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| Identifier: | 05NAIROBI4002 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NAIROBI4002 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Nairobi |
| Created: | 2005-09-26 13:53:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL MASS PTER MARR MOPS PGOV KE |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004002 SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2025 TAGS: PREL, MASS, PTER, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, KE SUBJECT: UK FRUSTRATIONS WITH CT COOPERATION IN KENYA Classified By: Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: British counterparts told Poloffs September 19 they are focusing their counter-terrorism (CT) efforts in Kenya on border and aviation security and have money to spend in both arenas. They are, however, frustrated with the Kenyan government,s lackluster CT performance and also continue to be hindered by their currently tenuous bilateral relations. The British are experiencing the same frustrations as the USG in gaining traction with the Kenyan police, but they are making headway with the Administrative Police on some of their border security proposals. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- ----------- British Continue to Focus on Police, Despite Difficulties --------------------------------------------- ----------- 2. (C) British Regional Advisory for Counter-Terrorism, Colonel Rob Andrew briefed Pol/C and Poloff September 19 on his government,s CT efforts in Kenya. Andrew began by expressing his frustrations working with the Kenyan Police Service (KPS). The British High Commission,s police advisor, who intended to work with the U.S.-sponsored Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), was sent back to the U.K. because the JTTF failed to stand up as planned. However, Andrew has had more success working with individual units within KPS, particularly the Anti Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and with the separate Administrative Police (AP). The British plan to work closely with both ATPU and AP to help create a border security management strategy. In preparation for such a strategy, Colonel Andrew has been spending weeks traveling Kenya's remote border regions; he plans to soon drive the desert tracks which run the length of the entire Somali border along with AP and possibly some Kenyan military officials. If so, this would be the first time to our knowledge that anyone -- including the government -- has done so in many years. 3. (C) The British have funding for some capacity training and a MANPAD training class for the AP and the Kenyan military. Additionally, they have 70,000 Pounds to equip the AP with radios and 30 thousand Pounds for training with the equipment. (COMMENT: Before FMF was frozen due to Kenya,s signing of the Rome Convention without a bilateral Article 98 agreement, KUSLO planned to equip the Kenyan military with radios. If FMF returns or other funding is found, this is an area where our two countries can work together to increase Kenya,s capacity to monitor their borders and respond to threats and/or disasters. END COMMENT). --------------------------------------------- ---- British Relationship with Kenyan Military Tenuous --------------------------------------------- ---- 4. (C) Kenyan media recently reported the GOK is delaying renewing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allowing British soldiers to train in Kenya. One article claimed British troops departed Kenya after being denied access to their training facility. . British Head of Policy Delivery, Alex Budden, countered media reports, explaining training is still ongoing, although the soldiers have been somewhat restricted to certain areas. The MOU, in fact, is renegotiated every three years. Currently, it is in an extension period until November, and it could be extended for another three months. Budden said the new Kenyan military leadership is on board with extending an MOU, and they are still working out the details. He speculated that the news reports were planted by ministers opposed to the UK -- such as former National Security Minister Chris Murungaru (who not only was stripped in August of his US visa, but who through his corrupt dealings now owns significant landholdings near some of the British training areas.) The British recognize the need to provide Kenya with some benefit in exchange for training their soldiers here, and are considering ways to make the relationship more constructive. Budden and Andrew both note the renewal is typically a "down-to-the-wire" matter, with high-level officials flying in from the UK to seal the deal. That, plus the inevitable dickering over terms and amounts of recompense, is why the UK now hopes to seal a five-year renewal instead of just three. 5. (C) COMMENT: The British CT engagement strategy meshes well with USG plans. In addition to taking the lead on aviation security in Kenya (British Airways has 10 flights out of Nairobi weekly), the British can provide necessary border security training and equipment that compliments our maritime and other border security programs. Although spikes in British relations with Kenya continue, they have relations with some aspects of the police and military that will allow them to move forward with their security and CT plans. Post will continue to coordinate CT efforts with British counterparts to ensure cohesiveness without duplication. END COMMENT. BELLAMY
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