE THE 
SUSPECTS TO SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
-     D) DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN 
PROSECUTION.  THIS WOULD INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, 
PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL 
NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT AND EFFORTS 
BY HOST GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR 
TO ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS: 
 
-     SAUDI OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO SPEAK OUT STRONGLY 
AGAINST TERRORISM AT EVERY APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY. 
IN ADDITION TO STRONG STATEMENTS CONDEMNING SEVERAL 
TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST SAUDIS ABROAD (SEE SECTION G), 
THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PUBLISHED A REBUTTAL IN APRIL 
TO IRANIAN ACCUSATIONS AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING IN 
IT A LIST OF IRAN'S MISDEEDS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS 
AND SPECIFICALLY PINNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 1989 
MECCA BOMBINGS ON THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.  THE SAUDI 
GOVERNMENT COOPERATED FULLY IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
MURDERS IN THAILAND, INCLUDING SENDING A SAUDI 
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM TO BANGKOK AND ALLOWING THAI 
INVESTIGATORS TO COME TO SAUDI ARABIA IN ORDER TO 
INTERVIEW FAMILIES AND COLLEAGUES OF THE SLAIN DIPLOMATS. 
 
-     E) DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
UNDERTAKEN IN 1990 BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING 
STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA: 
 
-     SAUDI SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED THEIR PREVIOUS 
LEVEL OF COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND 
WITH U.S. SECURITY AGENCIES IN 1990 ON INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS.  INTENSIVE, BUT LARGELY 
UNOBTRUSIVE, SECURITY PRECAUTIONS RESULTED IN THE HAJJ 
PASSING WITHOUT INCIDENT.  THE ONSET OF THE GULF CRISIS 
IN AUGUST LED TO INTENSIFIED INTERNAL SECURITY, IN WHICH 
SAUDI SECURITY PERSONNEL COOPERATED FULLY ON TACTICAL 
MILITARY MATTERS WITH U.S. MILITARY SECURITY AGENCIES. 
IN ADDITION, STARTING IN MARCH, THE SAUDIS TOOK STEPS TO 
TIGHTEN INTERNAL SECURITY BY IMPLEMENTING A PLAN TO 
IDENTIFY ILLEGAL RESIDENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND EITHER 
REGULARIZE THEIR STATUS OR DEPORT THEM.  DUE TO THE GULF 
CRISIS, THIS PROGRAM WAS ACCELERATED, TOGETHER WITH A 
REVOCATION OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGES HERETOFORE GRANTED TO 
YEMENI RESIDENTS IN THE COUNTRY; AS A RESULT, YEMENIS 
EITHER HAD TO OBTAIN A SAUDI SPONSOR, AS ALL OTHER 
NATIONALITIES HAD PREVIOUSLY DONE, OR EXIT THE COUNTRY. 
SAUDI AND KUWAITI SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS WORKED TOGETHER 
CLOSELY IN SCREENING REFUGEES FROM KUWAIT FOR POSSIBLE 
TERRORISTS TRYING TO ENTER THE COUNTRY IN DISGUISE. 
 
-     F) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
FOR TERRORISM, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL 
AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT 
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC 
POUCH AND OTHER PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; 
SANCTUARY EXTENDED TO TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS 
AND/OR THE PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF SUCH GROUPS; HOST 
GOVERNMENT TRAINING OR THE PROVISION OF TRAINING SITES TO 
TERRORIST GROUPS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON TERRORISM ISSUES 
IN INTERNATIONAL FORA: 
 
-     THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE POLITICAL OR 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND HAS 
REPEATEDLY SPOKEN AND VOTED AGAINST TERRORIST ACTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL FORA.  SAUDI ARABIA MAKES A CAREFUL 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND SUPPORT FOR 
THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A LEGITIMATE 
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.  SAUDI ARABIA RECOGNIZES 
THE PALESTINIAN "STATE" AS A GOVERNMENT, AND SUPPORTS THE 
INTIFADA BOTH POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY.  IN 1990 IT 
CONTINUED TO BE ONE OF THE PLO'S LEADING DONORS. 
HOWEVER, IRRITATION OVER THE CURRENT PLO LEADERSHIP'S 
SUPPORT OF IRAQ DURING THE GULF CRISIS APPEARS TO HAVE 
ENDED SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THAT ORGANIZATION FOR THE 
PRESENT.  THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT DECRIES ACTS OF TERRORISM 
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN THE NAME OF THE PALESTINIAN 
CAUSE.  SAUDI ARABIA IS NOT A KNOWN SANCTUARY FOR 
TERRORISTS, NOR DOES IT MISUSE DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO 
SUPPORT TERRORIST GROUPS. 
 
-     G.  HAS THE HOST COUNTRY MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS 
IN FAVOR OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY (CUBA, IRAN, 
IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA AND SYRIA) ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? 
 
-     NO.  IN FACT, SAUDI AUTHORITIES REPEATEDLY 
CONDEMNED TERRORISM, BOTH IN THE CASE OF THE KILLINGS OF 
SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND IN GENERAL TERMS, AT INTERVALS 
THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. 
 
-     H. DECRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1989, 
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST COUNTRY'S ATTITUDE 
TOWARDS TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC.  WHAT IS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? 
 
-     THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SAUDI 
ARABIA'S ATTITUDE REGARDING DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM SINCE 1989.  SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE NEVER 
SUPPORTED TERRORISM BY EXTREME PALESTINIAN FACTIONS (AS 
OPPOSED TO THE INTIFADA, WHICH THEY CONSIDER A LEGITIMATE 
EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND MEANS 
OF PROVIDING PALESTINIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION), AND 
TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST PERSONS AND PROPERTY CONTINUE TO 
BE CAPITAL CRIMES UNDER SAUDI LAW.  MOREOVER, SAUDI 
ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND 
ITS CONSTITUENT GROUPS DIMINISHED MARKEDLY AS A RESULT OF 
THE CURRENT PLO LEADERSHIP'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S INVASION 
OF KUWAIT.  OFFICIAL CONCERN ABOUT ATTACKS ON SAUDI 
OFFICIALS AND PROPERTY OVERSEAS CONTINUED TO DEEPEN IN 
1989-90 AS THE RESULT OF THE THAILAND KILLINGS, THE 
MURDER OF A SAUDI DIPLOMAT IN BEIRUT (OCTOBER 1989), 
BOMBINGS OF SAUDI OFFICIAL CARS IN ANKARA (IN OCTOBER 
1989 AND JANUARY 1990), ONE OF WHICH RESULTED IN THE 
MAIMING OF A SAUDI DIPLOMAT, AND THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING 
(AS PART OF AN EXTORTION ATTEMPT) OF A SAUDI AIRLINES 
FLIGHT FROM ISLAMABAD IN NOVEMBER 1989. 
 
FREEMAN